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INTRODUCTION

Fashioning a law of preclusion that sensitively accommodates
individual and institutional interests as well as the policies and structure of the substantive law is a difficult enterprise even in a wholly
domestic context. The enterprise is considerably more difficult in
an interjurisdictional context. The full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution and its implementing statute' have simplified the task
in interjurisdictional cases involving state judgments, or so it has
seemed. Thus, in the state-state configuration, the answers to most
questions have, for many years, appeared clear. As a result, recognition of judgments was the least important-and perhaps the most
welcome-part of a course in conflict of laws, one that could as well
2
have been entitled workers' compensation.
The answers have always been considerably less clear in cases
involving mixed state and federal configurations, but the questions
were neglected. In recent years, however, interest in this branch of
interjurisdictional preclusion has led to progress in solving some of
its mysteries. Much of the credit belongs to Professor Ronan
1 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, quoted infra note 8; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), quoted
infra note 6; infra text accompanying notes 21-25.
2 See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Industrial
Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S.
430 (1943).
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Degnan. By focusing attention on sources of law and demonstrating
how federal law may bear on the issues, his 1976 article 3 dispersed
fog that, in this area as in others involving the relationship between4
federal and state law, rolled in after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.
Moreover, there is now available a work that, within a comprehensive treatment of preclusion, elaborates Professor Degnan's pioneering study with discriminating intelligence. 5
Professor Degnan's signal contribution to the study of interjurisdictional preclusion was to remind us that the full faith and
credit statute 6 speaks to the recognition of the judicial proceedings
of state courts in subsequent proceedings in federal courts as well as
in the courts of other states. That perception, coupled with the perception that the "Erie problem" is in fact a collection of discrete
problems whose solution depends upon the source of putative federal law, enabled Degnan to demonstrate that the jurisprudence associated with Erie's progeny has no place in one area of
interjurisdictional preclusion where it had assumed prominence.
Thus, the statute and not Erie's progeny directs a federal court sitting in diversity with respect to the preclusive effects of prior state
judicial proceedings, whether those of courts of the state where the
federal court sits or those of some other state. 7 Of greater import
and interest, Degnan's work made it clear that the full faith and
credit statute must be reckoned with whenever an action in federal
court is preceded by state judicial proceedings claimed to have
preclusive effect. Degnan himself did not pursue these issues, but
they have been the center of the Supreme Court's attention in a series of cases decided during the past few terms.
Interjurisdictional preclusion is a multi-lane highway, and Pro3
4

Degnan, Federalized ResJudicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5
See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§§ 4466-4472 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER].
6 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). The statute provides:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of
the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the
seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State,
Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in
other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal
exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law
or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which
they are taken.
7 See Degnan, supra note 3, at 750-55.
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fessor Degnan travelled it in more than one direction. Neither the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution8 nor the implementing statute appears to speak to the preclusive effects of the proceedings of federal courts. Degnan described how the Supreme Court
hurdled that barrier to arrive at the obviously sensible conclusion
that state courts are not free to disregard the proceedings of a federal court claimed to have preclusive effect. 9 Moreover, he recognized that, simply because federal law imposes that obligation, it
need not also answer the question of the preclusive effects of federal
judicial proceedings.1 0 In a section of his article that has proved
influential, Degnan argued that, just as uniform federal law governs
the scope and effect of federal proceedings adjudicating matters of
federal substantive law (a clear, if not clearly reasoned, proposition
in Supreme Court opinions), so should it govern the preclusive effects of federal proceedings adjudicating matters of state substantive law." Thus, in his view, the federal-state configuration is the
mirror image of the state-federal, permitting him to propose a general rule applicable to both:
A validjudgment rendered in any judicialsystem within the United States
must be recognized by all otherjudicialsystems within the United States, and
the claims and issues precluded by that judgment, and the parties bound
thereby, are determined by the law of the system which rendered the
2
judgment.'

"[E]ven the most luminous analytic framework"' 3 can blind us.
Once the gains it permits are secure, the framework invites refinement. With respect to interjurisdictional preclusion, it is an appropriate time to survey those gains and to reexamine the areas where
there is still room for debate, and hence for progress.
In this Article, I argue that Professor Degnan's proposed general rule, as applied to both the state-federal and federal-state configurations, "moves too fast and far"'14 in the directions he charted.
Applied to the preclusive effects of state judicial proceedings in federal court, as it has been by the Supreme Court in recent years, the
rule risks the sacrifice of policies animating federal substantive law
and indeed of federal substantive rights. Perception of the risk to
8
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
9 See Degnan, supra note 3, at 744-50.
10 See id. at 756.
11 See id. at 755-73.
12

Id. at 773.

13
14

Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741, 753 (1974).
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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federal law posed by application of domestic state preclusion law
helps to explain doubts, hesitations, and peculiarities in the
Supreme Court's recent decisions, as it helps to refine the rule.
Neither the full faith and credit clause nor the full faith and credit
statute directs application of domestic state preclusion law. The former does not apply in the state-federal configuration. The latter
does not choose domestic state preclusion law; it refers to the domestic state solution, which is determined exogenously and may be
5
governed by federal law.'
Applied to the preclusive effects of federal diversity proceedings adjudicating matters of state law, as it has been by some lower
federal courts, Professor Degnan's rule risks the sacrifice of state
substantive policies and rights as well as of the articulated federal
policy against different outcomes on the basis of citizenship. Other
federal courts, as well as scholars and law reformers, have recognized that the rule is too broad in this context. They have not, how6
ever, adequately addressed the issues.'
Professor Degnan's general rule was the product of an insufficiently general approach. I believe that the best hope for further
progress lies in that direction. But there are formidable obstacles,
both to the development of a more general approach and to its application to the law of preclusion.
Problems of interjurisdictional preclusion are problems in the
relationship between federal and state law. Because the putative
federal law of preclusion is federal common law-I believe I can
demonstrate that, apart from the Constitution and except when a
federal statute provides a rule of preclusion, that is all it ever is-we
are likely to confront vigorous disagreement concerning the standards of pertinence and validity of judge-made federal rules. But
the scholars who have skirmished on the question of a federal common law of "procedure" in federal diversity cases have tended to
neglect the battle of which it is but a part.' 7 The Supreme Court has
decided relatively few cases implicating a federal common law of
"procedure" in diversity cases. The Court has, however, spoken
often on the question of federal common law. It would be surprising if we could learn nothing from those cases in this context. As to
See infra text accompanying notes 318-461.
See infra text accompanying notes 215-317.
17 See, e.g., Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974); Redish &
Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 356 (1977); Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie after the Death of Diversit4,?, 78
MicH. L. REV. 311 (1980); Redish, Continuing the Erie Debate: A Response to Westen and
Lehman, 78 Min.L. REV. 959 (1980); Westen, After "Life for Erie"--A Reply, 78 Miii. L.
REV. 971 (1980). But see Bourne, Federal Common Law and the Erie-Byrd Rule, 12 U. BALT.
L. REV. 426 (1983).
15
16
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both groups of cases, however, the role played by the Rules of Deci8
sion Act must be identified.'
Once one recognizes that the full faith and credit statute states
or chooses only a domestic referent and not domestic state preclusion law, it is not apparent why a general approach to federal common law should not also accommodate problems concerning the
preclusive effects of state judicial proceedings. The analysis must
confront, however, the tendency of courts and commentators to
treat problems of federal law in domestic state litigation, or at least
those to which a procedural label can be attached, as sui generis.1 9
If I am right that a traveller on all lanes of the interjurisdictional
preclusion highway must consider whether there is pertinent and
valid federal common law, and that a general approach to that question is both possible and fruitful whether or not the Rules of Decision Act provides a common vehicle, the remaining roadblocks are
specific to the nature of preclusion rules.
As a concession to the shortness of life, we are drawn to characterization, particularly in delimiting the proper spheres of federal
and state law. Professor Degnan would have us assimilate preclusion law to procedure. 20 But rules of preclusion, like many legal
rules, resist confident characterization. Emphasis on the changes in
the legal landscape that made possible modem domestic preclusion
law or preoccupation with the stimuli for more recent developments
in that law may cause us to lose sight of the complex of policies and
values that inform the basic rules and to view history in our own
image. Moreover, single-minded attention to policy analysis may
cause us to forget that legal rules, including preclusion rules, have
effects as well as purposes. We may be willing to accept the costs of
applying the same preclusion rules to all adjudications of domestic
substantive law, against the background of which they were formulated. Reference to a domestic law model, however, may cause us to
neglect the additional costs that attend the application of such transsubstantive preclusion rules to adjudications of the laws of other
jurisdictions.
In my view, both traditional federal common law analysis and
analysis under the Rules of Decision Act support the accepted (but
18

See infra text accompanying notes 81-129, 264-85. The Rules of Decision Act

provides:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of
the United States, in cases where they apply.
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
19 See infra text accompanying notes 318-67.
20
See Degnan, supra note 3, passim.
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unreasoned) conclusion that uniform federal preclusion law governs
the interjurisdictional effects of federal judicial proceedings adjudicating matters of federal substantive law. Neither, however, supports that conclusion to the extent urged by Professor Degnan, or
the commentators who have modified his general rule, where a federal court adjudicates matters of state substantive law in the exercise
of diversity jurisdiction. As to the interjurisdictional effects of state
judicial proceedings, both Professor Degnan's general rule and the
Supreme Court's recent cases are misdirected. The correct interpretation of the statute focuses attention on the domestic preclusion
solution, which may be furnished, pursuant to traditional federal
common law analysis or analysis under the Rules of Decision Act, by
federal common law. The full faith and credit statute makes the domestic solution the national solution.
Simplicity and predictability are important in the law of interjurisdictional preclusion as in other areas of law. Professor
Degnan's general rule has these great advantages. The benefits may
be purchased, however, at a cost too great. We need a law of interjurisdictional preclusion that is sensitive to the complexity of our
federal system and to the fact that preclusion rules have effects as
well as purposes. Ironically, symmetry of a sort is attainable: in
both the federal-state and state-federal configurations, we are left
with mixed regimes of federal and state law.
I
CREDIT TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS; SOURCES
OF LEGAL OBLIGATION

A.

The Constitution

Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution directs that "Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State" and provides that
Congress may prescribe their manner of proof and effect. 2 1 Congress's power under article IV is limited to the interjurisdictional
effects of state judicial proceedings; it does not extend to the preclusive effects of those proceedings in the same state. The meager historical evidence suggests that, in providing a norm of respect and
empowering Congress to flesh it out, the framers sought "not
merely to demand respect from one state for another, but rather to
give us the benefits of a unified nation by altering the status of
otherwise 'independent, sovereign states.' "22
Article IV, section 1 provides no guidance on problems of in21

See supra note 8 for the text of the full faith and credit clause.

22

Reese &Johnson, The Scope of Full Faithand Credit toJudgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv.
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terjurisdictional preclusion in mixed state and federal configurations. First, it makes no mention of the "public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings" of the federal government. Second, by its
terms, the section imposes no obligation upon the federal government to give full faith and credit to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the states.
B.

Federal Statutes

The first Congress implemented and elaborated the full faith
and credit clause, requiring that duly authenticated records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state have "such faith and
credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they
have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said
records are or shall be taken." '2 3 In so providing, a Congress closer
than any to the framers' purposes, and one that had enacted legislation resolving doubts concerning the existence of lower federal
courts, remedied the second omission noted above in connection
with article IV.24 It did not, however, remedy the first. Nor, it is
generally agreed, was the gap regarding federal judicial proceedings
wholly filled by a supplementary statute passed in 1804. That legislation made the provisions of both the 1790 and 1804 statutes applicable to, inter alia, the judicial proceedings "of the respective
territories of the United States, and countries subject to the jurisdic25
tion of the United States."
C.

The Special Problem of Federal Courts as the
Rendering Forum

After a brief survey of Supreme Court decisions declaring an
obligation on the part of the state courts to respect federal judicial
proceedings, Professor Degnan concluded that the Supreme Court
"was wantonly right" and not "willfully wrong in doing what it
did." 2 6 What the Court appears to have done, in some cases, was to
153, 161 (1949) (quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948)). See also infra
text accompanying notes 321-29.
23
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
24
See McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312,326 (1839); Degnan,supranote 3,
at 743-44. That is not to say that art. IV, § 1 is the only source of constitutional authority
for legislation prescribing the effect of state judgments in federal courts.
25 Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298, 299.
It would be little more than an act of blind heroism to contend that federal courts are included as the courts of a country "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." The rendition of this phrase as referring to a
"possession" of the United States in the present codification of the Judicial Code seems to reflect a much more probable interpretation.
18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4468, at 651 n.10.
26 Degnan, supra note 3, at 749.
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attribute an obviously sound result to the full faith and credit statute, a reading it will not bear. A few of the cases are worth another
look, particularly because, upon reexamination, a firmer basis for
the Court's conclusion need not be left to the imagination. The full
faith and credit statute has nothing to do with federal judgments;
the obligation to respect them is a derivation of federal common
law.
The first case Professor Degnan discussed is Dupasseur v. Rochereau.2 7 The language he deemed relevant, however, speaks to the
question of the preclusive effects to be given the proceedings of a
28
federal court, not to the source of the basic obligation of respect.

For analysis addressing the latter question, it is necessary to look
elsewhere in the Court's opinion. In holding that it had jurisdiction
to hear the case, the Court opined:
Where a State court refuses to give effect to the judgment of a
court of the United States rendered upon the point in dispute,
and with jurisdiction of the case and the parties, a question is undoubtedly raised which, under the act of 1867, may be brought to
this court for revision. The case would be one in which a title or right is
claimed under an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against the title or right so set up. It would thus be a case arising
under the laws of the United States, establishingthe CircuitCourt and vest-

ing it with jurisdiction; and hence it would be within the judicial
power of the United States, as defined by the Constitution; and it
is clearly within the chart of appellate power given to this court,
over cases arising in and decided by the State courts.
The refusal by the courts of one State to give effect to the decisions of the
courts of anotherState is an infringement of a different article of the Consti-

tution, to wit, the first section of article four; and the right to bring
such a case before us by writ of error under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, or the act of 1867, is based on the refusal
of the State court to give validity and effect to the right claimed
under that article and section.
In either case, therefore, whether the validity or due effect of
a judgment of the State court, or that of a judgment of a United
States court, is disallowed by a State court, the Constitution and
laws furnish redress by a final appeal to this court. 29
27

588.

88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 (1875). The correct date of decision is found in 22 L. Ed.

28 "The only effect that can be justly claimed for the judgment in the Circuit Court
of the United States, is such as would belong to judgments of the State courts rendered
under similar circumstances." Dupasseur,88 U.S. at 135, quoted in Degnan, supra note 3,
at 745.
29 Dupasseur, 88 U.S. at 134 (emphasis added). The Court's reliance on art. IV in its
discussion of state court judgments demonstrates that the entire discussion concerned
the basic obligation of respect. See McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 324-25
(1839) (art. IV, § 1 is self-executing as to basic obligation). A recent student note seri-
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In the first paragraph, the Court suggested that the obligation of
respect for a federal judgment flows from the federal statutes that
created the lower federal court and vested it with jurisdiction. In
later referring to "an infringement of a different article of the Constitution" (than article IV, which concerns only state judicial proceedings), the Court may have intended to suggest that article III
imposes the obligation (upon the creation by Congress of lower federal courts). The latter is not a necessary interpretation, however.
The Court may have had in mind that disregard of an obligation
derived from federal statutes, as of one derived from article III,
would constitute an infringement of the supremacy clause of article
VI.30
However imprecise the Dupasseur Court's ascription of an obligation of respect for federal judgments was at the time, the notion
that federal jurisdictional statutes may be the source of policies to
be given effect by the courts comes as no surprise today. A grant of
jurisdiction to the federal courts would be an empty gesture if their
determinations of right and duty could be reexamined without restraint by the state courts. In an alienage diversity case like Dupasseur, for example, of what use to the plaintiffs was the promise of an
unbiased federal forum if the promise could be broken at will by
state courts in subsequent litigation? This mode of analysis is congenial to a modern reader; we should not assume that it was beyond
the ken of the Court in the nineteenth century. In any event, the
Court in Dupasseur did not mention the full faith and credit statute,
either in its discussion of the obligation of respect for federal judgments or in stating the rule that state law governed the preclusive
31
effects of the judgment involved in that case.
The Court did, however, mention the full faith and credit statute in Embry v. Palmer,3 2 the case "most often cited for the rule that
state courts must give full faith and credit to federal adjudications."'3 3 Embry involved the effect of a judgment of the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia in subsequent proceedings in the
ously misinterprets this section of the Dupasseur Court's opinion. See Note, Erie and the
PreclusiveEffect of FederalDiversity Judgments, 85 CoIJum. L. REv. 1505, 1515 (1985).
30
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. But see Phoenix Fire & Marine Ins. Co.v. Tennessee,
161 U.S. 174, 185 (1896), where the Court observed that "the Constitution provides
that full faith and credit shall be given" to federal judgments.
Cdngress's power to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, is another possible source of the basic obligation of respect.
31
See Dupasseur, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 135; infra text accompanying note 63.
32
107 U.S. 3 (1883). The correct date of decision is found in 27 L. Ed. 346. Professor Degnan is correct that the case is "easily misunderstood." Degnan, supra note 3,
at 746. Unfortunately, the facts he summarizes, id. with n.23, are not the facts of Emby,
but rather of Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 543 (1850), discussed in Embiy, 107 U.S. at 11-12.
33
Degnan, supra note 3, at 746.
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courts of Connecticut. Having determined that it had jurisdiction,
the Court noted that the full faith and credit statute's provision for
the effect to be given state judicial proceedings was founded on article IV, section 1, "which, however, does not extend to the other
cases covered by the statute." 3 4 The Court continued:
The power to prescribe what effect shall be given to the judicial
proceedings of the courts of the United States is conferred by
other provisions of the Constitution [than article IV, § 1], such as
those which declare the extent of the judicial power of the United
States, which authorize all legislation necessary and proper for executing the powers vested by the Constitution in the government
of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof, and
which declare the supremacy of the authority of the national government within the limits of the Constitution. As part of its general authority, the power to give effect to the judgments of its
courts is coextensive with its territorial jurisdiction. That the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is a court of the United
States, results from the right of exclusive legislation over the District which the Constitution has given to Congress. Accordingly, the
judgments of the courts of the United States have invariably been recognized
as upon the samefooting, so far as concerns the obligation created by them,
with domestic judgments
of the States, wherever rendered and wherever
35
sought to be enforced.
According to Professor Degnan, "[t]he Court's reasoning is
perplexing: it suggests that because the statute requires states to
recognize judgments of territorial courts, and because territorial
courts are courts 'of the United States,' the statute thereby requires
the states to recognize the judgments of all 'courts of the United
States.' "36 Perhaps so, although the Court's holding may have
been only that the District of Columbia is one of "the respective
territories of the United States" or one of the "countries subject to
37
the jurisdiction of the United States" contemplated by the statute.
Alternatively, the Court may not have been relying on the full faith
and credit statute at all.
How then explain the broad language at the end of the quoted
passage? How indeed, given that one of the cases the Embry court
cited in support of the broad language was Turnbull v. Payson.38 In
Turnbull the Court, albeit without referring to the supplementary
Embry, 107 U.S. at 9.
Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added).
36
Degnan, supra note 3, at 747.
37
See Note, Conclusiveness and Effect ofJudgnents as Between Federaland State Courts, 21
U.S.G.C.A. Rep. 478 (1897). See also Note, ResJudicataas a FederalQuestion, 25 HARV. L.
REV. 443, 445 (1912) (suggesting that statute covers only judgments of states, territories, and District of Columbia).
38
95 U.S. 418 (1877), cited in EmnbDy, 107 U.S. at 10.
34
35
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legislation of 1804, had said that "the act of Congress does not apply to the courts of the United States." '3 9 Moreover, even in the absence of statutory support, the Court in Turnbull had posited an
obligation on the part of "all other courts of the country" to respect
the proceedings of federal courts. 40 Finally, if the Court in Embry
was interpreting the full faith and credit statute to cover the judicial
proceedings of all federal courts, the rule it announced as to preclusive effects was problematic on its face. The Court went on to hold:
The rule for determining what effect shall be given to such
judgments is that declared by this court, in respect to the faith and
credit to be given to the judgments of State courts in the courts of
other States, in the case of M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 326,
where it was said: "They are record evidence of a debt, or judgments of record, to be contested only in such way as judgments of
record may be; and, consequently, are conclusive upon the defendant in every State, except for such causes as would be sufficient to set aside the judgment in the courts of the State in which
'4 1
it was rendered."
The federal court that rendered the judgment at issue in Embry
was not situated within the territory of any state. The courts of the
District of Columbia could, however, be assimilated without strain
to the status of courts of a state and thus provide a referent of the
sort contemplated by the statute. 4 2 What of other, geographically
dispersed, federal courts? Domestication so as to fit the statutory
model was and is more difficult. 43 In sum, Embty need not be read
Turnbull, 95 U.S. at 423.
Id.
41
Embiy, 107 U.S. at 10.
42 The Embry Court, having asked "what causes would have been sufficient in the
District of Columbia, according to the law then in force, to have authorized its courts to
set aside the judgment," id., found that one of its previous decisions stated "the law
prevailing in the District of Columbia, not by reason of any local peculiarity, but because
it was a general principle of equity jurisprudence." Id. at 11 (citing Marine Ins. Co. v.
Hodgson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 332 (1813)).
43 That is, if the full faith and credit statute is thought to apply to federal judgments, under the statute where is one to look for the governing law: to the law that
would be applied in subsequent proceedings in the rendering court or in such proceedings in some other federal court? This problem would disappear if the statute chose the
rendering court as the referent, as the Court has occasionally, albeit carelessly, suggested. See, e.g., Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481,484 (1813). But the statute did
not (and does not) say that, see supra text accompanying note 23; note 6. Although the
choice of referents makes no difference as to state court judgments, we cannot assume at
the start of the analysis that the same law will be applied to federal judgments in all
federal courts. The purposes of the exercise are precisely to determine whether that
proposition is true and whether the full faith and credit statute speaks to the problem.
But see Case Comment, 4 ILL. L. REV. 515, 516-18 (1910) (statute applies to federal judgments and requires application of uniform federal preclusion law in certain
circumstances).
39
40

1986]

INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRECLUSION

745

as relying on the full faith and credit statute, and there is good reason not to do so.
The point is not that the Supreme Court has never sought refuge in the full faith and credit statute, for it surely has, and not that
the "Court has consistently assumed that the implementing statute
of 1790 required such recognition, ' 44 for it surely has not. Rather,
the point is that the Court has consistently reached the same result,
with or without that refuge. 4 5 In Dupasseur and Turnbull, and perhaps in Embry itself, the Court relied not on what Congress had said
in so many words, but on what the "national government" might do
within its constitutional prerogatives and what it was necessary to
do. Having "suppl[ied]" one "ellipsis" 4 6 in the statute explicitly,
the Court in Embry recognized that another had already been supplied. Even taking Professor Degnan's view of Embry, the Court's
exercise in statutory interpretation merely blessed an anterior exercise in federal common law. Moreover, with or without the statute,
the Court did not limit itself to declaring an obligation of respect for
federal judgments.
Dupasseur, Embry, and the cases following them were not, however, the only instances of "judicial legislation" 4 7 concerning federal judgments during this period. Federal common law, in the
sense ofjudge-made federal law that is binding on both federal and
state courts, is not exclusively a post-1938 phenomenon. 48 In the
area of interjurisdictional preclusion, the Supreme Court went beyond a federal rule of respect for federal judicial proceedings and
references to state law for preclusive effects long before 1938. In
Deposit Bank v. Frankfort,49 for example, the Court announced a federal common law rule of preclusive effect for proceedings of a federal court determining federal rights. The Court refused to permit
the Kentucky state courts to apply state law so as to deny preclusive
effect to the judgment of a Kentucky federal court holding that the
bank had constitutionally protected contract rights under a state
statute. It stated:
Degnan, supra note 3, at 745.
See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4468, at 651.
46 Embry, 107 U.S. at 9. The Embry Court was referring to the failure of the statutory language consistently to refer to territories and countries subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States.
47 Costigan, The History of the Adoption of Section 1 ofArticle IV of the United States Constitution and a Considerationof the Effect on Judgments of that Section and of FederalLegislation, 4
COLUM. L. REV. 470, 483-84, 489 (1904).
48
See, e.g., Tullock v. Mulvane, 184 U.S. 497 (1902) (federal law governs in state
court action on federal injunction bond); Bourne, supra note 17, at 428-38; Hill, The Erie
Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1023 (1953).
49 191 U.S. 499 (1903).
44
45
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In our judgment the adjudication of the Federal court relied
upon here, although based upon the judgment of a state court
given as a reason therefor, is equally effectual as it would have
been had the Federal court reached the conclusion, as upon the
original question, that the Hewitt law constituted a binding contract between the parties. Any other conclusion strikes down the
very foundation of the doctrine of res judicata, and permits the

state court to deprive a party of the benefit of its most important
principle, and is a virtual abandonment of the final power of the
Federal courts to protect all who come before them relying upon
rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution and established by
the judgments of the Federal courts. 50
The Deposit Bank case, together with Stoll v. Gottlieb,51 in which it
was cited, may provide the key to what Professor Degnan regards as
"the puzzling suggestion" in Stoll that "because there was a federal
question involved (bankruptcy) [in the federal judicial proceedings],
'It]he problem before the Supreme Court of Illinois was not one of
full faith and credit but of res judicata.' "52 For, when juxtaposed
with Dupasseur, those cases help to illuminate the various roles of
federal common law in connection with federal judgments.
Although suggesting that the federal statutes establishing the
lower federal courts and vesting them with jurisdiction require respect for the proceedings of federal courts, the Court held in Dupasseur that state rules govern the preclusive effects of the judgment of
53
a federal court whose jurisdiction is founded on alienage diversity.
In other cases, including Deposit Bank and Stoll, federal interests require federal preclusion rules. Both regimes of preclusion rules,
federal and state, subsume, to the extent that they implement, the
basic federal obligation of respect for federal judgments. To that
extent, both regimes of preclusion law are binding under the
supremacy clause. "Resjudicata"-federalizedin one case and federal in the other-seems as good a way to describe them as any.
The Court in Stoll grasped this point as to federal preclusion rules, 54
but its reliance on the full faith and credit statute for nonfederal
question judgments prevented full understanding. 5 5 That reliance,
although not "surprising" in light of the history, is indefensible.
Id. at 520. See infra text accompanying notes 72-75.
305 U.S. 165 (1938).
52 Degnan, supra note 3, at 749 (quoting Stoll, 305 U.S. at 171).
53 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130, 135 (1875), quoted infra text accompanying note 63. The
last sentence in the quotation helps to clarify how state law subsumes, by implementing,
the basic obligation of respect.
54 See also Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 524-25
(1931) (suggesting that federal preclusion law governs issue of validity of diversity
judgment).
55 See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170 (1938), quoted infra note 69.
50
51
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The statute plays no part in an analysis of the obligations imposed
by federal judgments.
II
THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL JUDGMENTS

In treating the law governing the preclusive effects of federal

judgments, Professor Degnan told a story like this: 5 6
Prior to 1938, when Eie was decided and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure became effective, federal courts were required, in
common law actions, to apply the procedural law of the state in
which they sat. During that period, and probably for that reason,
the Supreme Court decided that the preclusive effects of federal
judgments were to be the same as those of state judgments in the
57
state in which they were rendered.
After Erie and the Federal Rules, the federal courts came to

realize that, "[a]t least in matters of exclusive federal jurisdiction, ' '5 8 federal preclusion law should govern federal judgments.
But they were concerned about the implications of Eie for the

preclusive effects of diversity judgments and slow to realize the
implications for preclusion law of the nearly complete rejection of
conformity in the Federal Rules.
Starting about 1951, courts have increasingly recognized that
preclusion law is largely a reflex of procedural law and that the
Federal Rules speak directly to some aspects of preclusion and
indirectly to others. Even when the Federal Rules do not speak
"authoritatively," 59 Eie jurisprudence has no role to play. The
full faith and credit statute does not appear to contemplate pick56

See Degnan, supra note 3, at 755-71. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF JUDG-

MENTS § 87 comment a (1982); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 100A, at 695 (4th

ed. 1983) (telling largely same story).
57 Professor Degnan glosses over the problem of the decrees of federal courts sitting in equity, which were free to apply their own procedure. See Degnan, supra note 3,
at 746 n.20, 756-57. It is true that "[t]he few cases in which the federal adjudication was
a decree in equity. . . elicited no special notice of the problem of governing law," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 87 comment a (1982), but the fact that the Court
did not vary its approach in those cases belies the notion that the source of preclusion
law followed the source of procedural law. See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining
& Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 129-30 (1912); infra note 65 and accompanying text.
Professor Schofield had criticized the decision affirmed by the Court in Bigelow for failure to mark the distinction. See Case Comment, supra note 43 (for authorship, compare
id. at 522 with Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity ofJudge-Made State Law in State and
Federal Courts, 4 ILL. L. REV. 533 (1910)). But Schofield took the view that the federal
equity decree in question not only resulted from proceedings conducted according to
federal equity procedure but applied a discrete federal equity jurisprudence. See Case
Comment, supra note 43, at 519. That was not the view of the Court. See Bigelow, 225
U.S. at 129-30.
58 Degnan, supra note 3, at 760.
59

Id. at 763.
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ing and choosing among federal and state preclusion rules. 60
Moreover, at some point the power of the federal courts finally
"to decide the force of federal adjudications" 6 1 is a federal constitutional question. Rather than engaging in the difficult business
of determining what that point is, we should read the Rules of
Decision Act not to apply.
The story is artfully told, but it does not persuade. As an historical
account, it assigns to the Supreme Court in the years prior to 1938 a
view of preclusion law it did not hold, and thus it sees in that year a
great divide that did not exist. As a doctrinal account and prescription, the story fails to integrate the approach suggested for preclusion with the approach taken by the Court to other problems
involving the relationship between federal and state law, essentially
wishing away a statute and a body of doctrine by resort to dubious
constitutional premises.
It may be, of course, that Professor Degnan's conclusion-federal preclusion law governs the effects of all federal judgments-is a
good one. Informed judgment on that question requires, I believe,
engaging broader themes, against an historical background more
faithfully rendered.
A.

The History

We have seen that in Dupasseur,6 2 the Supreme Court, without
referring to the full faith and credit statute, posited an obligation in
the state courts not to disregard federal judicial proceedings. Having established the basic obligation, the Court considered the
preclusive effects of the federal judgment before it, which was entered by a federal court in Louisiana sitting in alienage diversity jurisdiction. Again without reference to the statute, the Court
reasoned:
The only effect that can be justly claimed for the judgment in
the Circuit Court of the United States, is such as would belong to
judgments of the State courts rendered under similar circumstances. Dupasseur & Co. were citizens of France, and brought
the suit in the Circuit Court of the United States as such citizens;
and, consequently, that court, deriving its jurisdiction solely from
60 See id. at 768. Professor Degnan's argument is surprising, given that he recognizes the dubiety of applying the statute to federal judgments. See id. at 748-49. Moreover, the argument apparently assumes that the statute requires a monolithic regime of
state law as to state judgments. One of the major purposes of this Article is to demonstrate that that assumption is erroneous. See infra text accompanying notes 318-461.
Other considerations may, of course, suggest the wisdom of a single source of preclusion law. See infra text accompanying notes 202, 248-49.
61
Degnan, supra note 3, at 770 n.138.
62 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 (1875).
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the citizenship of the parties, was in the exercise ofjurisdiction to
administer the laws of the State, and its proceedings were had in
accordance with the forms and course of proceeding in the State
courts. It is apparent, therefore, that no higher sanctity or effect
can be claimed for the judgment .. .rendered in such a case

under such circumstances than is due to the judgments of the
State courts in a like case and under similar circumstances. If by
the laws of the State a judgment like that rendered by the Circuit

Court would have had a binding effect as against Rochereau, if it
had been rendered in a State court, then it should have the same
effect, being rendered by the Circuit Court. If such effect is not
conceded to it, but is refused, then due validity and effect are not
given to it, and a case is made for the interposition of the power of
63
reversal conferred upon this court.
Professor Degnan quotes parts of this passage as support for his
hypothesis that, prior to 1938, the preclusive effects of federal judgments were governed by state law, because federal courts in actions
at law were required by the Conformity Act to apply, roughly, state
procedural law. 6 4 Fairly read, the passage does not support the hypothesis, which in any event is too broadly formulated.
According to the Court in Dupasseur, the preclusive effects of the
federal judgment involved in that case had to be the same as those
of a state court judgment "rendered under similar circumstances,"
because the rendering federal court, "deriving its jurisdiction solely
from the citizenship of the parties, was in the exercise ofjurisdiction
to administer the laws of the State, and its proceedings were had in
accordance with the forms and course of proceeding in the State
courts." Important to the conclusion were the ground of federal
jurisdiction (alienage diversity), the substantive law applied (state),
and the procedural law applied (state). Moreover, if the order of
precedence established in the sentence leaves any doubt as to which
federal source of state law was uppermost in the justices' minds, the
headnote, written by the author of the Court's opinion, provides additional basis for inferring that it was not the Conformity Act. 6 5
Id. at 135. See supra note 53.
See Degnan, supra note 3, at 756; see also id. at 745-46. In both places, the quotations omit the language, "was in the exercise ofjurisdiction to administer the laws of the
State." Apparently, the omissions fooled the author of the Note, supra note 29. See id. at
1518.
65
The headnotes to Dupasseurwere written by Justice Bradley, author of the Court's
opinion. Headnote 3 provides in relevant part: "Ifjurisdiction of the case was acquired
only by reason of the citizenship of the parties, and the state law alone was administered,
then only such validity and effect can be claimed for the judgment as would be due to
the judgment of the State Courts under like circumstances." Dupasseur v. Rochereau,
22 L. Ed. 588 (1875). See also Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 516 (1903) (cases
in which "no higher sanctity or effect can be given to a judgment of the Circuit Court
...than to state judgments ... [are cases in which] the court derives its jurisdiction
63
64
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The Court's opinion in Dupasseur, carefully crafted to address
only the preclusive effects of a judgment of a federal court sitting in
alienage diversity, thus supports neither an attempt to assimilate
preclusion law to procedure, nor the notion that state law provided
the measure of preclusive effects for all federal judgments, prior to
1938. It is true that in the Crescent City Live Stock case 66 the Court
appeared to extend the rule stated in Dupasseur to cover the preclusive effects of a federal judgment on a matter of federal law in the
courts of the state in which it sat.6 7 The case is, however, ambiguous. 68 Other cases in which the Court invoked the broad formulation involved judgments of federal courts sitting in diversity, albeit
69
not always within the same state.
On at least some occasions when the Court was unambiguously
called to decide whether the preclusive effects of a federal judgment
adjudicating matters of federal law are delimited by the law applied
in the courts of the state where the federal court is held, the Court
applied an independent federal rule. Thus, in determining the effect of a sale of property under the order of a district court exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction, the Court held:
Without examining into the decisions of the State courts on
that subject, it is sufficient to say that in construing the effect of
from the citizenship of the parties and in the exercise of the jurisdiction to administer
the laws of the State where the proceedings are had"); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper
Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 129-30 (1912) ("The United States court was in
the exercise of jurisdiction to administer [state law], since its jurisdiction depended
solely upon diversity of citizenship. Its judgment is. . .entitled in the courts of another
State to the same faith and credit which would attach to a judgment of [the rendering
state]."); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4468, at 655 ("The Supreme
Court affirmed [the lower court's judgment in Dupasseur], ruling that the effect of the
federal judgment must be measured by state law, in a statement that looks both to the
fact that state substantive law controlled the action and to the fact that under the Conformity Act procedure in the federal court had been drawn from state practice .. ")
(footnote omitted); supra note 57. For language suggesting that the Court associated the
concept of "administering" state law with the Rules of Decision Act, see Owings v. Hull,
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 607, 625 (1835) (Story, J.).
66
Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union Slaughter-House Co., 120 U.S.
141 (1887).
67
See id. at 146-47; Degnan, supra note 3, at 747-48 (where, however, there are
errors in describing sequence of events and Court's opinion). For the nature of the
federal judgment involved, see Crescent City Live Stock, 120 U.S. at 157.
68
Compare Crescent City Live Stock, 120 U.S. at 146-47 with id. at 151.
69 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 11
(1912) (different state); Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900) (different
state); Metcalf v. Watertown, 153 U.S. 671 (1894) (same state). In Stoll v. Gottlieb, the
Court observed that "[u]nder [the full faith and credit statute] the judgments and decrees of the federal courts in a state are declared to have the same dignity in the courts
of that state as those of its own courts in a like case and under similar circumstances."
305 U.S. 165, 170 (1938) (footnote omitted) (dictum). The Court in Stoll went on to
distinguish federal judgments on federal questions. See id. at 170-71; supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
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this sale under the order of the District Court of the United States,
it must be decided by those general principles which govern bankruptcy proceedings under that statute, rather than the code of the
State in regard to voluntary sales of mortgaged property between
70
individuals.
In that case, the Court had previously observed that the result of the
state court's decree was "at variance with the policy of a statute
whose main purpose was to secure an equal distribution of an insol-

vent debtor's property among all his creditors.

71

The question was more starkly put, and received full dress at-

tention, in Deposit Bank v. Frankfort.72 The Court found that the rule
stated in Dupasseur was intentionally limited to cases "wherein the
court derives its jurisdiction from the citizenship of the parties and
in the exercise of the jurisdiction to administer the laws of the State
where the proceedings are had."' 73 Having distinguished Crescent
City Live Stock, albeit unpersuasively, 74 the Court articulated a view
of federal judgments in federal question cases, and of preclusion
law, that simply does not fit in Professor Degnan's story:
But it is equally well settled that a right claimed under the
Federal Constitution, finally adjudicated in the Federal courts, can
never be taken away or impaired by state decisions. The same
reasoning which permits to the States the right of final adjudication upon purely state questions requires no less respect for the
final decisions of the Federal courts of questions of national au75
thority and jurisdiction.

The Court's emphasis on the source of the substantive law applied by the rendering court-state law in Dupasseur and federal law
in Deposit Bank-is surprising only to those who have been habituated to thinking about preclusion law as procedure and to thinking
about procedure disembodied from rights under the substantive
law. In the nineteenth century and beyond, procedure was imbued
with notions of the importance of securing and protecting substanFactors' & Traders' Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 11I U.S. 738, 743 (1884).
Id. at 742.
72
191 U.S. 499 (1903). See supra text accompanying notes 49-5 1.
73
191 U.S. at 516.
74
See id. The language from Crescent City Live Stock quoted there was irrelevant to
the problem before the Court in Deposit Bank.
75
Deposit Bank, 191 U.S. at 517. See also Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200
U.S. 273, 290-91 (1906) (federal court decree to be given "the force and effect to which
it is entitled under the principles of resjudicataas settled by this court, especially in view
of the fact that the controversy . . . involved rights protected by the Constitution ..
"); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4468, at 656-57. But Deposit
70
71

Bank hardly "made explicit" the rule "that federal rules measure at least most res judicata questions" as Wright, Miller, and Cooper argue. Id. at 656.
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tive rights. 76 Moreover, the "very foundation" of preclusion law,
"its most important principle," was the protection of the "rights
• . .established by. . .judgments. ' 77 This idea was so strong that
the Supreme Court permitted a successful defendant in a patent infringement suit to enjoin the plaintiff from bringing subsequent
suits, based on the same patent, against those who sold the product
manufactured by the defendant in the first suit.78 As expressed by
the Court in a more conventional context:
This doctrine ofresjudicata is not a mere matter of practice or
procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours. It is a
rule of fundamental and substantial justice, "of public policy and
of private peace," which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts to the end that rights once established by the
final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be recognized by those who are bound by it in every way, wherever the
judgment is entitled to respect. .... 79
In sum, no monolithic rule regarding the preclusive effects of
federal judgments existed prior to 1938, and thus that year marked
no great divide. The cases that prescribed a federal obligation of
respect for federal judgments and defined whether federal or state
law governed their preclusive effects may plausibly be read as applying federal common law, binding throughout the land by virtue of
the supremacy clause. Even if the cases are not so viewed, there can
be no doubt that, long before Erie and the Federal Rules, the
Supreme Court had held that federal preclusion law governs at least
some questions of the effects to be accorded federal judgments on
matters of federal substantive law. During the same period, the
Court required that the preclusive effects of federal alienage and
diversity judgment on matters of state substantive law follow state
law. The Court's articulated concern in both contexts was to protect rights conferred by the substantive law.
An assertion that a proposed change in the law is evolutionary,
not revolutionary, is a standard palliative of the law reformer. 80 The
fact that it is not so is insufficient warrant for the status quo.
Whatever the history with respect to the preclusive effects of federal
76

See S. Subrin, The Field Code and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Fantasy

and Reality of Procedural Continuity 53 (unpublished manuscript) ("The major goal of
the Field Code was to facilitate the swift, economical, and predictable enforcement of
discrete, carefully articulated rights.").
77 Deposit Bank, 191 U.S. at 520.
78 See Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907). The Kessler Court was not concerned
with the preclusive effect of the judgment, but rather with the rights established by it. See
id. at 288-89.
79 Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917).
80
See Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement ofJudgments: Issue Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 564, 586 (1981).
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judgments, the law of the future should fit within the context of
which it is inescapably a part. In this case, the context is federal
common law.
B.

Preclusion Law as Federal Common Law
1. Federal Common Law and the Rules of Decision Act

In espousing a general rule of federal preclusion law for federal
judgments, Professor Degnan suggested that the grant of judicial
power to decide cases and controversies in article 11181 "implies
some binding effect" and that "it seems inappropriate that some
other sovereignty-the states-should have ultimate authority to determine what binding effect the judgment has and on whom."'8 2 He
argued that "it is in the nature of the judicial power to determine its
own boundaries" but conceded that there is a "possible limitation of
federal courts' power to give force to their own adjudications. . if
the Congress ha[s] acted affirmatively and unequivocally to reduce
it."3
Professor Degnan found no need to face the issue because, in
his view, Congress had not made the attempt.
To treat the effect of diversity judgments as a matter amenable to [common law] rulemaking by the federal courts is not inconsistent with the command of the Rules of Decision Act that the
"laws of the several states ... be regarded as rules of decision."
...By the terms of the Act, state rules of decision are applicable
only where there is no constitutional or statutory requirement to
the contrary, and only "in cases where they apply." That the
power to decide the force of federal adjudications is, in extremis, a
defining element of article III judicial power gives reason to find
that even in less extreme instances the laws of the several states
do not "apply" within the terms of the Rules of Decision Act
84
itself.
Professor Deguan's argument is curious. Article III may be the
ultimate source of the obligation to respect federal judgments.8 5 If
so, article III may be thought to require a limited number of federal
preclusion rules to protect the basic norm of respect.8 6 But the no81
82

U.S. CONST.art.

84

Id. at 770 n.138.

III.

Degnan, supra note 3, at 768-69. Neither traditional federal common law analysis
nor analysis under the Rules of Decision Act presents the polar choices posited by Professor Degnan. Both leave "ultimate authority" in federal hands where, as here, federal
interests are implicated. See infra text accompanying notes 105-29.
83 Degnan, supra note 3, at 769-70.
See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
See infra text accompanying notes 140-47. Even on Professor Degnan's view of
the relevance of article III, the argument does not get one very far. See 18 WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4466, at 620 ("The minimum requirements mandated
85

86
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tion that it is also a grant of power to the federal courts initially and
finally to determine all matters relating to the preclusive effects of
their judgments is wishful thinking. The inherent powers of federal
courts, in the sense of powers that are insulated from congressional
override, are limited to those "necessary to the exercise of all
others." 8 7 Tested by that demanding standard, an assertion of inherent power with respect to most preclusion rules simply comes
too late in the day. As to diversity judgments, the federal courts
managed tolerably well under the regime of Dupasseurv. Rochereau8 8
for more than one hundred years. The switch from the Conformity
Act8 9 to the Federal Rules, whatever its significance for sub-constitutional law, cannot transmogrify a power that was not regarded as
inherent in the sense of being "shielded from direct democratic controls"9 0 into one that is so regarded. If article III judicial power
does not include the power, as against a contrary legislative direction, to determine the rules of evidence in federal court,91 it requires more than an "abstract" argument to distinguish rules of
92
preclusion.
by the case or controversy limitation ... do not begin to exhaust the full body of preclusion rules.").
87
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). See
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-67 (1924); Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc.,
757 F.2d 557, 560-64 (3d Cir. 1985); Burbank, Sanctions in the ProposedAmendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 100406 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Sanctions]; Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1015, 1115 n.455 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Rules EnablingAct].
88 See supra text accompanying notes 31, 53-54, 62-65.
89 Act ofJune 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
90 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).
91 See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1980); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31 (1976) (dictum); Burbank, Rules EnablingAct, supra note 87, at
1116 n.455.
92 Degnan, supra note 3, at 768. Observe that Congress's acknowledged control
over supervisory court rulemaking by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941), is not dispositive. See Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra
note 87, at 1183 n.728. A distinction should also be drawn between the power of a
federal court to fashion rules in the context of a case or controversy and its power to
govern practice and procedure prospectively through local court rules. Congress has
regulated local rulemaking by the federal courts since 1789, and the statutes have always
required consistency with acts of Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982); Burbank, Sanctions, supra note 87, at 1004-05 n.30.
If, as Professor Degnan maintains, preclusion is a species or reflex of procedure,
how does one square with his analysis the Court's acquiescence, from the beginning of
the Republic, in congressional regulation of the procedure of the federal courts in actions at law through directions to follow state law? See Burbank, Rules EnablingAct, supra
note 87, at 1036-40. Cf. Thomas v. Am, 106 S.Ct. 466, 471 (1985) ("Even a sensible
and efficient use of the supervisory power, however, is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions."). Only rarely has the Court balked at those directions.
See, e.g., Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426 (1875); Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91
(1931). Needless to say, commentators sympathetic to Professor Degnan's conclusion
make the most of those rare occasions, attempting to generalize from holdings that, as in
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Deprived of its constitutional prop, Professor Degnan's argument for ignoring the Rules of Decision Act 93 also collapses. Yet,
he has not been alone among commentators in wishing the Act away
in the context of federal common law. Moreover, the Supreme
Court itself has been less than clear in articulating the relevance of
the Act to inquiries regarding the relationship between federal and
state law, no matter what the context.
One answer to Professor Degnan's treatment of the Rules of
Decision Act, at least in diversity cases, is that the Court appears to
have had that statute in mind when it tied the preclusive effects of
federal alienage and diversity judgments to state law. 94 Moreover,
the language of the Court in Dupasseur v. Rochereau was not that of
freedom to choose the governing law. 9 5 But that is not a sufficient
answer, if only because the Court has recently evinced a willingness
to dispense with precedent rooted in the Act, albeit in nondiversity
cases. 96 If, as I contend, the Act is pertinent, it is necessary to reconcile with its requirements cases, both pre- and post-1938, in
which the Court has held that federal preclusion law governs the
effects of a federal judgment. The task is not, I think, as difficult as
has been assumed, although taking the Rules of Decision Act seriously has implications for federal common law. The arguments require a brief survey of well-plowed terrain.
The Court's decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 97 involved an
interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, one that it said was conHerron, are carefully limited to "the essential character or function of a federal court."
283 U.S. at 94. See, e.g., Hazard, Reflections on the Substance of Finality, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
642, 644 n.14 (1985). But see Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to Professor Hazard and a
Comment on Marrese, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 660-61 & nn.6 & 18 (1985); supra text
accompanying notes 85-87.
Article III is not, however, irrelevant. We have noted the role it may play in imposing a basic obligation to respect federal judicial proceedings. In addition, to the extent
that preclusion rules can be assimilated to rules governing the conduct of litigation, the
federal courts have the power to fashion them in the absence of congressional authorization. See, e.g., Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-14 (1920); Eash v. Riggins Trucking
Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563-64 (3d Cir. 1985); Burbank, Sanctions, supra note 87, at 1004-06;
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 24 (1985). Cf.
Thomas v. Am, 106 S. Ct. 466, 470 (1985) ("It cannot be doubted that the courts of
appeals have supervisory powers that permit, at the least, the promulgation of procedural rules governing the management of litigation."). And if that is so, one need not be
concerned, at least abstractly, about the separation of powers implications of judgemade rules of preclusion. But the analogy is flawed, and if Congress has spoken on the
subject, the argument gets us nowhere.
93 See supra text accompanying note 84.
94
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
95 Dupasseur, 88 U.S. at 135, quoted supra text accompanying note 63.
96 See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13
(1983); infra text accompanying notes 109-10, 113-21.
97 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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stitutionally compelled. 98 So long as federal courts exist and have
jurisdiction to adjudicate cases in which the Constitution requires
them to apply state law, that law may be said without linguistic strain
to govern "of its own force." 9 9 In such cases the Rules of Decision
Act is redundant.
Long after Erie, there was widely shared uncertainty as to the
reach of its constitutional holding. 10 0 The Court's persistent failure,
in diversity cases, to disaggregate the problems in the relationship
between federal and state law that it resolved by reference to that
case ensured confusion. Moreover, in addressing those problems,
the Court rarely referred to the Rules of Decision Act.101
In the same period, the Court was called upon to declare the
limits of the holding in Erie. That case could be read as speaking to
the constitutional power of the federal government.102 It was thus
natural for the Court to neglect other possible constraints on fed98

See id. at 77-80.
For various uses of the notion of state law governing "of its own force," see Hart,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 529 (1954); Mishkin,
The Variousness of "FederalLaw " Competence and Discretionin the Choice of Nationaland State
Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 799 (1957); United States v. Little Lake Misere
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973). For the refinements at the beginning of the
sentence, see Westen & Lehman, supra note 17, at 315-16, 356-58, 389 & n.226.
100 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956); Ely, supra
note 17, at 700-06.
101 See Westen & Lehman, supra note 17, at 371-72.
102 But see, e.g., Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARv. L. REV.
1682 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Last Words]. Professor Mishkin reads Erie as being
animated by a perception of constitutional limitations on federal lawmaking by the federal courts in addition to those on federal lawmaking by Congress. See id. at 1684 n.10;
see also Mishkin, supra note 99, at 800 n.13. I agree with him that there are such limitations, but Erie need not be read to speak to the issue, at least for the reason given by
Professor Mishkin. It may be true that "even by then contemporary standards, Congress
would have been seen as having power to prescribe a substantive rule of liability for the
specific accident in Erie." Mishkin, Last Words, supra, at 1684 n. 10. See also, e.g., Ely, supra
note 17, at 703 n.62; Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 397 n.66 (1964). But, other explanations for the Court's language
aside, it is not clear that the Court thought Congress then had, or that it now has, the
power to prescribe such a rule applicable only in federal courts, with the states having
concurrent jurisdiction and remaining free to apply their own rules. That, of course,
would be the statutory equivalent of the "federal general common law" banished in Erie,
304 U.S. at 78, in the sentence immediately preceding that commenting on the powers
of Congress. It is unclear whether Professor Merrill shares this view of Erie. Compare
Merrill, supra note 92, at 14 with id. at 15.
I am aware that Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967), may be thought to suggest power in Congress to regulate interstate commerce
through legislation applicable only in federal court. See id. at 405. But the question was
left "up in the air," id. at 424 (Black, J., dissenting), and the Court subsequently and
unambiguously held that at least certain provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act are
binding in state courts. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984). Moreover, it seems clear that, whatever Congress's actual intent, it could have restricted the
Act's applicability to federal courts in the exercise of its power to regulate the procedure
99
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eral common law, including the Rules of Decision Act.1 0 3 At least it
was not surprising when the occasions for declaring Erie's limits did
not involve the exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction, and given
that old habits die hard.
In recent years, the Court and most commentators have recognized that the reach of Erie's constitutional holding is short even in
diversity cases. In other words, state law rarely governs "of its own
force." 1 0 4 The Court has not made clear, however, whether the
nonconstitutional constraints on judicial lawmaking in diversity
cases derive from the Rules of Decision Act or from some other
source. When called upon to decide whether federal common law
governs in nondiversity cases, however, the Court has recognized,
albeit begrudgingly, that the Act does have a role to play. The reasons for the Court's ambivalence become clear when one considers
the history of federal common law after Erie.
It is commonplace that the question whether federal common
law or state law governs involves a two-step inquiry.10 5 The first
of the federal courts. See id. at 25-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Westen & Lehman,
supra note 17, at 356.
I also agree with Professor Mishkin that "where Congress has ... spoken in terms
which are not only unambiguously consistent with an underlying constitutional principle
but actually affirmatively restate its meaning and implications and thus reinforce itproper construction of the congressional language should be most hospitable to giving
it full range." Mishkin, Last Words, supra, at 1686. I am, therefore, puzzled why he has
given short shrift to the Rules of Decision Act in his other work on federal common law.
See Mishkin, supra note 99, at 800-01 n.16, 814 n.64; infra note 108 and accompanying
text. A finding of federal lawmaking competence does not exhaust constitutional concerns about the separation of powers. See Merrill, supra note 92, at 20. And taking the
Rules of Decision Act seriously will prevent the "egregious abuses" that, it is common
ground, would be unconstitutional. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 17, at 340-41.
The Erie Court knew the difference between "federal general common law," see Erie,
304 U.S. at 78, and "federal common law." Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). In stating that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law
of the State," Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, the Court may have intended to address the issue that
concerned Professor Mishkin. CompareJay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133
U. PA. L. REv. 1231, 1313 (1985) ("Not a word in Erie spoke to the problems to come in
cases such as Clearfield Trust ....")with id. at 1319-20 (implicitly recognizing that
quoted language does speak to those problems). The Court's formulation is, in any
event, reminiscent of the Rules of Decision Act. In neither case need the language used
be interpreted "in a crabbed or wooden fashion." Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S.
584, 598 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Friendly, supra, at 408 n. 119. But see C.
WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 60, at 388.
103
See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). There the
Court upheld the application of rules developed by the federal courts prior to Erie. See
id. at 367. But see D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447,
465-75 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
104
See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965); Ely, supra note 17, at
700-06; supra text accompanying note 99.
105 See generally Mishkin, supra note 99. See also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
440 U.S. 715, 726-29 (1979). Other important works on federal common law include
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step looks to whether there is federal competence to provide a rule
of decision. At one level, the issue of competence requires an examination of the constitutional prerogatives of the federal government.
At another level, the inquiry requires an examination of the prerogatives, both constitutional and statutory, of the federal courts. Particularly in the early years following Erie, the Court tended to
conflate the two levels and hence to leap from a conclusion of federal power to one ofjudicial power. 10 6 Moreover, in its enthusiasm
for a legitimate, although hardly new, species ofjudicial lawmaking,
the Court at times treated the second step of the inquiry-whether a
uniform federal rule or state law "adopted as federal law" should
apply-cavalierly, if it paused at that step at all.107
More recently, the Court has applied the brakes. The Court has
paid some attention to the second level of the first step of the inquiry-the relationship between the federal courts and Congress.
But it has applied most of the braking force at the second step. Increasingly, the Court, while asserting that a matter is governed by
federal law, has determined that there is no need for a uniform federal rule. The result in these cases is that state law governs, as federal law, unless it is found to be hostile to or inconsistent with
federal interests.' 0 8
And what is the relevance of the Rules of Decision Act? In a
1973 decision, the Court suggested that, where the first step of the
inquiry (federal competence) is satisfied, "the Constitution or Acts
of Congress 'require' otherwise than that state law govern of its
Friendly, supra note 102, and Hill, The Law-Making Power of the FederalCourts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967). For an interesting recent article, taking a
general approach to federal common law, see Merrill, supra note 92.
106 See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50
(1939); Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 296 (1941); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943). But see D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 465-75 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring). See
infra note 108.
107
See, e.g., Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940); D'Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 451-59 (1942); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
108 See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). See also C.
WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 60, at 393. Cf. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. I1 (1979) (private right of action); Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication
Doctrine's Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IowA L. REV. 617
(1984).
Professor Mishkin justified lack of specificity as to the boundaries of federal judicial
competence on the ground that "in many areas of undoubted federal competence, adoption of state law is indicated, and functionally the areas of competence may well shade
off imperceptibly into those where state law governs of its own force." Mishkin, supra
note 99, at 800 n.15.
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force."' 0 9 Ten years later, the Court observed that, when the second step of the inquiry yields the conclusion that a uniform federal
rule applies, "then the Rules of Decision Act is inapplicable by its
own terms." 110
The first of these decision may be thought to suggest that the
constitutional holding of Erie not only limits the interpretation of
the Rules of Decision Act but exhausts it. In any event, the Court's
approach deprives the Act of any role in defining the circumstances
in which it is appropriate for the federal courts, as opposed to Congress, to make law. But there is no historical warrant for the suggestion that Erie's constitutional holding exhausts the Rules of Decision
Act, whatever confusion about the reach of that holding may have
followed in its wake. The Act is not confined to cases in which state
law governs "of its own force.""' Moreover, the language of the
Act requires federal judges to justify federal common law by reference to a constitutional or statutory source that either explicitly or
implicitly authorizes-"provides" for-or implicitly and plausibly
12
calls for-"requires"--its creation."
The quoted statement from the second decision is correct, and
its negative pregnant is that, if a uniform federal rule is not required
or provided for by the Constitution or acts of Congress, the Act is
not "inapplicable by its own terms." The Court was unwilling to
109 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973). See
also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979) (quoting Little Lake
Misere).
I10 DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983).
111 See, e.g., McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830); McNiel v. Holbrook, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 84 (1838); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895). See also Hill, State
ProceduralLaw in FederalNon Diversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 66, 78-83 (1955); Note,
The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules of DecisionAct and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J.
678, 680-90 (1976). These sources document the application of the Act to matters, such
as statutes of limitations and evidence, as to which federal competence is indisputable.
They also make clear that any attempt to confine the Rules of Decision Act to questions
of substantive law is ahistorical. Compare Hazard, supra note 92, at 645 and Merrill, supra
note 92, at 32 with Burbank, supra note 92, at 661.
112
"In a much-admired concurring opinion," C. WRIGr, supra note 56, § 60, at

389, but one that, in this aspect, is much ignored, Justice Jackson observed:
I do not understand Justice Brandeis's statement. . . that "There is no
federal general common law," to deny that the common law may in
proper cases be an aid to, or the basis of, decision of federal questions.
In its context it means to me only that federal courts may not apply their
own notions of the common law at variance with applicable state decisions except "where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United
States [so] require or provide."
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring). See also Merrill, supra note 92, at 27-32; infra note 121.
"[Tireaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), are omitted here and
elsewhere for economy of expression only. Cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938), quoted supra note 102.
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accept that conclusion and, by argumentation reminiscent of the
kitchen sink, struggled to avoid it. a"1 We may quickly dispense with
the Court's suggestion, based on language in Erie, 1 4 that the Act is
confined to diversity cases. 1 5 That suggestion finds no support in
the language of the Act, in history, or in the Court's own fumblings
with the Act in nondiversity cases." 16 The fact that considerations
requiring application of state law in diversity cases are not relevant
to the elaboration of a federal legislative scheme'1 7 tells us nothing
about the relevance of the Rules of Decision Act in the latter context. Similarly, the fact that "neither Erie nor the Rules of Decision
Act can now be taken as establishing a mandatory rule that we apply
state law in federal interstices""" does not answer the question
whether the Act speaks to the circumstances when the filling of
those interstices with judge-made federal law is permissible. It is
true, of course, that where federal lawmaking competence exists, it
113 See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159-61 n.13
(1983). For other criticism of DelCostello, see Merrill, supra note 92, at 31 & n.138.
114 "[Tlhe purpose of the section was merely to make certain that, in all matters
except those in which some federal law is controlling, the federal courts exercisingjurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would apply as their rules of decision the law of
the State, unwritten as well as written." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73
(1938).
115 See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 160 n.13.
116 The Court explicitly rejected an attempt to restrict the Act's applicability in
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614-16 (1895). See also DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 173
n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The DelCostello Court's attempt to dispatch Campbell and
other cases on the ground that they were decided before Erie, in which it had recognized
the restricted purpose of the Act, is unpersuasive. See id. at 160 n.13. The Erie Court
relied on the work of Charles Warren. See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
JudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923), cited in Erie, 304 U.S.
at 73 n.5. Although the original congressional grants ofjurisdiction magnified the importance of diversity cases, Warren's attribution of a restrictive purpose involved pure
speculation, rhetorically useful in aid of the author's effort to demonstrate that the
Court erred in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See Warren, supra, at 83-84.
Professor Goebel posits no such restricted purpose. See J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO

1801, at 502-

03 (Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 1, 1971). For other more recent historical work casting doubt on Warren's conclusion on this matter, as well as on others, see Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section
34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513
(1984). See also infra note 121.
Although he noted that "[t]he Court has not extended the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins beyond diversity cases," D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
315 U.S. 447, 467 (1942) (concurring opinion), Justice Jackson did not question the
broader applicability of the Rules of Decision Act. See id. at 465-66, quoted supra note
112. See also Hazard, supra note 92, at 643; Burbank, supra note 92, at 659; Currie, On
Blazing Trails: Judge Friendly and FederalJurisdiction,133 U. PA. L. REV. 5, 8 (1984); Westen
& Lehman, supra note 17, at 367-68. As to the "oft-encountered heresy" that Erie is
limited to diversity cases, see, e.g., Friendly, supra note 102, at 408-09 n.122.
117 See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 160 n.13 (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
392, 394 (1946)).
118 Id. at 161 n.13.
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is a federal question whether the federal courts may, under the Constitution and acts of Congress, fashion federal rules."i 9 But one of
those acts is the Rules of Decision Act. Federal common law cannot
plausibly be deemed one of the "Acts of Congress" referred to
there,' 20 the best hope for those who do not simply wish the statute
12
away or confine it to diversity cases. '
The real problem with taking the Rules of Decision Act seriously, as an original proposition, is that the standards for the creation of federal common law suggested in the Act may be thought
inadequate to the needs of the federal government, including those
of the federal judiciary. Moreover, in light of what transpired after
Erie, the Act is an embarrassment because it is a reproach. But those
days are gone, if not wholly forgotten. The Court is now more re119
Cf. Mishkin, supra note 99, at 802 ("federal judicial competence to choose which
law shall govern").
120 But see Westen & Lehman, supra note 17, at 369-71; Westen, supra note 17, at 98588. I agree with Professor Redish's criticisms of Professor Westen's position on this
issue. See Redish, supra note 17, at 962-64, 968 n.60. See also C. WRIGrr, supra note 56,
§ 60, at 388 n.4.
This is not to say that federal common law that is itself, valid under the Rules of
Decision Act may never serve as a valid source of policy in federal common lawmaking.
See Merrill, supra note 92, at 58 n.247, quoted infra note 189.
121
For other techniques to avoid confronting the Rules of Decision Act, see
Mishkin, supra note 99, at 800 n.16; Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1512, 1515 (1969); supra note 102. Having pointed out the flaws in the argument that
federal common law should be read into the exception clause of the Rules of Decision
Act, see supra note 120 and accompanying text, Professor Redish achieves the same result
by manipulating the language "in the cases where they apply." See Redish, supra note 17,
at 968 n.60.
Professor Fletcher argues that the Act was originally viewed as an embodiment of a
broader lex loci principle. See Fletcher, supra note 116, passim. So viewed, the Act imported choice among bodies of law not, in modern terms, exclusively federal or exclusively state. See also R. BRIDWELL & R. WHrEN, THE CONSTrrUTION AND THE COMMON
LAW 78-97, 99 (1977). But Professor Fletcher is careful to distinguish between judgemade "general common law," which was not binding on the states, and judge-made
federal law, which, to the extent it was thought to exist (a hotly debated point), was
supreme. See Fletcher, supra note 116, at 1521-27. See also Jay, Origins of Federal Common
Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1985); Jay, supra note 102 (both supporting
Fletcher's conclusion in this regard). Assuming contemporaneous views of the Act
should be imputed to the Congress that passed it, nothing in Professor Fletcher's account detracts from the view, taken here, that the Act speaks directly to the circumstances in which federal courts can fashion or apply judge-made rules of federal law
binding on the states. But seeJay, supra note 102, at 1263-67. Moreover, on that assumption, changes in the way in which we think about law mean that the language "in the
cases where they apply" no longer "leaves us an out." Redish, supra note 17, at 968
n.60. Nor do various statements to the effect that the Act is "merely declarative of the
rule which would exist in the absence of the statute" leave us an out. Mason v. United
States, 260 U.S. 545, 559 (1923). Compare Mishkin, supra note 99, at 801 n.16 (invoking
such statements as reason to view Act as only "an expression of an underlying policy")
with R. BRIDWELL & R. WHrrrEN, supra, at 110-11 (explaining such statements in historical context). For another similar use of such statements by Professor Mishkin, see
Mishkin, Last Words, supra note 102, at 1683 n.9.

762

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:733

spectful of Congress's prerogatives and of state law, albeit usually at
the second step of the traditional inquiry. 122 The Court need not
apologize for past transgressions, but it should set its house in
order.
The traditional two-step inquiry is not necessary to protect federal interests, and it may have led to a misallocation of lawmaking
within the federal government. If the Constitution or acts of Congress, fairly read, provide for or require federal common law, state
law does not apply. The same is true whether a uniform federal rule
is called for or a particular state rule is found to be hostile to or
inconsistent with federal interests. 12 3 In other cases where the Constitution does not so ordain, state law applies, not "of its own force"
and not by judicial grace or borrowing, but because Congress has
borrowed it.124 The considerations that have prompted the Court
to eschew independent choice of law rules in diversity cases, a result
not required by the Constitution, 2 5 are not pertinent outside that
context. The same is true with respect to the freedom of the federal
26
courts to determine the law of a particular state.'
The only reason to leave the Rules of Decision Act "a derelict
. . .on the waters of the law"' 127 is to avoid highlighting past mistakes. That seems an insignificant benefit measured against the
costs, not just those inevitably incurred when the federal courts fail
to take seriously an act of Congress, particularly one that imposes
limits "on the courts themselves,"' 128 but also the costs of continuing doctrinal uncertainty. There is good reason not to interpret the
Act "in a crabbed or wooden fashion,"' 29 but it is time to rescue it
from the open seas.
2.

Cases in which Federal Law Furnishes the Rules of Decision

As we have seen, even prior to Erie and the dual revolution it
initiated, 13 0 the Supreme Court had applied federal law to determine some questions regarding the preclusive effects of federal judicial proceedings.
The proceedings in question involved
determinations of federal substantive rights. 13 ' Since Erie, it has beSee supra text accompanying note 108.
See infra text accompanying notes 173-74.
See Westen & Lehman, supra note 17, at 315-16, 356-59.
See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 102, at 401-02; Hart, supra note 99, at 515.
See Mishkin, supra note 99, at 806-10.
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring & dissenting).
128
Mishkin, Last Words, supra note 102, at 1687. See supra note 102.
129
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See
Merrill, supra note 92, at 31-32.
130 See generally Friendly, supra note 102.
131
See supra text accompanying notes 70-80.
122
123
124
125
126
127
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come widely accepted that federal preclusion law governs all ques32
tions in such cases.'
When considering the law that governs the preclusive effects of
federal judgments adjudicating matters of federal substantive law, it
would seem necessary to advance an approach that is consistent with
the Court's general approach to federal common law. The view that
the Rules of Decision Act applies only in diversity cases or the view
that its exception clause is triggered upon finding that there is federal lawmaking competence does not provide an escape. But analysis under the Rules of Decision Act should lead to largely the same
results as traditional federal common law analysis if the Act is "used
to give expression to important federal interests"' 33 plausibly
grounded in the Constitution or acts of Congress and if the traditional analysis takes separation of powers seriously.
Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to
prescibe the effects of state judgments in other jurisdictions; it does
not provide any authority with respect to cases domestic to one
state.' 3 4 The Court has never maintained that article IV has anything to do with the interjurisdictional effects of federal judgments,135 and a fortiori, it does not speak to domestic preclusion
rules, whatever "domestic" means when federal judgments are concerned.' 36 The federal government's interest that the judgments of
its courts be respected is fairly inferable from other provisions of
the Constitution or laws of the United States. A federal common
law obligation to respect such judgments is binding under the
supremacy clause. Moreover, to the extent that they provide the
measure of that federal obligation, the rules adopted to govern the
preclusive effects of federal judgments, whether furnished by federal or state law are also binding under the supremacy clause.' 3 7 But
the source of those rules remains to be determined.
Congress's constitutional power to create substantive law entails power to define the preclusive effects of federal question judgments. Congress has only rarely exercised that power.' 38 In the
case of putative federal common law rules of preclusion that are
binding in federal and state court alike, state interests are impliSee infra text accompanying notes 205-10.
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
135
See, e.g., Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130, 134 (1875); Embry v.
Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1883). See also supra text accompanying notes 29-30, 34-35.
136
See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
137
See supra text accompanying notes 47-55.
138
See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4466, at 621; Hazard, supra
note 92, at 643. I do not here consider Congress's power under article III. See iqfra text
accompanying notes 227-31.
132

133
134
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cated. Moreover, as demonstrated later in this Article, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide federal preclusion law, because the Rules Enabling Act does not authorize Federal Rules of
preclusion. 13 9 It is important, therefore, to analyze, rather than
merely to accept, the widely shared view that federal preclusion law
determines the effects of federal judgments adjudicating matters of
federal substantive law.
a. Preconditionsto Preclusion. There is little difficulty in concluding that uniform federal law governs two matters typically regarded
as preconditions to the application of preclusion. The validity of a
judgment is thought to turn on the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and territorial authority in the rendering court and due notice to the defendant. Finality is a concept that, as it has been
developed, has no fixed referent outside of the law of preclusion
and, at least in recent years, no fixed meaning within it. 140 Save for
any constitutional constraints, neither validity nor finality need play
a part in domestic preclusion law. But if, as it appears, there is a
federal common law obligation not to disregard federal judgments,
it requires as a corollary that the federal courts have the power to
define the conditions precedent to status as a "judgment" having
the potential for preclusive effect. Moreover, the need here is not
simply for federal law-in-reserve, acting only as a check against hostile or inconsistent state law. The nature of the problem demands a
uniform, and uniformly federal, solution. 14 1 Under a traditional
federal common law analysis, there is federal competence and a
need for uniform federal law. Under the Rules of Decision Act, uniform federal law applies because the Constitution or acts of Congress-whichever is deemed the source of the basic obligation139

See infra text accompanying notes 182-98.
For treatments of validity and finality from a domestic perspective, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS §§ 1-16 (1982); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note
5, §§ 4427-4434.
141
These elements of preclusion law are so closely tied to the basic obligation of
respect that a regime of borrowed state law would entail serious risks of evasion of that
obligation, as well as administrability problems for the Supreme Court and for litigants.
See infra text accompanying notes 144-76. The risk of evasion seems particularly great in
connection with the question of validity.
140

[T]he question of validity often arises in a context in which there is also
serious doubt about the quality of the adjudication in other respects. As a
result, it often can be said with equal meaning that a judgment ought to
be avoided because it is invalid and that it ought to be regarded as invalid
because it should be avoided.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS ch. 2, introductory note, at 20 (1982).

For a case suggesting that federal preclusion law governs a question of validity of a
diversity judgment, see Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522
(1931).
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require otherwise than that state law apply. Under both approaches,
the federal solution is one that binds federal and state courts alike.
b. Claim Preclusion. The same reasoning applies to one aspect
of claim preclusion. Traditional claim preclusion doctrine required
that, in order for a judgment to bar another action by the plaintiff
on the same claim, the judgment must have been "on the merits."
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments has discarded this label, but it
retains the notion that some judgments do not constitute a bar. 142
Again, there is nothing in the nature of things that requires exceptions to the doctrine of bar. Except as constrained by the Constitution, jurisdictions are free to define those exceptions under
domestic law. The basic obligation to respect federal judgments
would be meaningless, however, if courts in subsequent proceedings were free to define those judgments that can preclude. Uniform federal common law rules, binding throughout the country,
43
are necessary.'
The analysis becomes more complex with respect to the rest of
claim preclusion. At a time when the concept of a cause of action or
claim was narrowly formulated and closely tied to the source of the
right under substantive law asserted in the action in the rendering
court,' 44 federal preclusion law could be justified by reference to the
underlying federal substantive law. 'In the event of a federal judgment in such circumstances, it was not for the states to alter the
federal rights thereby determined. The mode of analysis, focusing
on federal judgments as repositories of federal rights, was that used
by the Court in Deposit Bank v. Frankfort.'4 5 Moreover, little would
have been gained in distinguishing between federal law on the front
lines and federal law held in reserve. There was a high degree of
homogeneity in preclusion law throughout the country at that
time,146 fostered by the Supreme Court's invocation of or reliance
14 7
on "general common law."'
The modern tendency in domestic preclusion law, reflecting the
enhanced procedural opportunities available to litigants in the rendering court and enshrined in the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments, is
142 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 (1982); see also 18 WRIGrr,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, §§ 4435-4447.

143

See supra note 141. The conclusion that uniform federal rules are required does

not automatically follow from the perception of a federal interest. See supra note 82.
144 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24 comment a, at 196-97 (1982).
145 191 U.S. 499 (1903). See supra text accompanying notes 49-50 & 72-75.
146 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 comment a, at 315 (1982).
147 See, e.g., Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 315, 320-22 (1818) (federal
question judgment); Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U.S. 30 (1924)
(diversity judgment); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4468, at 652. In the
famous case of Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877), it is impossible to be sure

from the opinions the precise nature of the action claimed to have preclusive effect.
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away from a narrow formulation of the concept of "claim" for preclusion purposes. 148 Nonetheless, in this area, as in preclusion law
generally, there appears to be less homogeneity among American
legal systems than once obtained.' 4 9 In any event, rules of claim
preclusion, like all preclusion rules, are "[1]egal rules which impact
significantly upon the effectuation of federal rights."' 150 Under
traditional federal common law analysis, they must therefore "be
treated as raising federal questions."' 5 1 The next step under that
analysis is to choose between uniform federal rules of claim preclusion or state law adopted as federal law (meaning that there is power
in the federal courts to choose the state law and to check any rule of
state law found to be hostile to or inconsistent with federal interests). Under the Rules of Decision Act, the two steps merge, and it
is here that the approaches appear to diverge.
So long as preclusion law affects substantive rights, there is a
federal interest in the definition of the federal rights adjudicated in a
federal judgment. It is not clear, however, whether that interest requires uniform federal rules. Even if preclusion law is less homogeneous than it once was, still, it is difficult to justify uniform federal
rules on the basis of a priori predictions of adverse effect of state law
on federal interests. 15 2 Moreover, modem claim preclusion law may
foreclose unadjudicated assertions of rights over a broad range of
legal sources, and, in the present context, those sources need not be
federal. 153 Even when all sources are federal, as for instance when
the putative federal rule of preclusion would foreclose subsequent
assertions of legal rights under a federal statute different from that
which was relied upon in the first action, uniform federal rules can
rarely be justified by reference to the policies animating the statutes.
It is obviously impossible to make that case when the rights foreclosed arise under state substantive law.
Under traditional federal common law analysis, when state law
148

See

149
150

See id. § 87 comment a.
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477 (1979).

151

Id.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 24 (1982).

152 Compare United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729-38 (1979) (borrowed state law would not hinder administration of federal loan programs) with DelCostelIo v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161-69 (1983) (borrowed state
statutes of limitations "unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law").
153

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 comment e (1982); Cemer v.

Marathon Oil Co., 583 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); infra note 299.
As to the separate problem of "state questions. . . decided as an incident of federal
question litigation," it has been suggested that "the clear right of federal courts to insist
on their own preclusion rules as to the federal questions may carry over to include all
questions in a uniform body of doctrine." 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, Supra note 5,
§ 4472, at 733 (footnote omitted).
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is borrowed as federal law, displacement occurs only when a particular state rule is found to be hostile to or inconsistent with federal
interests. 15 4 But the anterior inquiry-whether a uniform federal
rule is necessary-is not cabined in the same way. A uniform rule of
federal common law must be consistent with federal substantive interests, but scope is given for the consideration of the values of uniformity itself. There are, in other words, situations in which "the
very application of varying state laws would itself be inconsistent
55
with federal interests."'
Ranged against the considerations favoring borrowed state law
are problems of administrability for the federal courts that such a
system would entail. Preclusion rules are characteristically transsubstantive. A trans-substantive body of federal preclusion law imperfectly accommodates particular federal substantive schemes;
trans-substantive bodies of state preclusion rules are even more
worrisome. Although federal and state judges alike are obligated to
adjust preclusion rules that are inconsistent with federal substantive
policies, 156 federal judges are likely to be more sensitive to dissonance than are their state counterparts, particularly in connection
with claims within exclusive federal jurisdiction. The rendering
court does not determine the preclusive effects of a federal judgment, 15 7 and some of the courts that determine them are not federal
courts. If a state court decided the preclusion question applying
borrowed state law, it is not clear that discretionary review by the
Supreme Court would be an "[a]dequate means . . . to insure fair
treatment of.

.

. federal interests."' 158

Interjurisdictional preclusion rules also implicate problems of
administrability for litigants. Preclusion rules affect litigation strategy. It is therefore important that litigants know what the rules are.
Before filing a complaint asserting federal rights in a federal court,
or in response to the successful removal of such a case to federal
court, the plaintiff should be able to predict with considerable assurance the rules of claim preclusion that will govern a judgment. A
system that informed a plaintiff to look to state law, unless state law
was hostile to or inconsistent with federal substantive interests,
See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1979).
Id. at 479 n.6. Compare United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 72040 (1979) (refusing to fashion uniform federal law) with Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 366-72 (1977) (refusing to borrow state law).
156
Cf. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (statutes of
limitations).
157
"[The question of the binding effect of thejudgment in the first action is tested
only in the later actions." Sutcliffe Storage & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 162 F.2d
849, 853 (1st Cir. 1947). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2972
(1985); C. WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 72, at 483.
158 See Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 674 (1979).
154
'55
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would immediately prompt the questions, what state and what
law? 15 9 These questions are particularly poignant where federal jurisdiction is exclusive.' 60 The first question may be difficult even
when jurisdiction is concurrent, because the constraints on choice of
law applicable to the exercise of diversity jurisdiction do not obtain
outside of that context.' 6 ' Uncertainty might lead our hypothetical
plaintiff to guess wrong and thereby to lose rights under the substantive law. Even if the answer to the choice of law question were
clear,162 prediction would depend upon the further steps of ascertaining state preclusion law 1 63 and testing it against federal substantive interests. Uncertainty would probably prompt a person in this
situation to play it safe by satisfying the broadest rule of claim preclusion potentially applicable.
Difficulties of this order are not, however, restricted to preclusion rules. In filling the interstices of federal statutes with limitations periods, the Court has usually opted for state statutes, unless
inconsistent with federal substantive interests.' 64 The problems of
uncertainty in these cases are even more vexing. Moreover, the potential impact of uncertainty on rights asserted under the substan159
The decision to borrow state law "raises two questions: first, to what State do we
look, and second, given a particular State, what part of that State's law [governs the
matter]." De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956).
160
Apart from the problem of choice of law, see infra text accompanying note 161,
exclusive jurisdiction cases present an additional difficulty: no state cases announcing a
rule to deal with the precise problem of claim preclusion before the federal court exist.

This difficulty is discussed in detail, with reference to initial adjudication in state court,

infra text accompanying notes 428-61.
161
See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1956); 19 WRIGHT, MILLER
& COOPER, supra note 5, § 4514, at 264-65; Mishkin, supra note 99, at 806-08; Note,
Applicability of State Conflict Rules Vhen Issues of State Law Arise in Federal Question Cases, 68
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1955). But see UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705
n.8 (1966) (applicability of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), to
borrowed state limitations law an open question).
162
The federal courts could solve the problem of lack of predictability by adopting
for all cases the preclusion law of the state in which the rendering federal court sat. This
was the regime suggested by Crescent City Livestock Co. v. Butchers' Union Slaughter
House Co., 120 U.S. 141 (1887). See supra text accompanying notes 66-68. Moreover,
applying Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), see supra note 161,
would usually lead to the same result. But see infra text accompanying note 327. The
only state interests implicated in this situation derive from the possible foreclosure of
rights under state substantive law. Thus, either approach would render the protection
of those interests wholly fortuitous. The rights in question may not be provided by the
substantive law of the state in which the federal court sits.
163
See supra note 160.
164
See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
To belabor the obvious, the problem of the limitations period for a federal claim
implicates federal procedural as well as federal substantive interests: state interests are
either negligible or nonexistent. Therefore, the problem provides a useful basis for testing the analysis in the text, as well as, one would think, a sobering dose of reality for
advocates of a federal common law of procedure.
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tive law is even more dramatic, and those rights are unquestionably
federal. 6 5 Here, the risk-averse plaintiff would comply-if he
could-with the strictest limitation period potentially applicable.
In both the preclusion and limitations contexts, the lack of
strong state interests and concerns about the administrability of a
system of borrowed state law support a uniform federal rule.
Problems of administrability may themselves lead to the loss of federal rights. In the case of the limitations period for a federal statute,
the federal nature of the loss, should it occur, is certain. In the case
of the rules of claim preclusion in an action asserting federal rights,
the federal nature of the loss is contingent-as is the loss of rights
under substantive state law. On the other hand, in the preclusion
context federal courts are relatively less fettered by the conventions
of common law courts and their implications for the separation of
powers.1 66 Thus, in most cases involving the limitations period for a
federal statute, the federal courts are faced with a choice between
state law and the creation of federal law that is inherently arbitrary.' 6 7 In contrast, federal courts have available to them a corpus
of preclusion law that was fashioned by federal judges. 1 68 And in
the area of preclusion as to federal question judgments, federal
judges are less encumbered by precedent applying state law, particularly precedent under the Rules of Decision Act.' 69 The Supreme
Cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1944-47 & n.34 (1985) (uniform federal
165
characterization of civil rights claims for purposes of state limitations law borrowed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
166
See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 (1966) ("drastic sort of
judicial legislation"); Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83-84 (2d Cir.
1961); Currie, supra note 116, at 6, 8.
167 But see, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169
n.20 (1983) (applying existing federal limitations period); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (same). "Even so simple a matter as placing limitation
periods on private actions requires a statute; no common law principle explains why a
cause of action valid on one day should be barred the next." Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1717, 1721 (1982).
168
See, e.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877); supra text accompanying
note 147. For the relevance of the existence of a body of law fashioned by federal judges
to the choice, under traditional analysis, between uniform federal rules and borrowed
state law, see, e.g., California es rel. State Lands Comm'n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273,
284 (1982); Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1961).
The existence of a body of law fashioned by federal judges, although not specifically
mentioned, may also have played a part in cases like Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), where the Court found federal common law rules in the
general federal common law fashioned prior to Erie. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
For purposes of this analysis, it is necessary to ignore decisions that have assumed
its conclusion by formulating uniform federal preclusion rules.
169
See supra text accompanying notes 130-31. In DelCostello v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), the Court rejected previous decisions that had attributed the application of state limitations law to the Rules of Decision Act. See id. at 159
n. 13. For criticism of its reasoning, see supra text accompanying notes 110 & 113-21.
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Court has recently come to realize the costs of borrowed state limitations law. 170 There is no good reason to incur such costs in connection with preclusion rules for the federal question judgments of
federal courts.
Finally, a regime of borrowed state preclusion law in this context might skew litigants' choices in the initial action in a manner
contrary to federal procedural policy. Whatever the role of such
policy, or the sources thereof that are cognizable, in the creation or
application of federal common law, 17 1 it is appropriate to consider
potential procedural costs in determining whether federal preclu72
sion law will be uniform or episodic.'
In sum, under traditional federal common law analysis, the
rules of claim preclusion governing a federal court judgment adjudicating matters of federal law are within federal competence. Moreover, the problems of administrability, for courts and litigants, that
would attend a regime of borrowed state law-problems that include the possible loss of federal substantive rights-support uniform federal rules. The federal courts need not write on a clean
slate. Their rules, if known in advance, should prevent the inadvertent loss of any state substantive rights.
Under a Rules of Decision Act approach, difficulty arises only if
the Act is interpreted to require that the precise content, rather than
the creation, of uniform federal common law rules be "required" by
the Constitution or acts of Congress. Nothing in the language of
the Act, however, compels that interpretation, even when state law,
normally applicable, is displaced because it is hostile to or inconsistent with federal interests. 17 3 When the application of state law
threatens federal substantive rights, the sources of those rights re17 4
quire otherwise than that state law apply.
Uniform federal preclusion rules must be consistent with federal substantive law, but they need not be limited to its protection.
For the results under the Rules of Decision Act in this context, see infra text accompanying notes 173-74.
170
See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985) (uniform federal characterization of civil rights claims for purposes of state limitations law borrowed under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1982)).
171
See infra text accompanying notes 181-95 & 291-301.
172 Federal procedural policy with respect to the scope of the initial action is, in this
aspect, indeterminate. See FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a); infra note 176; text accompanying note
197. But it is not clear that the uniformity inquiry need, or that it should, be cabined by
existing federal law. Moreover, preclusion law affects litigation strategy and may affect
the scope of litigation in a manner contrary to a policy of the rendering court that speaks
only to the initial action. See infra notes 195 & 242; seefurther infra text accompanying
note 376.
173
The Rules of Decision Act is set forth supra note 18.
174
See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13
(1983); supra text accompanying note 110.
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When required to displace state law, federal judges have the power
to fashion a substitute that is fully adequate in light of all of the
policies and interests that a common law court would consider in
making law to govern the matter.' 7 5 They need not blind themselves to the procedural opportunities afforded by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure nor to the capacity of preclusion doctrine to
lessen the burdens of litigation on courts and parties. But, at the
same time, they should not confuse stated opportunities with stated
requirements nor in their quest for judicial economy see in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure support for preclusion rules that is not
76
there. 1
c. Claim Preclusion: Defenses and Counterclaims. Claim preclusion
includes defenses to rights asserted under the substantive law.' 77
Where federal rights are asserted in federal court, the federal interest in defining both those defenses and the circumstances in which
they are precluded is patent. There is no scope for variation if a
federal judgment is regarded as a repository of federal substantive
rights. 178 In addition and for the same reason, uniform federal law
is required for the definition of the circumstances in which a subsequent suit by the defendant in a federal action adjudicating federal
rights should be precluded because such suit, if successful, would
nullify the federal judgment or impair rights established by it.'7 9
The tendency of modern law is to broaden the scope of required counter-demands. 8 0 As a result, arguments for uniform federal rules do not rest comfortably on the need to protect the
substantive rights embodied in the federal judgment. In this instance, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure appears to speak directly
175
"Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and federal statutes,
and is conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the
traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw upon all the sources of the
common law ..
" D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S.
447, 472 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). See id. at 469-70, quoted
supra note 112; Redish, supra note 17, at 964.
176
Cf. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978) (FED. R.
Ciy. P. 14(a) permits claim by plaintiff against third-party defendant but does not purport to and could not determine question of subject matter jurisdiction).
FED. R. Civ. P. 18, quoted infra note 197, could not provide a valid rule of preclusion.
See infra text accompanying notes 181-86. Moreover, far from expressing a policy in
favor of broad claim preclusion, the Rule is by its terms indifferent. It may, therefore,
prove a trap for the unwary litigant, and its preclusion implications would doubtless
have come as a surprise to the Congress that allowed it to go into effect.
177
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 (1982).

See supra text accompanying notes 144-47.
For the treatment of this problem in domestic law, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 22(2)(b) (1982); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4414.
178
179

180
TIVE

See R. MILLAR,
123-39 (1952).

CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPEC-
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to the problem.' 8 ' But Rule 13(a) raises more questions than it
answers.
d. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Common Law.
Those who drafted the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were not notably concerned about questions of power. They shared
no conception of the limitations imposed on their enterprise by the
Rules Enabling Act. In cases that they regarded as close, members
of the Advisory Committee tended to rely on the Supreme Court to
preserve them from error.18 2 It is striking, therefore, that the Committee rejected as exceeding its authority the strongly urged suggestion that its class action rule should include a provision as to the
preclusive effects of a judgment on persons not parties.18 3 Moreover, although Rule 14 originally included a provision on preclusive
effects, the Committee deleted that provision in 1946 as beyond the
18 4
rulemaking power.
On both occasions, the Committee was correct. Read in the
light of its history, the Enabling Act does not authorize Federal
Rules that predictably and directly affect rights claimed under the
substantive law.' 8 5 Aside from the fact that it governs procedure in
the rendering court, which lacks the power finally to determine the
preclusive effects of its judgment, Rule 13(a) does not in so many
words and could not validly provide a rule of preclusion. Indeed,
the apparent inflexibility of the Rule provides a case study for differ181

A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time
of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action was
commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2)
the opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other
process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13.
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
182
See Burbank, Rules EnablingAct, supra note 87, at 1131-37.
183
See id. at 1164 n.637.
184
A 1946 amendment to Rule 14 deleted the following sentence: "The third-party
defendant is bound by the adjudication of the third-party plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff, as well as of his own to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff." 3 J. MOORE,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
14.01[lI], at 14-7 (2d ed. 1984). According to the Advisory Committee, the sentence was "stricken from Rule 14(a), not to change the law, but
because the sentence states a rule of substantive law which is not within the scope of a
procedural rule. It is not the purpose of the rules to state the effect of ajudgment." Id.
14.01[3], at 14-11.

185 See Burbank, Rules EnablingAct, supra note 87, at 1121-31. For a remarkable misreading of the implications of my work in this context, see Note, supra note 29, at 1520
n.99.
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ences in standards of validity of Federal Rules and86 federal common
1
law in cases involving federal substantive rights.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not, however, irrelevant.
The Rules Enabling Act authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate "general"-that is, uniform-Federal Rules of practice and
procedure. Such Rules cannot by the express terms of the Act
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 187 Valid Federal Rules displace state law under the Rules of Decision Act not
because they are "Acts of Congress" but because they are provided
for by an act of Congress and one, moreover, that was enacted after
the Rules of Decision Act.1 8 8 In authorizing the Court to promulgate Federal Rules, Congress must have contemplated that the federal courts would interpret them, fill their interstices, and, when
necessary, ensure that their provisions were not frustrated by other
legal rules. 18 9 That does not mean that the federal courts are free to
create uniform federal decisional law or displace particular state law
rules in areas untouched by the Federal Rules. 190 Nor does it mean
that the federal courts can create federal common law on the basis
of policies not validly the concern of Federal Rules.1 9 1 It does
mean, however, that when the Supreme Court has exercised the
power delegated by Congress to prescribe uniform Federal Rules,
we should regard those Rules, if valid, as if they were acts of Congress. In effect, they are assimilated to the Enabling Act for purposes of the Rules of Decision Act. Because Federal Rules cannot
validly provide for the creation of federal common law-Rule 83 in
186 See Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 87, at 1193; Burbank, Sanctions, supra
note 87, at 1007-10; Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U.

MicH. J.L. REF. 425, 437-38 (1986).
187 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
188 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 17, at 718 & n.134.
189 See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 104 S. Ct. 2794, 2801-03
(1984); American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551, 553-54, 559 (1974);
Tullock v. Mulvane, 184 U.S. 497, 512-13 (1902); Kroetz v. AFT-Davidson Co., 102
F.R.D. 934, 936 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Cf. Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 651 &
n.51 (1983) (in action governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), displacement of state tolling rule not necessary to protect federal interest expressed in FED. R. Civ. P. 23). "But
there is no reason why preemptive lawmaking could not also be based on the need to

preserve or effectuate policies articulated by federal courts pursuant to delegated lawmaking." Merrill, supra note 92, at 58 n.247; supra note 120.

For a view of American Pipe as implying greater freedom to fashion federal law than
that suggested in the text, see Bourne, supra note 17, at 491-92. But seeJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466-67 (1975) (suggesting importance of"relevant body of federal procedural law to guide. . . decision").
The analysis in the text can be extended to local rules of court promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982). See Burbank, supra note t, at 636 n.59; infra note 282.
190

For rejection of uniformity as an argument for judge-made federal rules of pro-

cedure, given the Enabling Act, see Redish & Phillips, supra note 17, at 390 n. 184.
191

See infra text accompanying notes 194-95.
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that aspect is invalid19 2-they are sources of power only if, fairly
read, they may be said to require it.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can thus serve as sources of
federal common law, not only by leaving interstices to be filled but
also by expressing policies that are pertinent in areas not covered by
the Rules. Even when legal regulation in a certain area is forbidden
to the Rules, the policies underlying valid Rules may help to shape
valid federal common law. 193 But, when a Rule speaks to, and only
to, a matter with which it has no proper concern, it is a troublesome,
if not a bootstrap operation to invoke the Rule as legal justification
for a federal common law rule that effects the same purpose. Rule
13 serves as an apt example.
Rule 13 was modelled after Rule 30 of the Supreme Court's
Equity Rules of 1912, which also contained a compulsory counterclaim provision. According to the Court in a case involving Rule 30,
"[t]hat which grows out of the subject-matter of the bill must be set
up in the interest of an end of litigation." 194 Although the Advisory
Committee refrained from stating a rule of preclusion in the text of
Rule 13(a), it cited that opinion and other authority for the conclusion that "[i]f the action proceeds to judgment without the interposition of a counterclaim as required by subdivision (a) of this rule,
the counterclaim is barred."' 195
It was natural for the Advisory Committee to preserve the
mandatory language of the Equity Rule. And, particularly at a time
192
The last sentence of FED. R. Civ. P. 83, as amended in 1985, provides: "In all
cases not provided for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may regulate their
practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which
they act." For suggestions that the Rule is invalid, see Burbank, Rules EnablingAct, supra
note 87, at 1193 n.83; Burbank, Sanctions, supra note 87, at 998 n.2. For full discussion
of that question, including an analysis of the views and purposes of the original Advisory
Committee, see Rules EnablingAct of 1985: Hearing on H.R. 2633 and 3550 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 24-31 (1985) (letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 27, 1984)).
193
See cases cited supra note 189. See also C. WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 72, at 483 (to
permit person opting out of class certified under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) to rely on
favorable judgment for preclusion purposes "would make a mockery of the (b)(3)
procedure").
194
American Mills Co. v. American Sur. Co., 260 U.S. 360, 365 (1922).
195
3 J. MOORE, supra note 184, 13.01[2], at 13-8. See also Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974); Southern Constr. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57,
60 (1962) (per curiam).
A rule like 13(a) might be animated by procedural purposes within the contemplation of the Rules Enabling Act. For instance, one might conclude that the adjudication
of claims having the prescribed relationship could result in more accurate fact finding in,
and a more just resolution of, the initial action. Cf. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of
ScarceJudicialResources: The Efficiency of FederalIntervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701, 714
(1978) (joinder devices "should provide the court with more information about each
individual claim, revealing strengths and weaknesses").

1986]

INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRECLUSION

when compulsory counter-demands were not common, it was helpful for the Supreme Court to signal in its Equity Rules an intent to
depart from the norm. But none of this renders Rule 13(a) legal
support for a federal common law rule.19 6 If that is to be done, it
must be justified on the grounds that the Rule, itself not having the
proscribed effect, is valid and that Congress, alerted to the preclusion implications of the Rule, nevertheless failed to block it. At least
Rule 13(a), unlike Rule 18(a),1 9 7 alerts litigants to the possibility of
losing claims if they do not assert them in the initial federal action.
Unless Rule 13(a) supports creation of a uniform federal common law rule of compulsory counterclaims in federal actions adjudicating federal substantive rights, the argument for such a rule must
rest on the difficulty in supervising a system of borrowed state law
and the problems posed for litigants by such a system. If that argument prevails, the uniform rule may be fashioned with Rule 13(a) in
mind. In either event, any such rule should admit of exceptions in
addition to those required by the substantive law. t98
196
On the problem of incorporating pre-existing "federal law" beyond the power of
the rulemakers to fashion in the first instance in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see
Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 87, at 1147-57.
197
"A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as
many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against an opposing party." FED. R.
Cxv. P. 18(a). See Commercial Box & Lumber Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 623 F.2d 371, 374
n.2 (5th Cir. 1980); Degnan, supra note 3, at 764.
198 In Cavanaugh v. Western Md. Ry., 729 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
222 (1984), the court rejected plaintiff railroad engineer's contention that the Federal
Employers' Liability Act does not permit a defendant railroad to assert a counterclaim
for property damage in the employee's action for personal injuries under the Act. The
court relied in part on the fact that, if not permitted in the employee's action, the claim
would be barred by reason of Rule 13(a). See id. at 291. Although the court adverted to
possible constitutional objections to such a result, see id. n.5, it did not consider the
possibility that a federal common law rule of preclusion, waiver, or estoppel would account for the inability of the railroad, by reason of the interpretation of the FELA, to
assert its claim in the suit by the employee. The court's argument was, of course, a
bootstrap, but it was a bootstrap encouraged by the general poverty of analysis of Rule
13(a).
On the use of Rule 13(a) to create a waiver or estoppel, see, e.g., Dindo v. Whitney,
451 F.2d 1, 3 (Ist Cir. 1971); Wright, Estoppel By Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under
Modern Pleading,38 MINN. L. REv. 423 (1954). The author of that article observes:
Can a neater example be imagined of the impossibility of sensible distinctions between "substance" and "procedure"? Compulsory counterclaim
provisions are enacted as a regulation of "procedure," and indeed if, as
in most jurisdictions, they have been made by rules of court, they are
valid only as regulation of "procedure" which must leave rights of "substance" unimpaired. Yet their effects are held to be extra-territorial on
the explicit ground that these effects are "substantive."
Id. at 436. With these views, compare, in addition to the analysis in the text:
In recognizing the interdependence of procedure and substance. . . it is
not necessary, although it may be convenient, to reject the utility of any
attempt to develop rules or standards of classification for court rulemak-
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e. Issue Preclusion. Against this background, we need not pause
long over the law governing the issues precluded by a federal court
judgment adjudicating matters of federal substantive law. To the
extent that redetermination of issues adjudicated in the federal action might alter the substantive rights embodied in the judgment,
there is a federal interest in furnishing the rules. 19 9 In addition, the
rights that a litigant may lose through adjudication in the federal
action include federal rights not asserted in the original action.
There is a federal interest in ensuring that the rules employed are
sensitive to considerations that might make that loss unjust. 2 °0 The
difficulties of supervising a system of borrowed state law and the
potential costs of such a system are comparable to those discussed
in connection with claim preclusion. 20 ' Moreover, the existence of
valid uniform federal rules of claim preclusion furnishes an additional argument for the same regime as to issue preclusion. To the
extent possible, litigants and the courts should not have to conform
their litigation conduct or their decisions to two separate bodies of
20 2
preclusion law.
One aspect of issue preclusion, however, deserves closer scrutiny. After a federal court adjudicates matters of federal law, the
question may arise whether strangers to that action can use findings
in it, defensively or offensively, in subsequent litigation against one
ing purposes. It is necessary to accept that allocation rules, like other
legal rules, will not appropriately adjust the competing policies and interests in all of the cases to which they are applied. We should, of course, be
alert to the dangers of labels. We should question whether formalism
exacts too heavy a price when the question is who should decide. But we
should not continue to hide behind the dangers while pretending to perform a task mandated by Congress.
Burbank, Rules EnablingAct, supra note 87, at 1188 (footnote omitted).
199 Cf. Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907) (patent infringement suit against customer of victorious defendant in previous such suit violates right established by judgment in latter); supra text accompanying note 78. "Finality, repose and reliance are
often centered on a colloquial sense of the 'rights' established by ajudgment that can be
expressed only through binding determination of issues that cannot be reexamined
merely because a new claim . . . can be identified." 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,
supra note 5, § 4467, at 632-33.
For a recent case in which the Supreme Court appears to have proceeded on the
view that federal preclusion law governs the issue preclusive effects of one of its own
decisions, rendered in a case originating in a state court, see Limbach v. Hooven &
Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1984).
200 For the treatment of such matters in a domestic context, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28 (1982); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, §§ 442226.
201 See supra text accompanying notes 154-72. As suggestive of the risk to litigants
from guessing wrong, consider possible variations in state law on the question whether
actual litigation is a requirement of issue preclusion. Compare Vestal, The Restatement (Second) ofJudgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 464 (1981) with Hazard, supra
note 80, at 574-86.
202

See supra note 60.
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of the parties. Jurisdictions differ on this question, traditionally
treated under the rubric of mutuality of estoppel. 20 3 Following a
vigorous and highly successful attack on mutuality, there now seems
to be doubt about the wisdom of the revolution. 20 4 For our purposes, the question is not the wisdom of this or that rule, but
whether federal or state law governs the matter where a federal
court determined issues of federal law.
On this question, recent Supreme Court authority suggests, if it
does not compel, the answer that uniform federal law governs. The
first case in this recent series, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,20 5 demonstrated that the choice between
mutuality or nonmutuality as to federal issues adjudicated in a federal action may implicate substantive federal policies. In approving
defensive nonmutual issue preclusion in patent litigation, the Court
relied in part on those policies and in part on considerations of efficiency as regards parties and judicial administration. 20 6 But the
Court had already concluded that federal law governed, not relying
on the fact that in both actions involved in Blonder-Tongue the federal
courts had exclusive jurisdiction or otherwise justifying uniform federal law (as opposed to federal-law-in-reserve). In a footnote, the
Court laconically observed that "[i]n federal-question cases, the law
applied is federal law," 20 7 and cited in support an equally laconic
remark in one of its own decisions, a law review article and cases
cited therein. 20 8 There the matter has rested. In the interim the
Court has decided, as a matter of uniform federal law, that offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion is available in a federal action against a
company that had lost an action brought in federal court by the
SEC 20 9 and that nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not ap210
ply against the United States.
203

See generally

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, §§ 4463-65.
204
See, e.g., Green, The Inability of Offensive

§ 29 (1982); 18

WRIGHT,

CollateralEstoppel to Fulfill its Promise: An
Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOwA L. REV. 141 (1984).
205 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
206 See id. at 328-50.
207
Id. at 324 n.12.
208
This Court has noted, "It has been held in non-diversity cases, since Erie
.... that the federal courts will apply their own rule of res judicata."
Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946). See also Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66
Mich. L. Rev. 1723, 1739, 1745 (1968); id., cases cited at 1739-1740,
nn.62-64.
Id.
209
See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
210
See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984). But see id. at 162 (holding
limited to "relitigation of issues such as those involved in this case"). For other related
Supreme Court cases, see Corr, Supreme Court Doctrine in the Trenches: The Case of Collateral
Estoppel, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 37-50 (1985).
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In light of the federal interest in these circumstances 2 1 and the
problems of administrability that would attend a system of borrowed state law, even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is difficult to fault the conclusion that uniform federal law governs,
although it is easy to fault the lack of analysis of that question.
Moreover, here, as in other aspects of the preclusion law governing
federal question judgments, we need not consider whether an asserted federal interest in finality, judicial economy or the repose of
the parties (other than an interest in protecting adjudicated substantive rights) would have justified the wholesale displacement of state
law. 2 12 Once the Court found displacement necessary for other reasons, it properly considered those interests in fashioning uniform
federal rules. Whether the Court was wise in appearing to embrace
the revolution without regard to the requirements of substantive
law, 2 13 and whether "uniform" rules as fraught with qualifications
2 14
and exceptions as those the Court adopted are in fact efficient,
are inquiries beyond the scope of this Article.
3.

Cases in which State Law Furnishes the Rules of Decision

a. The State of the Law. In proposing a general rule that federal
preclusion law governs the scope and effect of federal judgments,
Professor Degnan was primarily concerned with diversity judgments. 2 15 The blessing of the Supreme Court, however laconic,
seemed to render the analysis of federal question judgments, at
least those within exclusive jurisdiction, unnecessary. In any event,
the result as to federal question judgments followed afortiori if the
day could be won on diversity judgments.
Professor Degnan did not rely solely on abstract arguments and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He had available a smattering
of decisions that applied uniform federal law to govern the preclu211
"[Tjhe abandonment of mutuality causes a statistically certain decrease in the
recovery of a party facing multiple opponents on related claims." Note, A Probabilistic
Analysis of the Doctrine of Mutuality of CollateralEstoppel, 76 MICH. L. REV. 612, 679 (1978).
212
These matters are considered infra text accompanying notes 291-301.
213
Compare Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-33 (1979) with
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330-50 (1971).
See Corr, supra note 210, at 39-40, 67.
214
See Green, supra note 204; Levin & Leeson, Issue PreclusionAgainst the United States
Government, 70 IowA L. REV. 113, 134-35 (1984). In rejecting the application of nonmutual offensive issue preclusion against the United States, the Court characterized "the
standard announced by the Court of Appeals for determining when relitigation of a legal
issue is to be permitted" as "so wholly subjective that it affords no guidance to the
courts or to the Government." United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984). A
similar concern is raised by the "standard" set forth in ParklaneHosiery, 439 U.S. at 331,
and in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982). See infra text accompanying
note 393.
215
See Degnan, supra note 3, at 755-73.
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sive effects of federal diversity judgments in varying circumstances. 21 6 By the time he published his article in 1976, the Fifth
2 17
Circuit was clearly moving toward the rule he espoused.
Since 1976, at least two other circuits have adopted Professor
Degnan's general rule for diversity judgments. The result in one
circuit, however, may be attributable to filial piety. 21 8 The result in
the other is supported by such tenuous authority and analysis that it
is ripe for reconsideration. 21 9 The courts in three circuits apply federal law to govern the preclusive effects of a federal judgment as to
matters addressed in Rule 41(b), but they have not otherwise taken
a clear position. 2 20 In one circuit the position is clear that the gov2 21
erning preclusion law depends upon the precise legal question,
216 See, e.g., Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962); Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 397 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1968); Degnan, supra note 3, at 761-63. As to Click,
see infra note 220.
217 See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed and
cert. denied sub noma.Metropolitan Dade County v. Aerojet-General Corp., 423 United
States 908 (1975); Degnan, supra note 3, at 766-68. For subsequent Fifth Circuit cases,
see, e.g., Henderson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 695 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1983);
Hardy v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
218
See Precision Air Parts, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 736 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11 th Cir. 1984)
(citing only decisions of its parent, the Fifth Circuit), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 966 (1985).
219 See Silcox v. United Trucking Serv., Inc., 687 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1982). The court
in Silcox purported to follow Cemer v. Marathon Oil Co., 583 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1978)
(per curiam). See Silcox, 687 F.2d at 852. But Cemer involved a federal question judgment; moreover, the court in that case relied on FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) as to the effect of a
dismissal and did not clearly distinguish the question of the law governing the scope of
the claim precluded. See Cemer, 583 F.2d at 832.
220
Second Circuit: Compare PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896-97 (2d
Cir.) (federal law governs effect of dismissal of diversity action under FED. R. Cxv. P.
41(b)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983) with Weston Funding Corp. v. Lafayette Towers,
Inc., 550 F.2d 710, 713 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977) (unnecessary to "decide whether state or
federal law, if they were in conflict, would control the resjudicata effect of a dismissal by
a federal court in a diversity action when the dismissal is based not on a federal rule...
but on a state door-closing statute"). Third Circuit: Compare Compagnie Des Bauxites De
Guinee v. L'Union Atlantique S.A. D'Assurances, 723 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1983) (federal law governs effect of dismissal of diversity action under FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (b)) with id.
at 361 n.1 (unnecessary to decide whether state or federal law of issue preclusion applies). See also Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493, 1497 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(collecting Third Circuit cases). Eighth Circuit: Compare Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc.,
397 F.2d 590, 592-93 (8th Cir. 1968) (federal law governs effect of dismissal of diversity
action under FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b)) and Degnan, supra note 3, at 762-64 (Glick implicitly
applies federal law of claim preclusion) with Gatzemeyer v. Vogel, 589 F.2d 360, 362
(8th Cir. 1978) (applying state law of claim preclusion) and Iowa Elec. Light & Power
Co. v. Mobile Aerial Towers, Inc., 723 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying state law of
claim and issue preclusion).
For the text of Rule 41(b), see infra note 238.
221
See Answering Serv., Inc. v. Egan, 728 F.2d 1500, 1505-06 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The
court in Egan qualified broad language in Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493
(D.C. Cir. 1983), which held that federal law governs the finality of a diversity judgment.
For a student comment on Hunt, see Note, Federal Courts-The Role of the Erie and Full
Faithand Credit Doctrines in the Choice Between State and Federal Res Judicata Law in Consecu-
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and in another, state law seems still to be the rule, although, again,
the courts' reasoning leaves much to be desired. 2 22 In the remain22 3
ing five circuits, the matter is up for grabs.
Professor Degnan's arguments have also influenced commentators and law reformers, although not usually to the extent of full
embrace. The two most prominent works on the subject in the intervening years, the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments and the treatise
of Professors Wright, Miller and Cooper, take the position that federal law governs but that, as to certain questions of preclusion implicating state substantive policies, state law should be borrowed as
federal law.2 24 The Restatement's qualification is, however, expressed
in the comment to black letter that states: Federal law determines the
2 25
effects under the rules of res judicata of a judgment of a federal court.
Moreover, neither work takes full account of the implications of
post-Erie Supreme Court decisions on the relationship between federal and state law in diversity cases.
b. Sources of FederalCompetence. If it is correct that the basic obligation to respect federal judgments requires rules defining a
"judgment" to which that obligation attaches, binding in federal
and state courts, that conclusion is as applicable to judgments on
state law questions as it is to federal question judgments. Moreover,
in this context as well, the federal interest in uniform federal rules
2 26
appears to be sufficiently strong to rule out resort to state law.
live Diversity Actions-Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1983), 57
TEMPLE L.O. 159 (1984).
222 See Gasbarra v. Park-Ohio Indus., Inc., 655 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1981); Morgan v.
Inter-Continental Trading Corp., 360 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1966); Lindsay v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (questioning Morgan but following it).
For criticism of Gasbarra,see Note, ResJudicatain the Federal Courts: Federalor Slate Law?,
17 IND. L. REV. 523, 534-35 (1984).
223 First Circuit: See Skrzat v. Ford Motor Co., 389 F. Supp. 753 (D.R.I. 1975) (state
law applied to permit offensive nonmutual use of federal diversity judgment). Fourth
Circuit: See Adkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1984) (claim preclusive

effect of federal diversity judgment determined without reference to state law). Ninth
Circuit: See Performance Plus Fund, Ltd. v. Winfield & Co., 443 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (applying federal law on finality of federal diversity judgment but state law on
nonmutual issue preclusion). Tenth Circuit: See McCarty v. First of Georgia Ins. Co., 713
F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1983) (applying state claim preclusion law to federal diversity judgment, without explanation). But see Fraley v. American Cyanamid Co., 570 F. Supp. 497
(D. Colo. 1983) (explicitly rejecting use of state law to determine availability of offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion).
I have not found any pertinent cases in the Federal Circuit.
224 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 87 comment b, at 316-18 (1982); 18
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4472, at 732-40. See, to the same effect, C.

WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 100A, at 695-96.
For recent student work bucking this trend and reaching results more in line with
those suggested here, see Note, supra note 29; Note, supra note 222.
225
226

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 87 (1982).

See supra text accompanying notes 140-43. This tentative conclusion should be
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When a federal court judgment involves only state substantive
law, federal competence to prescribe other rules of preclusion rests
primarily, although perhaps not exclusively, on article III of the
Constitution and the necessary and proper clause of article I, section 8. Current conceptions of Congress's powers under article III
and the necessary and proper clause suggest that Congress could, if
it chose, enact a complete code of preclusion rules to govern state
law actions brought in federal court. 22 7 Some of the policies that
may be considered in fashioning preclusion rules concern the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.
Thus, the rules would be "rationally capable of classification" 2 28 as
procedural.
The analysis proceeds smoothly so long as both actions, that
potentially preclusive and that to which the preclusive effects may be
attached, are brought in federal court. The analysis inspires less
confidence with respect to a federal-state configuration. In that context, apparently, the necessary and proper clause must do double
duty, 229 or Congress's power to protect federal substantive interests
23 0
must be added to the constitutional scales.
Congress has not enacted a code of preclusion rules, and I have
argued that the Constitution cannot plausibly be interpreted to give
that power, as against a contrary congressional directive, to the federal courts. I have also argued that, in considering the relationship
between federal and state law on matters of preclusion, the Rules of
tested within the analytical framework set forth infra text accompanying notes 265-306.
In that regard, it is not clear that the federal policy against different outcomes on the
basis of citizenship would be violated by different rules on the matters in question. See
Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finality); see also Note,
supra note 221, at 162-63.
227 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965); 18 WRIGrr, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 5, § 4466, at 621 ("Within the limits imposed by the case or controversy requirements of Article III, Congress probably has power to enact a code of res
judicata principles for federal judgments as part of its control over the creation, jurisdiction, and procedure of federal courts.").
228 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
229
The analysis assumes the basic federal obligation of respect as well as a limited
number of federal preclusion rules essential to implement that obligation. See supra text
accompanying note 220. It also assumes that these matters exhaust any discrete federal
interest in finality. See infra text accompanying notes 294-96. The remaining federal
"procedural" interests served by preclusion law are implicated only if subsequent litigation is brought in federal court. See ifra text accompanying notes 287 & 298-99. Finding support for federal preclusion law in article III and the necessary and proper clause
therefore requires opting for a procedural classification as to a matter "falling within the
uncertain area between substance and procedure," Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472, and positing
federal power to protect contingent federal interests.
230 See supra text accompanying note 138. Application of preclusion law to adjudications of state law claims by federal courts may have the effect of precluding federal
claims or issues.
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Decision Act cannot be ignored.2 3 ' That position is strongest in diversity cases. The Act appears to have been influential in shaping
pre-Erie law that the preclusive effects of federal alienage and diversityjudgments are governed by state law. 2 32 Moreover, not even the
Supreme Court in its most desperate moments has suggested that
2 33
the Act is inapplicable in diversity cases.
The task of justifying uniform federal rules across the whole
spectrum of preclusion law would appear easy if the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure embodied such a code. In that event, on any interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act that reflected modern de2 34
velopments, the Act would be "inapplicable by its own terms."
But the Rules Enabling Act does not authorize Federal Rules of preclusion, and the rulemakers, with few exceptions, have not sought to
state them. 2 35 The rule bearing most closely on claim preclusion

suggests anything but foreclosure of assertions of legal rights. In
that respect Rule 18(a) may be thought to convey a promise to be
broken. 2 36 The rule on compulsory counterclaims, Rule 13(a), is a
product of history and, at most, a vehicle of legal support for federal
23 7
common law.
Finally, properly viewed, Rule 41 (b) 2 38 merely states what other
sources of federal law, of a nationally binding character, have the
power to determine; it thus provides fair notice to litigants. 23 9 FedSee supra text accompanying notes 81-129.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
233
See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
234 DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983).
See supra text accompanying notes 110 & 113-21. For the relationship between the Rules
of Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act, see supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
235
See supra text accompanying notes 181-86.
236
See supra note 176 and accompanying text. Cf. Answering Serv., Inc. v. Egan, 728
F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (cross-claim under FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (g)).
237
See supra text accompanying notes 181-86, 193-98.
238 For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or
any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of
231

232

any claim against him . .

.

. Unless the court in its order for dismissal

otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal
not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (b).

239
This may be viewed as an instance of the phenomenon I call incorporation. See
supra note 196. In that regard, the 1963 amendments to the Rule responded in part to
decisional law. See 5J. MOORE, supra note 184, T 41.01[12], at 41-10 (1963 advisory
committee note).
The provision in Rule 41(a)(1) that "a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the
United States or of any state an action based on or including the same claim," FED. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(1), has been described as "unique at the time it was first adopted." 9 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2368, at 187 (1971). If so,
the most that can be said for it is that it suggests a rule that could validly be formulated
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eral standards are necessary to determine when a federal judgment
can preclude subsequent litigation, whatever law governs the
preclusive effects of that judgment. 2 40 In the case of so-called penalty dismissals under Rule 41(b), 24 1 that interest is buoyed by the
additional consideration that uncertainty as to the binding nature of
federal judicial action might lead to disregard of perfectly valid Federal Rules and orders and that the costs of such disregard would fall
on the federal courts. 2 42 Thus, the decision in a case upon which
Professor Degnan relied, Kern v. Hettinger,24 3 was correct, and the
courts that have subsequently reached similar decisions were correct. 24 4 We may forgive reliance on Rule 41 (b) as a direct source of
legal power in Kern and elsewhere, 24 5 but we should be wary of attempts to extrapolate from the decisions a more general rule regarding the relationship between federal and state preclusion
24 6
law.
c. Federal Common Law: General Considerations. If federal law is
to govern all matters of the scope and effect of federal diversity
judgments, that law must be federal common law. It is possible to
maintain that the Rules of Decision Act's force is exhausted once
there is a finding of federal lawmaking competence, 2 47 and that the
federal interest in the nature of a "judgment" entitled to respect, if
as a matter of federal common law as a corollary to the basic federal law obligation to
respect federal judgments. But see, e.g., Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 299 F.2d 480,
485 (8th Cir. 1962) (upholding validity of Rule).
240
See supra text accompanying notes 140-43 & 226; infra note 246 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Asociacion de Empleados del Instituto de Cutura Puertorriquena v.
241
Rodriguez-Morales, 538 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1976); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra
note 5, § 4467, at 643-44.
That is, there is a federal interest relating solely to the initial litigation thatjusti242
fies a federal rule. See supra note 195.
243
303 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962). See Degnan, supra note 3, at 761-63.
244
See cases cited supra note 220.
See Kern, 303 U.S. at 340; Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee v. L'Union Atlan245
tique S.A. D'Assurances, 723 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1983); Degnan, supra note 3, at 76063; Note, supra note 29, at 1519. Cf. Cemer v. Marathon Oil Co., 583 F.2d 830, 832 (6th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (Rule 41 (b) dismissal in federal action asserting federal substantive rights); supra note 219.
That is not to say that such reliance is without costs, in particular the loss of flexibility that characterizes common law adjudication. Cf supra text accompanying 186; infra
text accompanying note 310 (Rule 13(a)). In the case of Rule 4 1(b), comparable flexibility has been achieved by generous interpretation of the language "lack ofjurisdiction."
See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 286 (1961).
246
Kern itself demonstrates that the application of federal law to a matter covered by
FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) does not predetermine the law governing the claims or issues that
may be precluded by the judgment or the parties who may benefit from or are bound by
the judgment. There, the court assumed that state law would govern the availability of
nonmutual issue preclusion but found it unnecessary to choose between New York and
California law. See Kent, 303 F.2d at 340-41.
247
See supra text accompanying notes 109 & 11- 12.
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not Congress's power under article III to enact a complete code of
preclusion rules, satisfies the competence requirement. But that argument does not dispense with the need to justify a complete body
of judge-made federal preclusion rules, rather than state law borrowed as federal law. Rather, it remits the search for standards goverming the creation of federal common law to sources exclusive of
the Rules of Decision Act.
In light of a demonstrable federal interest in some matters of
preclusion, and assuming that uniform federal law governs those
matters, we should consider the possibility that a complete body of
uniform federal rules is necessary as to diversity judgments for the
administrability of the system of preclusion rules. To the extent
possible, litigants and courts should not be required to pick and
choose among preclusion rules. 24 8 Moreover, in this context too,
the use of state preclusion law could skew litigants' behavior in a
24 9
manner contrary to federal procedural policy.
According to the analysis to this point, the matters governed by
federal preclusion law all have to do with preconditions to recognition or, in the case of the "on the merits" exception to claim preclusion, something that is functionally identical. They are a discrete
group, clearly recognizable as such by courts and litigants. The uncertainty that might confront a litigant in a federal question case as
to the state law to be borrowed 250 is reduced, if not eliminated, in
the diversity context by the existence of a clearly stated choice of law
rule for the federal courts. 25 ' Further, whereas in federal question
cases state substantive interests are usually contingent, in diversity
cases, assuming the action involves the adjudication of rights under
state substantive law, state interests are directly and inescapably implicated. 25 2 The existence of uniform federal preclusion rules, developed for federal question judgments, is relevant. But those rules
See supra note 60; text accompanying note 202.
See supra text accompanying notes 171-72.
250 See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
251 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam). Moreover, in an action
grounded solely on state substantive law, litigants need be less concerned that, in a subsequent action, state preclusion law will be displaced because hostile to or inconsistent
with federal substantive interests. As to the possibility of displacement in aid of federal
procedural interests, see infra text accompanying notes 278-85 & 291-301.
252
Cf Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327,
1337 n.4 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("By contrast, when a federal court construes
substantive rights and obligations under state law in the context of a diversity action, the
federal interest is insignificant and the state's interest is much more direct than it is in
the present situation, even if the relevant state law is ambiguous.").
For a case suggesting that federal issue preclusion law governs the judgment of a
federal diversity court adjudicating matters of federal substantive law, see Partmar Corp.
v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89, 92 (1954).
248
249
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are trans-substantive and hence poorly suited to protect substantive
rights, particularly those conferred by another legal system. 2 53 Finally, an independent federal policy affects the circumstances in
which uniform federal law can be applied in diversity cases. The
effect of that policy in other contexts has been to submerge the costs
to the federal courts and litigants of a mixed system of federal and
state law.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Hanna v. Plumer2 54 and
Walker v. Armco Steel Co. 25 5 suggest that when the only putatively pertinent federal law is federal common law, the question whether a
common law rule applies in diversity cases depends upon two inquiries. First, one asks whether the application of a federal rule,
rather than the rule that would be applied by the courts of the state
in which the federal court sits, would materially affect the character
or result of the litigation-whether, in more familiar terms, the rule
in question is outcome determinative. Second, if the answer to that
question is affirmative, one asks the further questions whether the
difference between the putative federal rule and the state rule would
lead a litigant to choose a forum for that reason or whether application of a variant federal rule would lead to inequitable administration of the laws. 25 6 It also appears that, if the rule in question is
outcome determinative, it does not matter whether, on the facts of
the case, it prompted choice of forum, so long as applying a variant
federal common law rule would result in inequitable administration
2 57
of the laws.
All of this is, of course, well known to first year law students.
What is surprising is that those who do not accept Professor
Degnan's complete dispatch of the Rules of Decision Act and who
have espoused a modified version of his general rule for diversity
judgments proceed as if these cases did not exist.2 58
One possible explanation for the failure to grapple with the Erie
line of cases is a conclusion that those cases are irrelevant to questions concerning the preclusion law that governs the effects of a federal diversity judgment. But the conclusion is insupportable. It is
253
For the relevance of existing federal rules, see supra note 168. For purposes of
this analysis, the validity of federal preclusion rules for federal question judgments is
assumed. On the problem of trans-substantive rules applied trans-systemically, compare
supra text accompanying notes 156-58 (similar concern as to use of state preclusion law
for federal question judgments).
254
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
255
446 U.S. 740 (1980).
256
See, e.g., Walker, 446 U.S. at 744-47, 752-53; Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466-69 (dictum).
257
Walker, 446 U.S. at 753. For a suggestion that inquiry into the facts of the case
on the issue of forum shopping is inappropriate, see Burbank, Rules EnablingAct. supra
note 87, at 1175.
258
See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
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true that preclusion rules are not made by, and do not have their
ultimate bite in, the rendering court. But in fashioning preclusion
rules for federal judgments, federal courts are bound by federal
statutes, including the Rules of Decision Act and federal jurisdictional statutes. The purpose of the enterprise is precisely to determine the law that will attend a federal diversity judgment and that
will bind all courts, federal or state, in which the judgment is subsequently raised. Once that law is ascertained, it will not only furnish
the rules prescribing the ultimate bite, but it may also affect the conduct of litigation in the rendering court. As Professor Degnan recognized, albeit in a different context, "[i]f 'outcome determinative'
is the relevant test. . . hardly anything is more dispositive than the
25 9
doctrine of resjudicata."
Another possible reason for ignoring Erie's progeny is disagreement with the approach taken in those cases. This apparently
played a part in the Restatement's treatment. The comment to section
87 follows Professor Degnan's reasoning, including his historical account, a long way down the path, but draws back at the point of
banishing state law entirely. The comment mentions Erie and the
Rules of Decision Act, and it suggests that federal law should adopt
state preclusion law when the purposes of the latter can be characterized as substantive. The analysis wholly neglects the Supreme
Court's decisions that characterize rules as substantive according to
2 60
their effects on diversity cases.
We can disagree with the message in Hanna's dictum, which arguably became a command in Walker, but we should not ignore it.261
Indeed, since Dean Ely helped to clarify matters by pointing out that
one problem is really three, 26 2 scholars have disputed whether the
dilemma identified in Hanna's dictum is the dilemma that should
concern federal courts sitting in diversity to administer state law
where there is no pertinent constitutional or statutory provision or
Federal Rule. 2 6 3 Without repeating this debate, it may be useful to
259 Degnan, supra note 3, at 754 (footnote omitted). Differences in some aspects of
preclusion law, however, may not affect choice of forum. See Hunt v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 707 F.2d 1493, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1983); supra note 226.
260 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 87 comment b (1982). For the text
of § 87, see supra text accompanying note 225. See also C. WRIGHT, supra note 56,
§ 100A, at 695-96.
261
Professor Hazard, reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, has recently
expressed his disagreement with the post-Eie cases in this context. See Hazard, supra
note 92. For my response, see Burbank, supra note 92. For earlier, general, expressions
of disagreement, see Redish & Phillips, supra note 17; Redish, supra note 17; Bourne,
supra note 17.
262 See Ely, supra note 17.
263
See sources cited supra note 17.
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restate the implications of my analysis for some of the major points
in dispute before moving to the problem at hand.
d. The Rules of Decision Act. Whatever its role in prescribing the
relationship between federal and state law in other contexts, the
Rules of Decision Act unquestionably plays a role in diversity cases.
Moreover, the Act cannot fairly be read to exempt federal common
law from its requirements. Nor is the Act exhausted when there is
federal lawmaking competence. Finally, the last resort, selectively
reading the Act so that the reader determines "the cases where [the
laws of the several states] apply," turns the Court's mistake in Klaxon
2 65
Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 264 into a cop-out.
The Act does not prohibit federal common law, however. The
creation of federal common law must be justified by reference to
provisions (or the structure) of the Constitution, federal statutes, or
Federal Rules that, fairly read, so provide or so require. 266 In some
cases, the interpretation of those sources will yield the conclusion
that a uniform federal rule governs. In other cases, state law applies, unless hostile to or inconsistent with federal interests, and it
does so not because the federal courts have borrowed it but because
Congress has borrowed it.
Under this view, federal courts are not automatically remitted
to state law by the Rules of Decision Act whenever a matter has escaped specific treatment in the Constitution, an act of Congress, or
Federal Rules. It is doubtful, on the other hand, whether they have
the freedom suggested by the Court in Hanna.2 67 The analysis confines the federal "procedural" policies that federal courts can consider in creating federal common law to those that find expression
264
265

313 U.S. 487 (1941).

267

"In the first place, it is doubtful that, even if there were no Federal Rule making

See supra text accompanying note 125; note 121. Although times have changed,
and with them notions about law, language in the Rules of Decision Act that reflected an
understanding of the power of federal courts to choose the applicable law (even if
designed to ensure a choice of state law as to "local" questions), see Fletcher, supra note
116, need not be deprived of all significance, let alone used to deprive the Act of all
significance. Under this view, the Act empowers a federal court to choose which state's
law to apply, even in a diversity case. See Jay, supra note 102, at 1269.
266 See supra text accompanying notes 109-29, 173-76 & 187-92. As to local court
rules, see supra note 189; infra note 282. See also supra note 120 (federal common law as
source of policy for federal common law).
it clear that in-hand service is not required in diversity actions, the Erie rule would have
obligated the District Court to follow the Massachusetts procedure." Hanna, 380 U.S. at
466 (dictum). The Court did not make clear whether it was assuming not only no pertinent Federal Rule but also no relevant Federal Rules. Compare Kroetz v. AFT-Davidson
Co., 102 F.R.D. 934, 936-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (existence of relevant Federal Rules requires development of federal case law) with id. at 937 (even if Federal Rules silent, court
need not apply state law if to do so "would not discourage forum-shopping or avoid the
inequitable administration of the laws"). For other criticism of Hanna'sdictum, see Burbank, Rules EnablingAct, supra note 87, at 1174-75 & n.682.
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in or are fairly inferable from the Constitution, acts of Congress and
valid Federal Rules.
Federal law may give conflicting signals. The debate about the
wisdom of the course taken in diversity cases after Erie has included
the question whether, in effecting a policy against different outcomes on the basis of citizenship, the Court was interpreting the
Rules of Decision Act or something else. 26 8 The dichotomy is false.
The policy against different outcomes on the basis of citizenship is a
"policy of federal jurisdiction"; 2 69 it evidently derives from the act
of Congress conferring diversity jurisdiction on the federal
courts. 2 70 In considering whether the Constitution or acts of Congress (including the Rules Enabling Act) require the application of
federal law, the federal courts must consider both policies grounded
in those sources pointing towards a federal rule and policies pointing to the application of state law. The Supreme Court's decision in
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,2 7 1 the best refuge for
those who assert broad power in the federal courts to apply a federal
common law of procedure, is not inconsistent with this analysis. Of
course the case was easy if the seventh amendment required submission of the issue to the jury. 2 7 2 If the Court believed that, its approach is perhaps best explained as a response to fears for the
integrity of the Federal Rules because of its own confused opinions
in earlier cases; 2 73 painting with a broad brush is not unknown in
this comer of the law. But, if the Court believed that, the suggestion that it might have reached a different result if a "strong possibility" had existed that the difference between the federal and state
rules was outcome determinative, 2 74 an aspect of the opinion too
easily ignored, is inexplicable. 2 75 One need not espouse a theory of
268
Compare Westen & Lehman, supra note 17, at 365-77 (common law policy) with
Redish, supra note 17, at 962-65, 968-69 & n.60 (Rules of Decision Act). See also Westen,
supra note 17, at 982-89.
269
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945). See Burbank, supra note 92,
at 661. Cf. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980) ("The policies un-

derlying diversity jurisdiction do not support such a distinction ....

and Elie and its

progeny do not permit it.").
270
If this is "high fiction," Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 17 (1975), quoted in Westen & Lehman, supra
note 17, at 375 n.196, so be it. But the Court indulges this fiction, and it therefore
should not be ignored, even when inconvenient to one's theory of the relationship between the Rules of Decision Act and federal common law.
271
356 U.S. 525 (1958).
272
See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 102, at 403 n.95; Ely, supra note 17, at 709, 717
n.130.
273
See, e.g., Ely, supra note 17, at 709.
274
See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 539.
275
Professor Bourne suggests that this aspect of the opinion, rather than that relating to the seventh amendment, reveals the Court's desire to "shor[e] up faith in federal
statutes and rules." Bourne, supra note 17, at 466 n.177. See id. at 464 n.167.
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constitutional common law2 76 to accept the notion that, when con-

stitutional policies are implicated and the federal rule applicable in
federal question cases is clear, 27 7 the solemn business of constitutional decision may be deferred until the application of federal or
state law would make a difference and the federal policy against different outcomes on the basis of citizenship would thus be
implicated.
If one regards Byrd as authority in diversity cases for the consideration of federal policies other than those involving the judge-jury
relationship, 2 78 and if one reads Hanna and Walker as continuing
that authority even in cases implicating the federal policy against
different outcomes on the basis of citizenship, 2 79 the major obstacle
to the development of principled guides to decision is the articulation of processes by which the competing policies are identified and
decisional weight attached to them. Even those who reject the significance of the policy identified by the Court in its post-Erie cases
recognize that, unless those processes are disciplined, federal courts
28 0
are essentially free of constraints.
The approach advocated here regards the Rules of Decision Act
as speaking directly to the circumstances in which it is permissible to
fashion or apply federal common law. It has the obvious effect of
imposing discipline on the first of those processes. Federal courts
are not free to conjure up "interests"; rather, they must tie them to
276
See Monaghan, supra note 270. For a critique of Professor Monaghan's theory of
constitutional common law, see Merrill, supra note 92, at 54-59.
277
See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
278 See Redish & Phillips, supra note 17, at 371.
279 Compare Ely, supra note 17, at 717 n.130 ("[T]here is no place in the analysis for
the sort of balancing of federal and state interests contemplated by the Byrd opinion.")
with Redish & Phillips, supra note 17, at 367-72, 384 (balancing persisted after Hanna and
is necessary in light of costs to federal system exacted by Hanna).
Both of these articles were written before the Walker decision. See Redish, supra note
17, at 959 n.2. On one view, because Walker applied Hanna's dictum, interest balancing
by the lower federal courts is difficult to justify until the court "reevaluate[s] the standards set out in Hanna." Id. It is possible, however, to read the Court's opinion in
Walker as leaving the door open. The Court concluded: "There is simply no reason
why, in the absence of a controlling federal rule, an action based on state law which
concededly would be barred in the state courts by the state statute of limitations should
proceed. . . in federal court solely because of the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship between the litigants." Walker, 446 U.S. at 753. The negative pregnant may be
that, at least in cases where forum shopping is not a concern, but see supra note 257, a
consideration of federal policies may furnish a "reason why" and justify a conclusion
that a difference in outcome does not constitute "inequitable administration of the
laws."
280 See, e.g., Redish & Phillips, supra note 17, at 380. But compare Bourne, supra note
17, at 469-71 ("influence but not the command of federal positive law")with id. at 478
("a strong federal policy, a concrete federal pecuniary interest, a justifiable sense of the
need of uniform federal standards, or a sense that the problem implicates no state interests"). See also id. at 482-84.
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policies already articulated in, or at least articulable from, valid legal
prescriptions. 28 ' The natural tendency of institutions to seize the
moment to expand their power is thus bounded by a requirement of
resort for authority to policy choices made on other occasions
28 2
through different, more democratic, processes.
The approach also has the less obvious effect of disciplining the
process by which federal policies finding expression in the permissible legal sources are considered, as against competing policies, in
determining whether federal common law applies. If the Rules of
Decision Act is taken seriously, it should not be interpreted "in a
crabbed or wooden fashion." 28 3 Statutory interpretation and federal common lawmaking are variations on a common theme. 28 4 The
stronger the pull of a policy underlying the Constitution, an act of
Congress, or a Federal Rule toward implementation through federal
decisional law, the easier it is to conclude that the source "requires"
otherwise than that state law apply. 28 5 Where the pull is weaker but
still fairly discernible, and no conflicting federal policies point toward the application of state law, any linguistic strain involved in a
281
Cf.Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc)
(refusing in diversity action to apply federal standard of personal jurisdiction "in the
absence of an overriding federal interest intimated by Congress or its delegate"); Walko
Corp. v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 554 F.2d 1165, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Rules of
Decision Act "gives federal courts no license to shape the policy for diversity
litigation").
282
Cf Mishkin, Last Words, supra note 102, at 1687 ("[W]here the limits are being

imposed on the courts themselves. . . the judicial constraints to act in accordance with
legislatively imposed limits should be even stronger in order to counter the inherent
tendency of any institution to extend its own reach and power.").
Recent changes in the process by which local district court rules are promulgated
may diminish concern about those rules being considered valid sources of policy for
federal common lawmaking. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (as amended Aug. 1, 1985). See also
H.R. 3550, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1985) (requiring notice and comment in local
court rulemaking). The House of Representatives passed H.R. 3550 on Dec. 9, 1985.
131 CONG. REC. H 11,399 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1985). From this perspective, however, resort to valid federal common law as a source of policy for additional common law rules,
see supra notes 120 & 189, is troublesome.
283
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See
supra text accompanying note 129.
284 See Westen & Lehman, supra note 17, at 332-36.
285
Provisions or the structure of the Constitution or acts of Congress may also be
deemed to "provide" otherwise than that state law apply, not because a federal rule
alone will serve the purpose but because the framers or Congress contemplated implementation through judge-made federal law. See supra text accompanying note 188
(Rules Enabling Act); Merrill, supra note 92, at 40-46 ("Delegated Lawmaking"). See also
Hill, supra note 105 (discussing constitutional and statutory preemption); Monaghan,
supra note 270, at 14 ("federal common law gleaned by implication from the federal
structure of the United States"); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
642 (1981) ("Federal common law also may come into play when Congress has vested
jurisdiction in the federal courts and empowered them to create governing rules of
law."). As to FED. R. Civ. P. 83, however, see supra note 192.
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generous reading of the words of the Rules of Decision Act confronts the reality of a documented federal interest in the application
of federal law and no recognized policy favoring state law. When,
however, a pertinent federal policy favors the application of state
law, the strain reaches the breaking point.
e. Applying Federal Common Law Analysis and a Rules of DecisionAct
Approach. So long as uniform federal law governs only the definition
of a "judgment" entitled to respect, problems of administering a
system of borrowed state law do not justify, either under traditional
federal common law analysis or under a Rules of Decision Act approach, uniform federal rules for all preclusion questions arising
from federal diversity judgments. 28 6 Moreover, to the extent aspects of the preclusion law applicable to federal diversity judgments
implicate federal policies cognizable under traditional analysis or a
Rules of Decision Act approach, the relative homogeneity of preclusion law throughout the country cautions against a categorical a priori determination that the threat to federal interests requires
uniform federal rules. In diversity cases federal substantive interests are usually contingent. If federal procedural interests exist that
may be considered, they are not only contingent, but in terms of any
concern about federal court supervision, they are nonexistent. 28 7
Finally, distinguished authority, unwilling to follow the Supreme
Court's post-Erie decisions as far as Hanna and Walker may require,
acknowledges that state preclusion law should apply to protect state
substantive policies, and that complete uniformity is therefore
28 8
impossible.
Those who would apply federal preclusion rules except when
confronted by discrete state rules that are deemed "substantive"
seemingly have it backwards. 28 9 In the absence of a documented
See supra text accompanying notes 247-53.
See supra note 229 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 298.
288
See supra text accompanying note 224.
289
Professor Wright makes an attempt to reconcile the regime he advocates with the
Supreme Court's federal common law cases:
To say [that federal law governs the preclusive effect of a federal judgment] is not to suggest that federal courts are to ignore important state
interests or that the preclusive effect of federal judgments is monolithic.
It has become very common in other areas to hold that a particular subject matter is governed by federal law, but that a uniform national rule is
not necessary and state law is to be looked to so long as it is not discriminatory or in conflict with federal statutes. Some aspects of preclusion
reflect primarily procedural policies and go to the essence of the judicial
function. These aspects of preclusion should be governed by a single
uniform federal rule. Other aspects of preclusion reflect policies that
seem more distinctively substantive.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 100A,at 696 (footnote omitted). For criticism of this formulation, see bifra note 312.
286
287
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case for uniform federal rules, state law applies unless it is hostile to
or inconsistent with federal interests. Perhaps, however, I have not
fully grasped that case. The fact that the system of preclusion rules
will inevitably be mixed does not mean that we should abandon the
goal of predictability or the federal interest in administrability. If in
significant aspects of preclusion law (in addition to the definition of
a "judgment") federal interests require the displacement of state
law, predictability as to the governing preclusion law counsels, and
the relative homogeneity of preclusion law supports, departures
from a federal norm.
As to claim preclusion, Rule 18(a) certainly provides procedural
opportunities that federal courts may consider in fashioning common law rules that are otherwise justified. Whether the rule expresses a policy that calls for federal claim preclusion rules is
another question, one that is difficult to answer affirmatively. Certainly it is difficult to answer in the way in which those favoring particular federal preclusion rules would answer it. "May" as used in
Rule 18(a) does not mean "shall." "Shall" in this context is beyond
the competence of the Federal Rules, and "may" juxtaposed with
"shall," even if unauthorized, is a particularly feckless vehicle of
2 90
policy.
Many would not accept the notion that the federal "procedural" policies justifying federal common lawmaking are confined to
those expressed in the Constitution, federal statutes, or valid Federal Rules.291 In the context of preclusion, if one puts rhetoric concerningjudicial power in its proper place, 2 92 the arguments reduce
to a federal interest in finality or in efficient judicial administration.
Preclusion law is also typically concerned with litigants, 29 3 but the
concern is a function of (1) the interest in finality, (2) the protection
of substantive rights, which state law defines in this context, or (3)
repose simpliciter, as to which it is difficult to justify a federal policy
independent of that furnished by the system that governs primary
activity.
290
291

See supra notes 172 & 176 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Bourne, supra note 17, at 472-92; Redish & Phillips, supra note 17, at
384-94.
292
See supra text accompanying notes 81-92.
293

Application of both [claim and issue preclusion] is central t? the purpose
for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of
disputes within their jurisdictions . . . . To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multi-

ple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial
action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979) (footnote omitted).
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It is not clear why the federal interest in finality-the interest
that both the federal system and litigants in federal court have in the
stability ofjudgments-should extend, as a justification for uniform
federal rules, beyond the basic obligation of respect for federal
judgments and the few matters of preclusion law (for example, validity and finality) essential for its protection. 294 It is difficult to discern finality as an animating concern of discrete preclusion rules, as
opposed to a concern basic to the preclusion law of all American
legal systems. 2 9 5 Finality in this context is a mask for judicial
2 96
power.
Let us turn to efficient judicial administration. Assuming a federal interest in reflecting the procedural opportunities afforded by
the Federal Rules in federal rules of claim preclusion, 2 97 it bears
repeating that the interest is contingent or, put another way, defeasible. Thus, the costs of litigation foreclosed by a putative federal
rule of claim preclusion, but not by state law, will be incurred by the
federal system only if subsequent litigation is brought or removed to
federal court. 2 98 If federal-state relations were ordered identically
to state-state relations, that would be sufficient. 29 9 But they have
not been so ordered in other contexts involving the exercise of diversity jurisdiction, and it is a disservice to legal thought to pretend
294
295

See supra text accompanying note 226.

The central problem in finality ofjudgments is how far the principle
of finality is to be qualified. The law of res judicata grapples with this
central problem. Its specifications endeavor to state the conditions under
which the possibility of failure of civil justice is so substantial as to justify
remedial action in the form of relitigation ....
[A] policy of reasonable
finality requires rules that take into account the complex substantive and
procedural considerations going into a civil judgment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS ch. 1, Introduction, at 12-13 (1982).
296

The principle of finality is an essential element of a court's authority.
The rules of res judicata express the quality of a court's authority, not
only in general doctrine but in the technical particulars of the rules. The
source of the federal courts' authority is in Articles I and III of the Constitution. It is therefore appropriate to hold that, at least in the absence
of some other provision by Congress, the effects of a federal judgment
are a legal implication of those provisions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 comment a (1982). See id. comment b
("[TMhe basic rules of claim and issue preclusion in effect define finality and hence go to
the essence of the judicial function."); Hazard, supra note 92, at 644, 647; see also Burbank, supra note 92, at 660-62 (criticizing Hazard).
297
See Degnan, supra note 3, at 764.
298
See supra note 229; text accompanying note 287.
299
Professor Degnan grasped the difficulty in connection with pendent but unasserted state law claims, noting that application of a federal rule of bar "cannot bejustified by conventional invocations of economy, efficiency, and expediency." Degnan,
supra note 3, at 772. Rather, he asserted, "[i]t has to be the principle of full faith and
credit which is at stake ....
[A federal rule] will have to be placed forthrightly on the
ground that the integrity of the federal judicial power is at stake .... " Id. at 772-73.
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that they have. Indeed, to the extent that state preclusion law is not
sensitive to the "substantive" policies of other states, the intermediate position taken by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and
others3 0 0 is revealed not as a concession to post-Erie cases, but part
30 1
of the attack on those cases, and in particular on Klaxon.
Differences between putative federal and state rules of claim
preclusion present a "strong possibility" 30 2 that both the character
and result of litigation will differ depending on the forum. Those
differences will likely affect choice of forum. 30 3 Whether, in addition, such differences can be characterized as "inequitable administration of the laws," if the words mean anything, 30 4 may depend
upon whether federal interests may be considered, whether the contingent federal interest in efficient judicial administration is cognizable, and whether by some process that interest outweighs the
declared federal policy against different outcomes on the basis of
citizenship. Byrd, the best hope for interest balancers who do not
seek to remove the baby from the bath water, 30 5 provides precious
little support for the conclusion that federal law governs. Unless
one can dispense with the Court's entire post-Erie jurisprudence,
both traditional federal common law analysis and a Rules of Decision Act approach point towards the application of state law rules of
claim preclusion to diversity judgments, because they must take account of the federal policy against different outcomes on the basis of
citizenship, and because any federal interest is contingent. Unex30 6
pressed disagreement with that jurisprudence will not do.
If claim preclusion does not yield an analysis supporting the apSee supra text accompanying note 224.
313 U.S. 487 (1941). See supra text accompanying notes 251 & 264-65.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 539 (1958). See supra text
accompanying notes 271-77.
303
See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 744-47, 752-53 (1980); Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-69 (1965) (dictum); supra text accompanying notes 254-57.
304
See supra note 279.
305
For attempts to clean up, rather than merely drain, Byrd's dirty water, see Redish
& Phillips, supra note 17, at 362-66; Bourne, supra note 17, at 468-71. See also supra text
accompanying notes 274-75.
My editors suggest that I have no hope of my readers' forgiveness for this image.
But Burbank is not brought to book
For one imperfect calyx;
So we're prepared to overlook
One metaphor infelix.
Field, Frankfurter,J., Concurring, 71 HARV. L. REv. 77, 81 (1957) (footnote omitted).
306
See supra text accompanying note 261. Applauding Professor Hazard's acceptance of my invitation to be explicit in his disagreement with the post-Erie cases, see Hazard, supra note 92, I observed: "Of course, now that all the cards are on the table, lower
federal courts may feel reluctant to apply uniform federal preclusion rules in this context. They lack the freedom of law professors to overrule the Court." Burbank, supra
note 92, at 660.
300
301
302
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plication of uniform federal rules, there is no longer any need to
consider federal law as the norm. There may be a cognizable federal interest in protecting federal factfinding and, as to such matters,
the federal policy against differences in outcome on the basis of citizenship is less clearly implicated. But it is also sufficiently difficult to
predict as an a priori matter that state issue preclusion law presents a
threat to the federal interest that, even if it is cognizable, uniform
federal law does not seem justified under either traditional common
law analysis or a Rules of Decision Act approach. In that aspect of
issue preclusion law where consequential variation is most likelythe persons who may benefit from findings (herein again of mutuality)-any federal interest favoring uniform federal rules is attenuated,3 0 7 and the federal policy against differences in outcome on the
30 8
basis of citizenship is likely to be implicated in full force.
It remains to consider compulsory counterclaims. Rule 13(a) is
valid because it does not purport to state a rule of preclusion.
Moreover, even though it is animated by policies that are not properly the concern of Federal Rules, the Rule's implications for preclusion law are patent, and it was not blocked by Congress. 30 9 Thus, as
long as a putative federal common law rule of preclusion, waiver, or
estoppel did not mimic the seemingly inflexible command of the
Rule, thereby accomplishing indirectly what could not be accomplished directly and robbing the federal common law process of that
which traditionally has distinguished it from court rulemaking and
which may justify different standards of validity,3 1 0 the Rule could
serve as a source of policy. The problem, again, is the federal policy
against differences in outcome on the basis of citizenship, there being no doubt in this context that the policy is implicated. Given the
clear expression of policy in Rule 13(a), and the concern for obedience to other less problematic Federal Rules that might be aroused
through the failure to enforce the policy, uniform but flexible federal common law may be required.
This analysis undoubtedly suggests another reason to reconsider Erie's progeny.3 1 ' Its burden has been that those cases should
not be ignored. The greater need, however, is to integrate the
307
Moreover, because of the potential effect of the choice between mutuality and
nonmutuality on liability, see supra note 211, the interests of the states, which furnish the
rules governing liability in this context, are intense.
308
That is, the difference between a state rule requiring mutuality and a federal rule
not so requiring, see supra text accompanying notes 205-14, would materially affect the
character and result of the initial litigation in a predictable class of cases, and it would
similarly affect choice of forum.
309
See supra text accompanying notes 181-86, 193-98.
310
See supra text accompanying note 186.
311
It has already had that effect. See Hazard, supra note 92.
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Court's approach to problems in the relationship between federal
and state law in diversity cases with its approach to those problems
in other contexts.3 1 2 The Rules of Decision Act is the common vehicle, and it is time to take the statute seriously.
The interest of the federal judiciary in efficiency is unquestionable, and unquestionably powerful. Particularly when state substantive rights are involved, however, it is important that federal judges
not have free rein to define and pursue that interest. 31 3 Preclusion
rules may implicate substantive policies; they have dramatic effects
on substantive rights. When state substantive rights have been in
question, from the perspective of purposes or effects, federal judges
have not in the past been permitted to act with the autonomy of
statejudges. Rather, they have been required to do whatjudges of a
particular state would do.3 14 The question is whether, in fashioning
preclusion rules for diversity judgments, federal judges should have
greater freedom to act as if the federal courts were a domestic
31 5
system.
It would be analytically tidier if there could be one set of preclusion rules applied to successive actions in federal court and another
in the federal (diversity)-state configuration. The full faith and
credit principle, applicable to federal judgments through sources
other than the full faith and credit clause, requires only a very limited set of uniform federal rules. The full faith and credit statute,
fairly read, does not apply to federal judgments. In any event, it
does not designate the source of the law that governs the preclusive
effects of the judicial proceedings it covers, although it unquestiona312
The attempt made by Professor Wright to reconcile the preclusion regime he
favors, which is reflected in the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments, with the Court's federal
common law cases, see supra note 289, fails on two counts. First, it substitutes an amorphous procedure/substance dichotomy and rhetoric about the "judicial function" for
the discriminating analysis that has recently characterized the Court's response to calls
for uniform federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715
(1979). See also supra text accompanying note 108. Second, the procedure/substance
dichotomy suggested ignores "the policy of federal jurisdiction" that has led the Court
to allocate federal and state lawmaking authority in diversity cases. See supra text accompanying notes 269-70. Even if the Court accepted the latter reformulation, it is unclear
whether it would accept the former.
313
Usually, the federal courts have been provided jurisdiction for a purpose,
and any reduction in either their jurisdiction or in litigant access to the
courts will itself impose a cost. Moreover, if one myopically focuses upon
the administrative dangers caused by docket size, one is likely to accept
mostjudicial attempts to curb those dockets, for the very reason that they
have that effect.
Redish, Book Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1378, 1386 (1985). See Burbank, supra note
186, at 436-37.
314 See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel.Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
315 See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
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bly contemplates a domestic model or referent. 3 16 From the perspective of litigants, however, a system of preclusion rules for
diversity judgments keyed to the locus of subsequent litigation
would be hopeless, either because it would be unpredictable or because it would be, functionally, a sham. 3 17 The choice, then, is between imperfect solutions. Until such time as federal policy relevant
to preclusion law is more clearly articulated, through processes providing safeguards against judicial parochialism, state law should
provide the norm on most questions.
III
THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS OF STATE JUDGMENTS

A.

The Full Faith and Credit Statute

Professor Degnan evidently believes that the full faith and
credit statute directs courts in interjurisdictional cases to apply the
preclusion law of the state whose judgment is claimed to have
preclusive effect. 3 18 Certainly, he favors that regime as a normative

proposition. 31 9 In any event, although Professor Degnan devoted
little attention to state judgments outside the diversity context, the
Supreme Court has recently paid them great attention and blessed
Professor Degnan's general rule in the state-federal configuration.
The result of the Court's efforts has been that, in order to avoid the
application of state preclusion law, a federal court must find a violation of the due process clause or clear evidence of an intent by Congress expressly or impliedly to repeal the full faith and credit
See supra note 60; see also infra text accompanying notes 318-52.
Such a system might cause litigants to guess whether foreseeable subsequent litigation could or would be brought in, or removed to, federal court and to conduct the
initial litigation accordingly. More likely, because of the potential consequences of error, such a system would cause them to conform their conduct in the initial litigation to
the most broadly preclusive rules potentially applicable.
One might seek support for such a system in the rule that a dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds by the courts of one state is ineffective as a bar in another state. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110 comment b (1971). That rule, however, represents but a reflex of the traditional, monolithic approach to statutes of limitations for choice of law purposes and is hardly good authority. Moreover, it does not
subject litigants to the dilemma that the suggested preclusion regime would impose.
Finally, a proponent of a system keyed to the locus of subsequent litigation must be
willing to tolerate, or be prepared to eliminate opportunities for, forum-shopping as
between state and federal court in order to gain the benefit of a favorable rule oflaw that
the Court has thus far been unwilling to assimilate to interstate forum-shopping for the
same purpose. But see 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4472, at 738
("[T]here may be settings in which preclusion rules are so closely tied to procedural
interests of the second forum that federal rules are appropriate in a federal court and
state rules in a state court.").
318
See Degnan, supra note 3, at 750-53. But see id. at 755 n.60.
319 See id. at 733 (quoted supra text accompanying note 12).
316

317
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statute.320 I believe that the Court's approach is demonstrably
wrong and that, in this configuration as well, one must consider the
role of federal common law.
Consider first the language of the full faith and credit statute as
enacted by Congress in 1790:
[The duly authenticated] records and judicial proceedings of the
courts of any state

. . .

shall have such faith and credit given to

them in every court within the United States, as they have by law
or usage in the courts of the states from whence the said records
3 21
are or shall be taken.
As a linguistic matter, it is difficult to read the statute as choosing
the rendering state's domestic preclusion law rather than the law
that the courts of the rendering state would apply. The task is no
32 2
easier today.
Apart from the language of the statute, and in the absence of
pertinent legislative materials to aid in interpretation, 3 23 attention
should be paid to the constitutional basis of the statute and Congress's purpose in enacting it. Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to prescribe federal preclusion rules
governing the effects of state judgments in other jurisdictions. It
does not give Congress the power to prescribe such rules with respect to the effects of state judgments domestically, that is, in the
states where they are rendered.3 24 Congress has not prescribed federal preclusion rules for state judgments in the large. 32 5 But we are
asked to believe that it has chosen domestic state preclusion law to
320
See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 106 S. Ct. 768 (1986); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985); Migra v. Warren City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983);
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90
(1980); infra text accompanying note 336; note 338.
321
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
322
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), quoted supra note 6.
323
The best accounts of the antecedents and history of article IV of the Constitution
and the early implementing acts are Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit toJudgments: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33 (1957) and Whitten, The Constitutional
Limitations on State-CourtJurisdiction: A Historical-InterpretativeReexamination of the Full Faith
and Credit and Due Process Clanses (Part One), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499 (1981). For other
accounts, see, e.g., Abel, Administrative Determinationsand Full Faith and Credit, 22 IowA L.
REV. 461, 462-78 (1937); Childs, Full Faith and Credit. The Lawyer's Clause, 36 Ky. L. REV.
30, 30-50 (1947); Costigan, supra note 47, at 470-76; Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith
and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1944); Reese &Johnson, supra note 22, at
153-55; Ross, "Full Faith and Credit- in a Federal System, 20 MINN. L. REV. 140, 140-48
(1935). See also Degnan, supra note 3, at 742-44.
My own research has not unearthed any "pertinent legislative materials to aid in
interpretation."
324
See supra text accompanying notes 21-22 & 134.
325
Congress has, however, provided specific interstate enforcement rules for child
custody determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
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govern in interjurisdictional cases.3 2 6
There may be cases in which the courts of the rendering state
would choose to apply the preclusion law of another state, as where
the latter's law furnished the rules of substantive law in the initial
action and the question is who is bound by the judgment in that
action.3 2 7 Let us assume that there may also be cases wholly domestic to the courts of a state in which federal preclusion law is applicable.3 28

Are we to imagine that, notwithstanding the law applied

domestically in such cases, Congress intended a different law to apply in cases identical to them in all respects save that they are interjurisdictional? To what end? Such a regime would not serve the
purposes of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. On
the contrary, it would be fundamentally at odds with the goal of pro3 29
viding "the benefits of a unified nation."
Admittedly, Congress probably did not consider the role of
either another state's preclusion law or of federal preclusion law
when it passed the full faith and credit statute.3 3 0 But in a changed
legal climate, that is hardly a good reason to prefer a reading of a
326 "It is now settled that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the
same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in
which thejudgment was rendered." Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465
U.S. 75, 81 (1984). See id. at 85-87 (discussing Ohio preclusion law); Parsons Steel, Inc.
v. First Ala. Bank, 106 S. Ct. 768, 772 (1986) ("Once the state court has finally rejected a
claim of resjudicata, then the Full Faith and Credit Act becomes applicable and federal
courts must turn to state law to determine the preclusive effect of the state court's decision."); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 1332
(1985) ("This statute directs a federal court to refer to the preclusion law of the State in
which judgment was rendered."). See also infra text accompanying note 339.
327
This is not an assertion that any state court has so acted, but rather that the
choice of another state's preclusion law would in some cases be rational and constitutional-all that is necessary for the purposes of this discussion. The example is suggested by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 87 comment b (1982).
328
I pursue this assumption infra text accompanying notes 378-427.
329
See supra text accompanying note 22; Cheatham, ResJudicata and the FullFaith and
Credit Clause: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 337-41 (1944). But
see Dutton, Characterization,ResJudicata and the Lawyers' Clause, 22 IND. LJ. 201, 207-12
(1947) (statute requires reference to domestic law); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 94-97 (1971) (requiring application of "local law" of rendering state).
For those driven to interpret the full faith and credit statute as choosing domestic
state preclusion law out of fear and loathing of the problem of renvoi, see Dutton, supra,
note that federal common law is domestic law for these purposes. See infra note 332. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 5 comment b (1971) (" 'local law' of
a state. . . includes such rules of federal law as are binding upon it").
330 Cf. Smith, Full Faith and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63 N.C.L. REV. 59,
82 (1984) ("[I]n the early nineteenth century there was no sense that the common-law
preclusion doctrines might develop independently in state and federal courts.").
Professor Whitten has made an interesting argument, based on a review of the history, that neither article IV, § 1, nor the 1790 implementing statute, requires that
preclusive effect be given to statejudgments. See Whitten, supra note 323, at 542-70. As
to the latter, however, and in light of the Supreme Court's consistent contrary interpre-
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statute that can lead to results inconsistent with its purpose when a
reading that is more plausible linguistically entails no such results.
Under the latter interpretation, Congress has tied the measure of
the constitutional (interjurisdictional) obligation of respect to the
measure of respect required by law (or usage) in the courts of the
rendering state. Contrary to conventional formulations, 33 1 the full
faith and credit statute does not require application of the domestic
preclusion law of the rendering state. Rather, it requires application
of the preclusion law that the courts of the rendering state would
apply. That domestic state law usually will furnish the rules applied
domestically should not blind us to the possibility that, according to
principles governing the relationship between federal and state law
that have their source elsewhere, federal law may supervene. Any
such supervening federal law will, by reason of the full faith and
credit statute, be binding throughout the land because, by reason of
the supremacy clause, it is binding in subsequent proceedings in the
courts of the same state, a configuration untouched by article IV,
section 1 of the Constitution and by the full faith and credit statute.
3 32
I refer again, of course, to federal common law.
Given an interpretation that seems obviously correct, linguistically and in light of constitutional and statutory purpose, the temptation since Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813), he sensibly argues against a
return to the original understanding. See Whitten, supra note 323, at 569 n.304.
Even assuming Professor Whitten is correct, his conclusions do not alter the analysis. For, as will be demonstrated, the Court has only recently adopted the view that the
full faith and credit statute chooses domestic state preclusion law. See infra text accompanying notes 333-52. And that interpretation is less plausible, both linguistically and in
light of constitutional and statutory purposes, than the interpretation advanced here.
331
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 86 comment c (1982); Atwood,
State CourtJudgments in FederalLitigation: Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58
IND. Lj. 59, 68 (1982); Currie, ResJudicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 317,
325-26 (1978); Degnan, supra note 3, at 752-53; Smith, supra note 330, at 60-61.
332 As to the words "law or usage" in the phrase "law or usage in the courts
. . . from which they are taken": As applied to state judgments and decrees, the "law or usage" meant is the law or usage of the state wherein
the judgment or decree in question was rendered. . . . The "law or usage" of a state means (1) the local law or usage peculiar to that state, and
(2) the national law or usage, common to all the states, made up of the
constitution of the United States, acts of Congress and treaties, as expounded by the Supreme Court of the United States, constituting "a
common law, resting on national authority"-the paramount law or usage in every state, any local law or usage peculiar to any state to the contrary notwithstanding ...
Case Comment, supra note 43, at 518.
Since the publication of my tentative conclusions about the full faith and credit statute, see Burbank, supra note t; Burbank, supra note 92, Professor Luneburg has independently reached the same basic position. See Luneburg, The Opportunity to be Heardand the
Doctrines of Preclusion: Federal Limits on State Lano, 31 VILL. L. REV. 81 (1986) (forthcoming). See also The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 280, 289 (1981) (suggesting
that domestic litigation may lead to federal checks on state law).
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tation is to proceed immediately to the more interesting and
challenging business of working out its implications. But there is
precedent to contend with.
For those either emboldened or disheartened by the Supreme
Court's recent series of decisions concerning the full faith and credit
statute, 3 33 it is worthwhile to recall that, as late as 1979, the Court
decided two cases involving problems of state-federal interjurisdictional preclusion without reference to the statute. In both cases the
Court applied federal preclusion law. 3 34 A cynic might speculate
about the reasons for the Court's rediscovery of the full faith and
credit statute and of the role of state preclusion law when federal
substantive rights are at issue. Such a person should be aware, however, that this phenomenon is not unique to the present Court.
Over time, the Court's invocation of the full faith and credit
statute has been sporadic, as if the statute were periodically lostwhether in the fog following Swift or in that following Erie.33 5 Moreover, the opinions that have invoked the statute are of little help on
the question of interpretation that concerns us. Consider the following from the Court's 1982 decision in Kremer v. Chemical ConstrucJ
tion Corp.:
Our previous decisions have not specified the source or defined
the content of the requirement that the first adjudication offer a
full and fair opportunity to litigate. But for present purposes,
where we are bound by the statutory directive of § 1738, state
proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed
333
See supra note 320 and cases cited therein; see also McDonald v. City of West
Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (full faith and credit statute does not apply to arbitration
award).
334 See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147 (1979); Smith, supra note 330, at 64. It may be more precise to say that in neither
case did the Court refer to state preclusion law.
335
For pre-Erie cases deciding state-federal cases without relying on the statute, see,
e.g., Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930); Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388 (1929); Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123
(1927); Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891). For post-Erie cases of the same stripe,
in addition to Montana and Brown, see, e.g., Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947);
Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). See generally Atwood, supra note 331, at 71-72;
Developments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1334 (1977).
As suggested in the text, I am inclined to believe that the fate of § 1738 at the hands
of the Supreme Court has been determined in part by the prevailing jurisprudence of
federalism, with inadvertence and confusion also playing a role. That remains true today. In today's jurisprudence of federalism, however, and now that the Court's attention is firmly focused on § 1738, I cannot believe that it will deem cases decided without
reference to the statute as having equal claim to attention with those in which the supposed implications of the statute have been worked out. But see, e.g., Smith, supra note
330, at 84-85, 96-101.
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by federal law. It has long been established that Section 1738
does not allow federal courts to employ their own rules of res
judicata in determining the effect of state judgments. Rather it
goes beyond the common law and commands a federal court to
accept the rules chosen by the state from which the judgment is
taken. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 326 (1839); Mills v. Duryee,
7 Cranch. 481, 485 (1813).336

Even this interpretation of the full faith and credit statute can be
read as consistent with what, I have argued, is the correct interpretation of that statute. Thus, if the Court's notion of a state's choice
includes a "choice" of federal common law required by the
supremacy clause, there is no problem. But the Court's discussion
of New York law suggests no such role for federal law in a domestic
context. 3 37 Moreover, could any court agreeing with the interpreta-

tion of the full faith and credit statute advanced here at the same
time embrace the repeal analysis that has dominated the Court's recent opinions, including that in Kremer?338 We can safely assume
that the Court meant what it subsequently stated, namely that the
statute "directs a federal court to refer to the preclusion law of the
339
State in which the judgment was rendered."
Whatever the Court intended to say in Kremer, the cases it cited
do not support the interpretation of the statute it has now clearly
embraced as against the interpretation urged here. On the contrary,
in both Mills v. Duryee 3 40 and McElmoyle v. Cohen 34 1 the Court was, in
336

456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982).

See id. at 466-67. Note, on the other hand, that the Court's banishment of the
federal courts' "own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of state judgments,"
id. at 481-82, is not dispositive of the question because the Court probably was referring
to routine application of a comprehensive body of federal preclusion law, whether pre1938 general federal common law or post-1938 federal common law. See id. at 482
(quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980)); infra text accompanying note 350.
338
"Allen v. McCuny ... made clear that an exception to § 1738 will not be recognized unless a later statute contains an express or implied partial repeal." 456 U.S. at
468. "Congress must 'clearly manifest' its intent to depart from § 1738.
Id. at
477.
The source of the Court's repeal analysis appears to have been Currie, supra note
331, at 326-33. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 n.ll (1980) (citing Currie, supra
note 331, at 328). Professor Currie's article espouses the conventional but erroneous
view of the full faith and credit statute. See id. at 326 ("[Section 1738] does require that a
claim or issue be precluded in federal court if the res judicata law of the state in which
the judgment was rendered so indicates ..
").
There may still be room for repeal analysis under the reinterpreted full faith and
credit statute, but that analysis differs from the Court's. See infra text accompanying
337

notes 400-09.
339 Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 1332
(1985). See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 54 U.S.L.W. 4144, 4146 (U.S. Jan. 28,
1986); Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 85-86 (1984).
340 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
341 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839).
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this aspect, faithful to the statutory language.3 4 2 In Mills, the Court
held that the full faith and credit statute bound federal courts and
rejected an attempt to limit its reach to the admission ofjudgments
as evidence. As to the latter aspect, the Court could "perceive no
rational interpretation of the act of congress, unless it declares a
judgment conclusive when a Court of the particular state where it is
rendered would pronounce the same decision." 34 3 In McElmoyle,
the Court observed that the judgments of state courts "are conclusive upon the defendant in every state, except for such causes as
would be sufficient to set aside the judgment in the Courts of the
34 4
state in which it was rendered."
Apart from Mills and McElmoyle, a group of cases that might be
thought to shed light, but in fact casts shadows, has involved the
issue of greater preclusive effect. In a 1903 decision the Court held
that a federal court could not preclude litigation with respect to
state taxes on the basis of a judgment that would not be preclusive
in the rendering state's courts. 34 5 Subsequent decisions reaffirmed
the general principle, albeit occasionally in language difficult to decipher.3 4 6 The main problem with these cases, or at least with one
of them, is that the attempt to get behind the language will not be
made. In Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 3 47 the
Court applied the general principle and held that an Oklahoma state
court judgment without preclusive effect in Oklahoma courts could
not be preclusive in federal court. The Court concluded: "Hence,
the plea of resjudicatain this case must fail, for on that issue state law
'34 8
is determinative here.
Language like this can take on a life of its own, and the Court's
recent decisions suggest that it has done so. We need not pause
over the question whether the full faith and credit statute should be
read to forbid greater preclusive effect in interjurisdictional
For a departure from the literal language of the statute in Mills, see supra note 43.
Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Granch) at 485; see also id. at 484. For additional discussion of
Mills, see Smith, supra note 330, at 82-85; Whitten, supra note 323, at 564-67.
344 McElmoyle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 326.
345 Union & Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 (1903).
346
See Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 7-8 (1940)
(opinion on rehearing); Wright v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 216 U.S. 420, 429
(1910); Covington v. First Nat'l Bank of Covington, 198 U.S. 100, 109 (1905).
In Covington, the Court said that the holding in Union & Planters' Bank was that "the
Federal courts were not required to give to [state] judgments any greater force or effect
than was awarded to them by the courts of the State where they were rendered." Covington, 198 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added). This formulation appears to have been taken
from Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 517 (1903). See Covington, 198 U.S. at
109. A separate opinion in Oklahoma Packing, issued before the opinion on rehearing, is
to the same effect. See Oklahoma Packing, 309 U.S. at 11.
347
309 U.S. 4 (1940) (opinion on rehearing).
348
Id. at 8.
342

343
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cases. 3 49 Assuming that it should, Oklahoma Packing and its forbears
stand only for the proposition that federal courts cannot ignore the
statute, routinely applying "federal" preclusion law, whether of preor post-1938 vintage.3 5 0 These cases do not speak to the question
whether, in subsequent litigation domestic to the courts of the rendering state, federal preclusion law responsive to a particular
scheme of federal substantive rights displaces state preclusion law
and hence does so interjudisdictionally by reason of the full faith
and credit statute.
All of this is not to say, of course, that state law is an inappropriate place to begin analysis. Indeed, in two cases decided in the
period between Swift and Erie, when the Court was emerging from
one set of analytical shackles and before it succumbed to another, it
suggested that approach. In the first, the Court observed, without
reference to the full faith and credit statute:
But if the determination of the state court was res adjudicata
according to its laws and procedure, no reason is suggested, nor
are we able to perceive any, why it is not to be deemed res adjudicata here, if the proceeding in the state court was a "case" or
"controversy" within the appellate jurisdiction of this Court...
so that constitutional rights asserted, or which might have been
asserted in that proceeding, could eventually have been reviewed
3 51
here.
In the second, the Court, relying on the full faith and credit statute,
stated:
Thus, a decision in a proceeding begun by motion to set aside a
judgment for want ofjurisdiction is, under Idaho law, resjudicata,
and precludes a suit to enjoin enforcement of the judgment ...
Since the decision would formally constitute res judicata in the
courts of the state; since it in fact satisfies the requirements of
prior adjudication; and since the constitutional issue as to jurisdiction might have been presented to the State Supreme Court and
reviewed here, the decision is a bar to the present suit insofar as it
349
The Court appears to read the statute in this way. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 1334 (1985); Migra v. Warren City
School Dist. Bd., 465 U.S. 75, 88 (1984) (White, J., concurring). Compare Haring v.
Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313 n.6 (1983) with id. at 317-19. The previous cases bearing on
this question are not without ambiguities. See supra note 346.
350
See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
351
Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1927). The
Court determined that the state proceeding claimed to have preclusive effect "was judicial rather than legislative or administrative in character," id. at 130, therefore satisfying
the case or controversy requirement. See id. at 131-34. Moreover, as to the state preclusion law, the Court deemed itself bound by a state court decision interpreting the state
statute involved. See id. at 134-35. But the Court also relied on cases applying a federal
or general federal common law of preclusion. See id.
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seeks to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment for want of
3 52
jurisdiction.
The first case leaves open the possibility that there are "reasons"
why domestic state preclusion law should not apply. Both require
additional inquiry before applying state law. It is time to address
the appropriate scope of that inquiry.
B.

Federal Common Law in State Cases
1. Obstacles to Clear Vision

In choosing an interpretation of the full faith and credit statute,
it should suffice to consider that (1) a state court could rationally
and constitutionally determine the preclusive effects of its judgments according to the law of another state and (2) reading the statute to require a different result in interjurisdictional cases would
stand it on its head. 353 That has not been, however, what all the
fighting has been about. Rather, attention has focused on the role of
federal law in the state-federal configuration. The Court has held
that domestic state law governs the interjurisdictional effects of a
state court judgment, subject only to the requirements of the due
process clause and to a finding, on clear evidence, that Congress
intended in a subsequent statute expressly or impliedly to repeal the
full faith and credit statute.3 54 In so holding, the Court has failed to
consider the role of federal law in domestic state cases, the model or
referent used by the full faith and credit statute.
The Court's failure is puzzling in light of its recognition that the
due process constraints on the interjurisdictional application of
state preclusion law are identical to the constraints applicable domestically.3 55 Such recognition should have prompted the question
whether other valid and pertinent federal law controls in the domestic context and hence, by operation of the statute, in interjurisdictional contexts. There were, I think, three obstacles to clear vision.
First, the Court's erroneous interpretation of the full faith and
credit statute foreclosed an inquiry into the relationship between
American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166-67 (1932).
See supra text accompanying notes 321-29.
354 See cases cited supra note 320 and accompanying text.
355
A State may not grant preclusive effect in its own courts to a constitutionally infirm judgment, and other state and federal courts are not required
to accord full faith and credit to such ajudgment. Section 1738 does not
suggest otherwise; other state and federal courts would still be providing
a state court judgment with the "same" preclusive effect as the courts of
the State from which the judgment emerged. In such a case, there could
be no constitutionally recognizable preclusion at all.
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482-83 (1982) (footnotes omitted). See
Luneburg, supra note 332, at -.
352
353
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state and federal law in the domestic context. If the statute represents a choice by Congress of domestic state preclusion law, the
choice can be defeated only if it would lead to a deprivation of constitutional rights or if Congress subsequently made another choice.
Second, the Court has approached the relationship of federal
and state preclusion law without close attention to the meaning of
"federal law." It is no surprise that, having failed to analyze what it
means to say that federal preclusion law governs the effects of federal judgments, 35 6 members of the Court, when freed of the supposed mandate of the full faith and credit statute, take a
disembodied federal rule approach to state judgments. 3 5 7 What is
See supra text accompanying notes 132 & 205-14.
357 See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 88 (White, J.,
concurring) ("If the federal courts have developed rules of res judicata and collateral
estoppel that prevent relitigation in circumstances that would not be preclusive in state
courts, the federal courts should be free to apply them, the parties then being free to
relitigate in the state courts."). Justice White concluded that this view, which he favored,
was foreclosed by the "long standing" "contrary construction of § 1738." Id. But see
supra notes 346 & 349. For other criticism of Justice White's opinion, see Smith, supra
note 330, at 112 n.300.
It is unclear whether the imputation of a disembodied federal rule approach applies
with equal force to ChiefJustice Burger's concurrence in Marrese. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 1335-37 (1985). That depends
on the extent to which the inquiry whether "a state statute is identical in all material
respects with a federal statute within exclusive jurisdiction," id. at 1337, contemplates
analysis of federal statutory policies, including in particular the reasons for the grant of
exclusive jurisdiction, and of the implications of those policies for preclusion rules.
Unfortunately, the attempt to mitigate the damage caused by the Court's interpretation of § 1738 involved a reply in kind-unreasoned qualification of state preclusion law
with trans-substantive federal rules that have their origin in cases decided in disregard of
the full faith and credit statute. See, e.g., Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313-14 & n.7,
318 (1983) (dictum). In footnote 7, Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court,
relied on Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), for the proposition that "various other conditions. . . must also be satisfied before giving preclusive effect to a statecourt judgment." In that way, Justice Marshall (who also wrote the Court's opinion in
Montana) sought to avoid the restrictive gloss that had been placed on "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" in Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982). See
supra text accompanying note 336. Avoidance was a logical impossibility. Montana did
not refer to the full faith and credit statute. See supra text accompanying note 334. The
conditions and qualifications the Court announced in connection with the application of
preclusion under federal law cannot survive under the Court's current approach to state
judgments unless they are required by the due process clause or unless, in a particular
case, the Court determines that a subsequently enacted statute represents an express or
implied partial repeal of § 1738. See supra note 338. Of course, under the reinterpreted
full faith and credit statute, uniform federal preclusion rules may govern in a case like
Montana, because such rules would govern when the second action was brought in state
court. But, if that were true, it would probably result from the peculiar status of the
United States as a litigant. Cf. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion does not apply against the United States).
Justice Marshall also attempted in Haring to preserve possible "additional exceptions to collateral estoppel," Haring, 462 U.S. at 313, from the policies underlying
§ 1983. But Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980), from which those possible exceptions were derived, had assimilated them to "a full and fair opportunity to litigate,"
356
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surprising, and equally untenable, is the Court's suggestion that
federal common law rules of preclusion, otherwise applicable, are
insulated from congressional will to the same extent as the full faith
and credit statute-to be displaced only upon demonstration of an
3 58
express or implied repeal.
Third, cases emanating from state courts were the least likely
candidates for the development of a general approach to the relationship between federal and state preclusion law. For, passing the
failure to develop such an approach in the context of federal judgments, both the Court and commentators have tended generally to
treat federal law in state courts, at least if the issue can be labeled
procedural, as a discrete problem presenting unique considerations,
if not requiring its own doctrinal apparatus. 359 I refer to cases in
id., and Kremer then shut that door. But see Smith, supra note 330, at 73-76, 78-79, 10810. Taken together, Allen and Kremer prevented the Court in Haritg from realizing the
full potential of cases such as Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980) (cited
in Haring, 462 U.S. at 313, for proposition that "42 U.S.C. § 1988 authorizes federal
courts, in action under § 1983, to disregard otherwise applicable state rule of law if the
state law is inconsistent with the federal policy underlying 1983."). See infra text accompanying notes 414-27.
358
See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 97-98, 99 (1980). "Since repeals by implication are disfavored, Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154, much clearer
support than this would be required to hold that § 1738 and the traditionalrules of preclusion are not applicable to § 1983 suits." Id. at 99 (emphasis added). It is possible that
the Court intended only to signal its assumption that § 1738 itself makes applicable
"traditional rules of preclusion." See id. at 95 n.7; Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,
456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982). But the Court had earlier established a dichotomy between
the freedom of the federal courts to "look to the common law or to the policies supporting res judicata and collateral estoppel in assessing the preclusive effect of decisions of
other federal courts," Allen, 449 U.S. at 96, and their obligation under § 1738 "to give
preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which
the judgments emerged would do so." Id. Moreover, the Court had already stated the
conclusion that "nothing in the language of § 1983 remotely expresses any congressional intent to contravene the common-law rules of preclusion or to repeal the express
statutory requirements of [§ 1738]." Id. at 97-98.
The case cited by the Court, Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148
(1976), deals only with repeals of statutes. The doctrine suggested as to common law is,
for the federal courts, a battle lost long ago. See, e.g., Jay, supra note 102; see also City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 302, 316-17 & n.9 (1981) (distinguishing standards for
finding preemption of state law from those governing displacement of federal common
law).
For a case in which the Court paid attention to the implications of the substantive
law scheme where § 1738 was found not to apply, see McDonald v. City of West Branch,
466 U.S. 284 (1984). See also Smith, supra note 330, at 76 n.103, 117 n.316 (discussing
M'cDonald).
359 Compare, e.g., 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL
PRACTCE & PROCEDURE §§ 4019-27 (1977) (review of state courts) with 19 WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, §§ 4514-15 (federal common law).
The Court has made progress in collapsing analytical barriers by citing a case displacing state law in state court as sufficiently analogous to lend support to a discussion
of the borrowing of state law in federal court. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,479 (1979)
(citing Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949)). Moreover, some commenta-
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which state "procedural" law has been "preempted" because it was
inconsistent with a federal substantive objective. The best known
cases arose under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 3 60 and some
would treat the phenomenon as essentially confined to litigation in36
volving that statute. '
2.

The Relevance of Federal Common Law Analysis and the Rules of
Decision Act

I hope that I have removed the first of the three obstacles. It
remains to confront the other two. The problem of federal law in
state courts, even if that law is dubbed "procedural" for some purposes, is neither discrete nor aberrational. The problem is one of
federal common law-nothing more, nothing less-and we should
seek to determine the circumstances appropriate for the development or application of federal common law in the context of state
court proceedings. If, as is the case, a general approach is accepted
when the question is whether substantive federal common law governs in state cases, 3 62 no a priori reason exists why the same approach is inappropriate for matters less confidently characterized.
Indeed, looking at the problem this way highlights deficiencies in
traditional federal common law analysis, even with respect to the
problems for which that analysis was specifically adopted.
There is a federal interest in ensuring that legal rules used in
the process by which rights under federal substantive law are recognized and enforced are not inimical to a particular scheme of federal
substantive rights. This interest exists whether federal or state law
provides the process and however the rules are characterized. In
the case of litigation in the federal courts, the existence of the intertors have gone further. Thus, in Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980), the
Court held that a state court erred in refusing a requested jury instruction as to the
nontaxability of an FELA award. Id. at 498. Professor Clermont correctly described this
as a holding that the matter was "governed by ... uniform federal common law." R.
FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
251 (5th ed. 1984).
360 See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Brown
v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949). See generally Hill, Substance and Procedure in State
FELA Actions-The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 384 (1956).
My quairel is not, of course, with the choice of the "preemption" label instead of
"federal common law." It is rather with the failure to see the problems whole. Preemptive lawmaking is a subset of federal common law. See Merrill, supra note 92, at 32-39;
infra note 367.
361
Professor Wright observes that "even if the FELA cases are unique, they stand
for the proposition that Congress has constitutional power to control the incidents of a
state trial of a federal claim." C. WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 45, at 272-73. See also J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.8, at 234 (1985).
362 See, e.g., Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
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ests suffices, under traditional federal common law analysis, to trigger the conclusion that federal law governs. According to the
dominant (but not invariant) approach taken by the Supreme Court,
a federal court in such circumstances may choose between a uniform
federal rule and state law borrowed as federal law. 3 63 To the extent
that the Rules of Decision Act is deemed relevant, the perception of
a federal interest in the first step analysis is thought to dispense with
3 64
the Act's direction to apply state law.
Why hasn't the same approach been taken in cases litigated in
state courts? Surely we must admit the power of the Supreme Court
to displace state law employed by state courts in the adjudication of
federal rights when the Court finds state law hostile to or inconsistent with those rights. Could it be that those who treat the problem
discretely3 6 5 do so because the notion that "federal law governs"
the incidents of state litigation involving federal substantive rights
seems too broad, nay unconstitutional?
When federal courts adjudicate federal substantive rights, there
is unquestioned federal power to make all of the legal rules, including rules of procedure. The only question is whether the federal
courts can exercise that power. Congress has no power to make
rules of procedure for state courts except as they are necessary and
proper to implement federal substantive law, and nothing in article
III confers greater power on the federal courts. In these circumstances, the existence of an inchoate federal interest hardly seems
sufficient to warrant speaking of state law functioning as federal law.
And in this context, it would seem, the Rules of Decision Act func3 66
tions solely as a restatement of constitutional requirements.
See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
See supra text accompanying notes 109-2 1.
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 359-60.
The Supreme Court, which formulates federal common law for cases in state
courts, is bound by the Rules of Decision Act.
Even before the demise of the tenth amendment as an independent check on federal lawmaking, see Garcia v. San Antonio Met. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985),
preclusion law, because of its substantive impact, was an unlikely candidate for solicitude
under that rubric. Cf. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742
(1982) (provisions of Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 requiring states to
consider standards and to follow certain procedures in doing so are not unconstitutional
invasions of state sovereignty). But cf id. at 771-75 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting) (procedural provisions of Act violate tenth amendment).
The tendency of commentators to speak the language of preemption rather than
federal common law in the context of state court litigation is suggestive of the larger
issue, put well by Professor Monaghan:
The close relationship between preemption principles and federal
common law . . . has not been adequately discussed by the Court. Arguably, ambiguous federal statutes should have a displacing impact only
when state law is seen to be in mateial conflict with the policies of federal
law. This would establish state law as a norm operative until clearly in363
364
365
366
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This analysis should cause us to question whether, even in cases
initially brought in federal court, traditional two-step federal common law analysis is useful. The mere existence of federal power
does not justify federal common law.3 6 7 When a federal court concludes that a uniform federal rule is not necessary to protect federal
interests, what does it mean to say that state law operates as federal
law? One step will do nicely in both contexts, and the Rules of Decision Act provides the common vehicle.
It is not necessary, however, to accept my view of the role of the
Rules of Decision Act in connection with state court litigation any
more than it is necessary to accept it in connection with federal
court litigation. The key is to recognize that, when federal preclusion law applies to either federal or state judgments, it will almost
always be federal common law, and that the same principles or standards determine the pertinence and validity of federal common law
in both contexts.
3. Applying the General Approach
We are left with the question when federal common law validly
applies to determine the preclusive effects of state judgments in state
court. Whatever the role of federal "procedural" policies in the development or application of federal preclusion law for federal judgments, they can have no role in this context. But, because my
analysis of the law governing the federal question judgments of federal courts considered only the requirements of federal substantive
law, 36 8 that mode of analysis is equally relevant here.
Under traditional federal common law analysis, preclusion rules
are "[legal rules which impact significantly upon the effectuation of
federal rights. ' ' 369 The existence of that potential for impact in state
litigation involving federal substantive rights supports federal lawmaking competence just as it does in federal litigation. In the case
compatible with the policies of federal law. While this approach seems
very much in keeping with the philosophy of the Rules of Decision Act
... it finds only occasional support in the case law ....

Federal courts

have developed federal common law on a basis which to my mind would
not have been justified under a strict preemption analysis ....
Monaghan, supra note 270, at 12-13 n.69. See also infra text accompanying note 378. For
the suggestion that Professor Monaghan paid insufficient attention to his own view of
the Rules of Decision Act in discussing constitutional common law, see Merrill, supra
note 92, at 55 n.236.
367
See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981);
see also Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68, 71 (1966); Miree v.
DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1977).
368
See supra text accompanying notes 130-214.
369
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes
150-51.
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of state litigation, however, the case for uniform federal rules is far
weaker. The same holds true under a Rules of Decision Act
approach.
To be sure, the application of trans-substantive state preclusion
law to state judgments adjudicating federal rights370 presents a
problem of administrability for the federal courts. The possibility of
Supreme Court review may not adequately safeguard federal substantive law against state preclusion rules that are hostile to or inconsistent with its requirements. 3 71 State courts do not always
determine the domestic solution, however. 3 72 Given the relative homogeneity of American preclusion law, dissonance is difficult to predict a priori. Further, a body of federal preclusion law formulated
for similar cases by federal judges, who are likely to be more sensitive to dissonance, provides a convenient initial check for state
judges who share the obligation to honor the requirements of fed37 3
eral substantive law.
In contrast with the use of state law to determine the preclusive
effects of the federal question judgments of federal courts, the use
of state preclusion law for domestic state court judgments presents
no serious problems of administrability for litigants. In planning litigation strategy, they can be confident that, in most cases, they need
only consult the domestic preclusion law of the state where the ini3 74
tial action has been commenced.
Indeed, in the context of state court judgments, it is the use of
uniform federal preclusion law that would create administrability
problems. Local litigants would be required to know, and courts to
apply, two entire bodies of preclusion law, perhaps in the same
case. 3 75 Although alike in most respects, those bodies of law would
370
The word "adjudicating" in this context includes the preclusion of federal claims
and issues not raised as such in the initial action.
371
Cf supra text accompanying note 158 (federal judgment).
372
Many cases in which a state judgment is claimed to have preclusive effect will be
brought in federal courts. Although the reinterpreted full faith and credit statute requires such courts to use the domestic solution of the rendering state, they are free, in
the absence of an authoritative ruling by the Supreme Court, to determine the extent to
which federal law controls that solution.
373 This safeguard should be distinguished from that discussed supra note 372,
although federal judges required to apply a domestic state solution under the reinterpreted full faith and credit statute would surely advert to the federal preclusion rule
applicable to a comparable federal judgment. The discussion assumes concurrent jurisdiction, and the point made requires an initial adjudication of federal rights. Compare
supra note 370 and accompanying text. For an analysis of preclusion as to matters within
exclusive federal jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying notes 428-61.
374 Cf supra text accompanying notes 159-63 (federal judgment).
375
I am assuming that, when federal and state claims are litigated in state court, an
argument for uniform federal rules of preclusion as to the former could not plausibly be
extended to the latter. Compare supra note 153 (federal judgment adjudicating federal
and state questions).
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not be alike in all. Further, advertence to federal preclusion law
could skew litigants' choices in the initial state court action in a man3
ner contrary to that state's procedural policy.

76

There is, then, no strong argument for applying uniform federal preclusion rules to state judgments adjudicating federal rights,
particularly when, departing the normative realm, one considers the
paradox that a regime of "borrowed" state law, displaced whenever
hostile to or inconsistent with federal substantive policies, may
prove more protective of those policies than a regime of uniform
federal rules. 3 7 7 In any event, one need not either embrace a label

or invoke the rhetoric of federalism to rebel at the routine application of federal preclusion law to state court judgments in subsequent state proceedings.
Having determined that uniform federal preclusion law is not
required, under traditional federal common law analysis a court
must still be alert to the possibility that application of state law, borrowed as federal law, will thwart the purposes of, or otherwise interfere with, federal substantive law. In that event, the offending state
law rule is displaced, because federal sources require otherwise than
that it apply. The same result obtains in connection with litigation
in state courts, but there has been a failure to see the problems
whole.
In some cases, policies animating federal substantive law may
require a rule more preclusive than that provided by domestic state
law. Perceptive commentators have suggested as an example successive state contract actions on patent license agreements wherein
the validity of the patent is in issue, drawing an analogy to "preemption" cases.3 7 8 If, in the first action, the state court finds the patent
invalid, the question may thereafter arise whether one not a party to
that action may use the finding to preclude the patentee in state
court. The Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation379 was based in part on the conclusion
376
Cf supra text accompanying notes 171-72 (use of borrowed state preclusion law
may skew federal litigant's choices in initial action in manner contrary to federal procedural policy).
377 See infra text accompanying notes 450-51.
378 See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4467, at 625 ("principles akin
to federal preemption may occasionally require state courts to follow federal rules of
preclusion"); see also supra text accompanying notes 359-61. For the propriety of state
courts determining "questions arising under the patent laws," see Pratt v. Paris Gas Light
& Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897).
The problem discussed in the text, involving successive state court actions, should
be distinguished from the situation in which the subsequent action is brought in federal
court. See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4470, at 684-85; infra note 461
and accompanying text.
379 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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that the federal rule of mutuality of estoppel was inconsistent with
policies animating federal patent law.38 0 Presumably a state mutuality rule is equally inconsistent. In such a case, it must yield to fed381
eral common law.
In other cases, policies animating federal substantive law may
require a rule less preclusive than that provided by domestic state
law. If, for example, we assume that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction of title V113 8 2 actions, the question may arise whether in
such an action brought in state court, that court can apply domestic
law according preclusive effect to the adjudicatory proceedings of a
state administrative agency that is a deferral agency under title
VII.383 A strong argument can be made that application of the state

rule would be inconsistent with policies animating title VII. Because
the EEOC is required to give only "substantial weight" to administrative findings of deferral agencies, 38 4 and assuming Congress did
not intend in that regard to distinguish between investigative and
adjudicatory administrative action, it makes no sense to permit a
court, federal or state, to give those findings preclusive effect. Doing
so would seriously undermine the federal administrative process. 38 5
Thus far, we have considered cases in which state preclusion
law yields to federal common law in domestic litigation because a
1

See id. at 328-50; see also supra text accompanying note 206.
Note that, under the reinterpreted full faith and credit statute, such a case does
not present a problem of greater preclusive effect. Compare supra text accompanying
notes 346-50. The purpose of the inquiry is to determine what the domestic solution
would be, recognizing that domestic state preclusion law will usually but not always furnish that solution. The statute makes the domestic solution thus discovered the national
solution.
382
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). The Supreme Court has not resolved
this question. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct.
1327, 1332 (1985); Kremer, 456 U.S. at 479 n.20. For criticism of the Court's failure to
resolve the question in Kremer, see infra note 455 and accompanying text.
On the assumption of concurrent jurisdiction, the hypothetical case in the text
383
might arise in New York. Cf Kremer, 456 U.S. at 493-94 & n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that Court was granting preclusive effect to state agency's decision, as required by state law). It would be the domestic analog of interjurisdictional cases
brought in federal court. See, e.g., Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 768 F.2d
842 (7th Cir. 1985); Note, ResJudicataEffects of State Agency Decisions in Title VII Actions, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1985). In Elliott v. University of Tenn., 766 F.2d 982 (6th Cir.),
cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1985), the court held that an unreviewed
state administrative proceeding was not entitled to preclusive effect in a federal action
under title VII and the civil rights acts. But the administrative proceeding did not arise
within the title VII enforcement scheme and thus did not involve a state deferral agency.
384
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
385
See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470 n.7 ("Since it is settled that decisions by the EEOC do
not preclude a trial de novo in federal court, it is clear that unreviewed administrative
determinations by state agencies also should not preclude such review even if such a
decision were to be afforded preclusive effect in a State's own courts."). Cf Chandler v.
Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 844-45 (1976) (title VII confers right to trial de novo).
380
381
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particular state rule is found hostile to or inconsistent with a particular federal substantive policy. The question remains whether there
are occasions when state law is at odds, not with specifically identifiable federal substantive policies, but with the sum of such policies,
that is, a scheme of federal substantive rights as a whole. This problem, I believe, concerned Justice Marshall in Haingv. Prosise,38 6 and
some of the peculiarities in his opinion for the Court 38 7 may be attributable to an attempt to address it. Ultimately, the effort to preserve the federal checks that such an analysis affords fell before the
logic of the basic interpretive position into which the Court
backed.3 8 8 Once one recognizes that the Court's interpretation of
462 U.S. 306 (1983).
See supra note 357.
388
See id. The all-or-nothing posture of the first case in the recent series, Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), misdirected attention from the relationship between federal and state law to the question of preclusion or no preclusion. The Court purported
to decide only that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not prevent the application of the "conventional doctrine of collateral estoppel," id. at 95 n.7, in a case where federal habeas
corpus was unavailable. Incredibly, the Court announced its repeal analysis, see id. at 9899, without, or so it said, first having determined what the full faith and credit statute
requires. See id. at 93 n.2, 95 n.7, 105 n.25; Smith, supra note 330, at 68. The Court's
repeal analysis can be made to appear sensible if § 1738 embodies a choice of domestic
state preclusion law. It cannot be made even to appear sensible if, as I maintain, the full
faith and credit statute chooses not the preclusion law of the rendering state, but the
preclusion law that the courts of the rendering state would apply. In fact, the Court's
repeal analysis makes no sense on its own terms, and a repeal analysis based on a correct
interpretation of § 1738 might in some cases yield the conclusion that § 1738 does not
apply. See infra text accompanying notes 400-09. Perhaps recognition of the first proposition contributed to the Court's subsequent erroneous interpretation of the full faith
and credit statute. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-82 (quoted supra text accompanying note
336). At least Professor Currie, the probable source of the Court's repeal analysis, reasoned from erroneous premise to erroneous conclusion and not vice-versa. See supra
note 338.
In this light, Haring may represent an attempt by members of the Court who had
lost the major battle to regain some ground in a skirmish that, because everyone agreed
on the winner, might find the other generals sleeping, at least at the end of the campaign. See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, 1985 Pocket Part, at 161. Thus,
even after it was clear that federal courts could no longer routinely apply uniform federal preclusion rules to state judgments, and when it should have been clear, given
Kremer, that the Court's repeal analysis erected high barriers to the use of any federal
preclusion law, Haling observes that state preclusion rules may be displaced by particular rules drawn from trans-substantive federal preclusion law. See Haling, 462 U.S. at
313-14 n.7; see also supra note 357. After Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
465 U.S. 75 (1984), this instance of the losers putting one over on the winners must be
regarded as a sport. But see Smith, supra note 330, passim. But it does suggest additional
scope for federal preclusion law when the rules of battle have changed.
In this series of cases, the Court has, lamentably, confirmed Justice Jackson's view
that "the federalism of the faith and credit clause depends generally on private advocacy, not always supported by the best research and understanding, and often finds the
perception of the Justices unsharpened and their perspective uninformed by any extensive experience or investigation of this subject." Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-TheLawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1945).
386
387
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the full faith and credit statute is wrong, it is appropriate to address
the question anew.
Modem domestic preclusion law tends to be not only trans-substantive but also aggressive in its pursuit of the goals of finality and
economy. Major changes in preclusion doctrine have occurred in a
relatively short time, and the pace of change will continue with the
recent publication of the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments.3 8 9 It seems
unlikely that legislatures often think about preclusion law when they
are enacting schemes of substantive rights. But they do legislate
against a background of judge-made preclusion law.3 90 It seems
equally unlikely that judges often think about particular schemes of
substantive rights when they formulate preclusion law. But the totality of such schemes conditions their work. It is probable that
neither qualification obtains in an interjurisdictional setting. That
is, the federal legislative background probably does not include
state preclusion law, and state judges probably do not think about
federal substantive law when they formulate state preclusion rules.
Reminders of their duty may suffice to make judges, both federal and state, alert to the possibility that a particular trans-substantive preclusion rule is inconsistent with particular substantive
policies. Unfortunately, there is another problem. Preclusion rules
not only are animated by and interact with legal policies.; they have
legal effects. The effect of modem preclusion rules is to cut off
some substantive rights in circumstances that, had they been thinking of preclusion law, the legislators who created those rights, could
not possibly have imagined. 3 9 ' Preclusion rules may, in other
words, be inconsistent with the sum of policies that inform a scheme
of substantive rights.
From this perspective, broadly preclusive trans-substantive
rules are tolerable only to the extent that they are sufficiently
nonformal, or contain sufficient qualifications or exceptions, to permit the avoidance of preclusion in circumstances where it would be
unjust.3 9 2 But the characteristics that may make modem preclusion
389 See Allen, 449 U.S. at 94-95 & n.6; 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5,
§ 4403, at 21-22.
390 See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4403, at 19. Cf. Califano v.
Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 698-701 (1979) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
391 See Allen, 449 U.S. at 97; id. at 114-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This is not to

suggest that we should vary preclusion rules in accordance with the preclusion law prevailing at the time of a statute's enactment. Rather, an analysis of the fit between puta-

tively applicable preclusion rules and a particular scheme of substantive rights should
include awareness of this potential discontinuity.
392 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS ch. I (Introduction), at 11-13 (1982);
see also Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 407-09 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883
(1979) (refusing to preclude individual class member's claim for damages where notice
to class members did not alert them that they could seek damages in class action). Bo-
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law tolerable in the administration of substantive law are the very
characteristics that bedevil litigants, who desire clear and certain
93
rules in planning litigation strategy.3
These considerations suggest that a court administering a modem domestic body of preclusion law must be alert to the loss of
substantive rights caused by the failure of that body of law to provide fair notice of its implications for a particular context or by the
failure of the jurisdiction's law as a whole to afford a fair opportunity to pursue claims of substantive right. Moreover, both concerns
are more pressing when the preclusion law--is not only trans-substantive, but trans-systemic.
The perception of such problems may or may not have
prompted the Court to suggest federal checks against state preclusion law additional to the due process clause and express or implied
repeal of the full faith and credit statute.3 94 In any event, the protection of federal substantive rights against "springes" 3 95 set by the
states is a duty long acknowledged by the Supreme Court.
The principle is general and necessary. . . If the Constitution
and laws of the United States are to be enforced, this Court cannot accept as final the decision of the state tribunal as to what are
the facts alleged to give rise to the right or to bar the assertion of
it even on local grounds. . . . This is familiar as to the substantive law and for the same reasons it is necessary to see that local
practice shall not be allowed to put unreasonable obstacles in the
way. 39 6
When the Court determines that state law, in a domestic case,
puts "unreasonable obstacles in the way" of a federal scheme of
substantive rights, it applies federal common law, and it can do so in
accordance with the requirements of the Rules of Decision Act. In
the case of preclusion, the domestic solution thereby determined is
applicable interjurisdictionally by reason of the full faith and credit
gard is also an example of the influence of procedural policy reflected in a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure on federal common law. See id. at 408; supra text accompanying note
189.
"One implication of Kremer is that preclusion in an intersystem context, where the
full faith and credit statute applies, is a less flexible doctrine than preclusion in an intrasystem context." Atwood, supra note 331, at 86-87 n.136.
393 See supra note 214 and accompanying text; 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra
note 5, § 4407, at 49; Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S.
Ct. 1327, 1337 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
394 See supra text accompanying notes 386-88.
395
Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923). See generally Hill, supra note 360;
Neuborne, TowardProceduralParity in ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 Wm.& MARY L. REV. 725
(1981).
396 Davis, 263 U.S. at 24-25.
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statute.

C.

Special Problems Under the Reinterpreted Full Faith and
Credit Statute
1. Actions Under 42 U.S.C. section 1983

It is a pity that the occasion for the Court's recent rediscovery
of the full faith and credit statute was a case involving 42 U.S.C.
section 1983.398 For, even if the Court had considered the interpretive approach advanced here, the choice of interpretive approaches
might not have appeared to make a difference.
Section 1983 actions present an anomaly. The anomaly results
from the existence of a plausible argument that the statute is
animated by a policy in favor of a federal forum on the one hand,
and concurrent jurisdiction in state courts on the other.3 99 When a
federal action involving section 1983 follows state proceedings
claimed to have preclusive effect, the reinterpreted full faith and
credit statute requires a federal court to look to the law that the state
courts would apply in a section 1983 action. And in such a state
court action, a putative policy favoring a federal forum would not be
pertinent.
One answer to this line of reasoning is that the anomaly is apparent rather than real. Once one adopts the correct interpretation
of the full faith and credit statute, even a repeal analysis suggests the
conclusion that federal preclusion law governs in a subsequent section 1983 action brought in federal court.
Recall that the Court's repeal analysis initially focused on the
question of preclusion as against no preclusion. 40 0 Even though repeal analysis may ultimately have influenced the Court's interpretation of the full faith and credit statute, 40 1 the fact that the Court
regards the repeal question as relevant only if domestic state law
would preclude 40 2 is a signal that it continues to focus on results to
the exclusion of the source of law that should determine them.
Under the Court's interpretation of the full faith and credit statute, repeal analysis should focus on the question whether a subseFor an application of this analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 410-27.
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). For other regrettable aspects of the case,
see supra note 388.
399 For representative arguments concerning the policy in favor of a federal forum,
see Allen, 449 U.S. at 110 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For the concurrent jurisdiction of
the state courts, see Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980).
400
See Allen, 449 U.S. at 98-99; supra notes 358 & 388. In this the Court followed
Professor Currie. See Currie, supra note 331, at 328-29; supra notes 338 & 388.
401
See supra note 388.
402
See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327,
1335 (1985); infra text accompanying note 436.
397

398
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quently enacted statute or its legislative history provides "clear and
manifest" evidence 40 3 of Congress's intent that preclusion questions
in litigation arising thereunder be determined by (uniform) federal
rather than state law. After all, state law may not preclude. Thus,
the question the Court should ask in a case like Allen v. McCurry 4 04 is
whether the language and legislative history of the 1871 act clearly
warrant the conclusion that Congress intended preclusion questions
arising in litigation under that statute to be determined by (uniform)
federal rather than state law.
Of course, that too would be the wrong question, because Congress did not choose state preclusion law in 1790, and there was no
reason for Congress to believe that it had in 1871, when the predecessor of section 1983 was enacted. 40 5 As to the choice Congress
did make in 1790, reexamination of the 1871 legislation and its history may yield a different answer to the question of implied repeal.
The solicitude of the 1871 Congress for the availability of a federal forum has led to holdings that section 1983 expressly autho40 6
rizes an injunction within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act
and that the normal rule regarding exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply in section 1983 actions. 40 7 In light of that
solicitude, when a plaintiff has exercised a preference for a federal
forum to pursue a claim under section 1983, is there not something
odd in pretending that he did not exercise that preference? Yet that
is exactly what the reinterpreted full faith and credit statute requires. From this perspective-when the right question is askedthe two statutes reasonably may be deemed "in irreconcilable
40 8
conflict."
To find that section 1983 partially repeals the full faith and
credit statute should not lead automatically to the conclusion that
uniform federal law governs, let alone that federal section 1983 actions are immune to preclusion. But the reasons for finding a repeal
strongly suggest that uniform federal law governs. In any event,
when freed of the supposed mandate of the full faith and credit stat403
Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936), quoted in Radzanower v.
Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976). See also Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468 (quoting
from Radzanower).
404 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
405 See supra text accompanying notes 333-44. The text assumes that the 1871 Congress was aware of § 1738. But see infra note 411.
406 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972). The Anti-Injunction Act is
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
407 See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502-07 (1982); Smith, supra note
330, at 104.
408 Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936), quoted in Radzanower v.
Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976). See also Kreme, 456 U.S. at 468 (quoting
from Radzanower).
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ute, the Court has demonstrated its willingness and ability to apply
federal preclusion law that is sensitive to the peculiar substantive
context of section 1983.409

There are other routes to the conclusion that, even in section
1983 actions, a court's interpretive approach to the full faith and
credit statute may make a difference. The Supreme Court's repeal
analysis requires clear evidence of congressional intent on a specific
issue that Congress rarely addresses. 4 10 Apart from the fact that the
basic premise of the Court's repeal analysis is wrong, the analysis
imposes entirely too much on unsuspecting Congresses, that is, on
all Congresses legislating before 1980.411 This is hardly the heyday
4 12
of federal common law, even in its traditional manifestations.
But, on the assumption that the reinterpreted full faith and credit
statute applies, federal common law analysis, whether of the traditional type or under the Rules of Decision Act, holds greater potential to protect federal substantive rights than does the Court's repeal
4 13
analysis.
409
See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); supra note 358. The
Court did not consider the possibility that state preclusion law might apply except when
hostile to or inconsistent with federal interests.
If this analysis were accepted, it might lead to different preclusion rules being applied in § 1983 actions brought in federal and state courts. For, the preclusion law applied in federal actions would be uniformly federal law, while that applied in state
actions would be state law, except as displaced by federal law in response to the requirements of § 1983. See infra text accompanying notes 410-27. Such a result, whatever
"embarrassments" it might entail, see 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, 1985
Pocket Part, at 163, would be a function of the basic embarrassment of a statute
animated by a strong preference for a federal forum but one not so strong as to have
prompted a grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Another possible answer to the anomaly posited in the text, but one that I do not
pursue, is that the source of the preclusion rules governing in an action under § 1983 is
directed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). On § 1988, see generally Kreimer, The Source of
Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601 (1985).
See supra note 357; infra note 427.
410 See Allen, 449 U.S. at 96-105; Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468-78.
411 See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, 1985 Pocket Part, at 164. It has
already been observed that the Congress that passed the predecessor of § 1983 would
have found radically different preclusion rules, had it addressed the issue, than are applied today. See supra text accompanying note 391. In addition, a certain irony results in
holding any Congress to an awareness of the full faith and credit statute. See Atwood,
supra note 33 1, at 83 n. 119. But see Currie,supra note 33 1, at 329. At various times in its
history, the Court would itself have flunked that test. See supra text accompanying notes
333-35.
412 See supra text accompanying note 108.
413 The difference can be seen as between "normal principles of statutory interpretation" and "the more difficult test of demonstrating an implied repeal." Kremer; 456
U.S. at 471 n.8. Perhaps more usefully, it can be seen as the difference between "asking
what collateral or subsidiary rules [of preclusion] are necessary to effectuate or to avoid
frustrating the specific intentions of [Congress]," Merrill, supra note 92, at 36, and requiring evidence of specific intent as to preclusion matters.
For another example of the difference that federal common law analysis can make,
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In section 1983 actions filed in state courts, the Supreme Court
has the power and duty to ensure that the application of domestic
state law does not nullify federal substantive rights. The domestic
solution thereby determined is binding interjurisdictionally. The
concern, again, is to prevent the loss of federal rights through application of state preclusion law that does not give fair notice of its
implications for the particular context or through application of
state law that, viewed as a whole, fails to afford a fair opportunity to
pursue federal substantive claims. For these purposes, the notion of
fairness should not be confined to "the least possible good" one can
say about state law. 4 14 The due process clause is not the only pertinent repository of federal rights. 4 15 And just as federal preclusion
law can serve as an initial check for state judges alert to their duty to
safeguard particular federal substantive policies, so may it serve as a
reference when the concern is the effect of state law, including state
preclusion law, on federal substantive rights. Although typically
trans-substantive, 4 16 federal preclusion law is at least fashioned by
judges against the background of the substantive law with which it
interacts. When the application of state law, which is not so fashioned, would preclude federal substantive rights not precluded
under federal law, further inquiry is warranted.
In a case like Allen v. McCurry,4 17 it is not enough that the proceeding claimed to have preclusive effect met the requirements of
due process. One should also ask whether, if state law would accord
the proceeding preclusive effect, that result would be consistent
see Elliott v. University of Tenn., 766 F.2d 982, 989-94 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 54
U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1985). Although Elliott is an interjurisdictional case, the
court held the full faith and credit statute inapplicable because the case involved the
unreviewed proceedings of a state administrative body. See id. at 990. The court therefore felt free to fashion federal common law and did so under the influence of the policies found to inform § 1983. Compare supra text accompanying note 409.
For other criticism of the Court's repeal analysis, recognizing the correct interpretation of the full faith and credit statute, see Luneburg, supra note 332, at -.
414
"To say that a law does not violate the due process clause, is to say the least
possible good about it." Cheatham, Conflict of Laws: Some Developments and Some Questions,
25 ARK. L. REV. 9, 25 (1971). See Burbank, Sanctions, supra note 87, at 1010.
415 Even when the inquiry is purely constitutional, Professor Luneburg makes a persuasive argument that the adequacy of the procedures afforded in the first proceeding
should be assessed with reference to what is at stake in the subsequent proceedings (in
which the question of preclusion arises). See Luneburg, supra note 332, at -. He also
recognizes a role for federal common law checks on state preclusion law in domestic
state litigation. See id. at -.
416 But see, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); supra note
358. See also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1244 (1985) ("[I]n
framing preclusion rules in this context, courts shall take into account the federal interests warranting protection.").
417 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Again, the analysis assumes that the full faith and credit
statute applies (and that it is being correctly interpreted).
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with the scheme of substantive rights established by section 1983.
More specifically, under the reinterpreted full faith and credit statute, it is not enough to conclude that a state court's proceeding on a
motion to suppress evidence met constitutional minima given what
was involved in that proceeding. 4 18 Rather, when state law would
require preclusion in a subsequent section 1983 action in state
court, one should determine whether, viewed as a whole, state law is
adequate to the recognition and enforcement of the substantive
4 19
rights conferred by the federal statute.
Under federal preclusion law, "[r]edetermination of issues is
warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or
fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation. ' 4 20 In determining the preclusive effect of findings made after a pretrial suppression hearing in state court, the use of this rule should prompt a
number of inquiries: to what extent is discovery available to the defendant?; 4 2 ' to what extent do the rules of evidence apply?; 4 2 2 who
has the burden of persuasion and what is the standard?;4 2 3 and who
presides at the proceeding, and if that person is not a judge, what is
4 24
the nature of review by a judicial officer?
Can it be that such inquiries are irrelevant in state court litigation concerning federal substantive rights, and hence (if the full
faith and credit statute applies) in federal litigation? Granted that
the Congress that passed the predecessor of section 1983 could not
have contemplated the procedural opportunities available today in
418

Professor Luneburg would have the constitutional inquiry consider the stakes in

the subsequent proceeding. See supra note 415.
419 See Allen, 449 U.S. at 115-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
As another example, consider McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284
(1984). The Court's reasons for refusing preclusive effect to an unappealed arbitration

award in a federal § 1983 action are equally applicable in a state § 1983 action. See id.
at
288-92. Accordingly, a state rule giving preclusive effect to such an award should yield
to federal common law in state court.
420 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.11 (1979). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3) (1982). In a case like Allen, which appears to involve
nonmutual issue preclusion, see 449 U.S. at 114 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), other excep-

tions in federal preclusion law are relevant. Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322, 331 (1979) (offensive nonmutual estoppel may be unfair where second action affords
"procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different result"). The Court in Parklaneembraced the Restatement (Second) ofJudgnzents, see id.
at 330-31 & n.16, which provides an exception to issue preclusion in subsequent litiga-

tion with others when "[t]he forum in the second action affords the party against whom
preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and determination of
the issue that were not available in the first action and could likely result in the issue
being differently determined." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(2) (1982).
421 See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as LAFAVE & ISRAEL]; I id.§ 10.5(e).
422 See 1 id.§ 10.5(d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
423 See 1 W. LAFAvE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 421, § 10.3.
424 See id. § 10.6; United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
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civil actions in federal or state court, it also did not contemplate
modem preclusion law. 42 5 Assuming answers to some of the inquir-

ies suggested above, what sort of a federal substantive right is it that
can be lost as a result of a state court proceeding in which (1) the
person subsequently claiming the right is an unwilling participant,
(2) discovery is not available to that person, (3) the rules of evidence
do not apply, and (4) someone who is not a judge, and perhaps not
even a lawyer, hears the testimony? 4 26 It may be that when the
question is the admissibility of evidence in a state criminal trial, such
a regime passes constitutional muster. But there is no reason to accept that regime, implemented by state preclusion law, as providing
the final domestic word on substantive rights conferred by a federal
statute.4 2 7 The full faith and credit statute does not speak to the
problem. If it applies, it merely makes the domestic solution the
national solution.
2.

Claims Within Exclusive FederalJurisdiction

Those who hoped that claims within exclusive federal jurisdiction would be insulated from the rediscovered full faith and credit
statute received a dire warning in Kremer v. Chemical Construction
4 28
Corp.
In that case, the Court found that title VII does not ex425

See supra text accompanying notes 391 & 411.

426 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 & n.15 (1979); Allen, 449
U.S. at 115 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Cf. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 21-25
(1980) (nonmutual issue preclusion does not apply against government in criminal
case).
427 See Luneburg, supra note 332, at -.
Cf. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466
U.S. 284, 292 n.12 (1984) (according preclusive effect to arbitration award would
"gravely undermine the effectiveness of § 1983"); Merrill, supra note 92, at 53 ("By ignoring the possibility of preemptive lawmaking altogether in the statutory area, the
Court has overlooked the fact that relegating a plaintiff to existing state and federal
remedies could in some cases render federal rights a 'mere form of words.' "). Compare
the Court's analysis, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), in rejecting a short statute of limitations for a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981:
Similarly, the state petitioners argue that the short limitations period
. . . should be applied here because it affords public officers "some reasonable protection from the seemingly endless stream of unfounded, and
often stale, lawsuits brought against them." . . . The statement suggests
that the legislative choice of a restrictive six-month limitations period reflects in part a judgment that factors such as minimizing the diversion of
state officials' attention from their duties outweigh the interest in providing employees ready access to a forum to resolve valid claims. That policy is manifestly inconsistent with the central objective of the
Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes, which is to ensure that individuals
whose federal Constitutional or statutory rights are abridged may recover
damages or secure injunctive relief.
Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2932 (1984) (quoting petitioner's brief).
For the possibility that § 1988 is more than analogically pertinent in this context,
see supra note 409.
428 456 U.S. 461 (1982). See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, 1985
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pressly or impliedly repeal the full faith and credit statute without
determining whether title VII confers exclusive jurisdiction on the
federal courts. 4 29 Moreover, the Court held that antecedent New
York proceedings precluded Mr. Kremer's title VII action without
43 0
determining whether the preclusion was of a claim or an issue.
The other shoe dropped last term in Marrese v. American Academy
of Orthopaedic Surgeons.43 1 At issue was the freedom of plaintiffs in
federal court to litigate federal antitrust claims when those same litigants had been unsuccessful in state court litigation, involving state
law claims, against the same defendants. In Marrese, there was no
question as to the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction over the claims
sought to be raised in federal court.43 2 Nor was there any question
43 3
that, if preclusion applied, it would be claim preclusion.
If the full faith and credit statute requires a federal court to apply the law of the rendering state in determining the preclusive effect of a state court judgment on a claim within exclusive federal
jurisdiction, that court confronts a conundrum: where will it find
state law? Perception of this difficulty led Judge Posner, speaking
for a plurality of the court of appeals in Marrese, to conclude that the
full faith and credit statute did not apply. 43 4 In his opinion concurring in reversal, the Chief Justice recognized the problem, but he
dispensed with the statute only after satisfying himself that state law
4 35
was indeterminate.
The Court, however, was undeterred. Never mind that there
could be no state law on the precise question. That possibility had
not given the court pause in Kremer. On remand, the federal court
could probably figure out what Illinois law would be on the question
by looking at cases resolving analogous problems. Only if the lower
court determined that the law thus discovered would preclude the
federal antitrust claim would it need to inquire whether the federal
statute contains an express or implied partial repeal of the full faith
Pocket Part, at 151-52. It is important to note again that the analysis in the text concerns the source of preclusion law, federal or state, and not the content of the law that
may be applicable. The distinction is often overlooked. But see, e.g., Atwood, supra note
331, at 104-06; Note, The Claim Preclusive Effect of State CourtJudgments on FederalAntitrust

Clains: Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 71 IoWA L. REv. 609,
615 (1986).
429 456 U.S. at 479 n.20; see also infra note 455.
430 See 456 U.S. at 481 n.22.
431
105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985).
432 See id. at 1331.
433 See id. at 1333.
434 Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1154
(7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985). For the Court's misrepresenta-

tion ofJudge Posner's opinion, see Burbank, supra note 92, at 663 n.34.
435

See Marrese, 105 S. Ct. at 1335-37 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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In circumstances like those presented in Marrese, calling the
rules discovered "law," let alone "state law," is nothing more than a
play on words. In this aspect, the Court was most obliging in demonstrating the folly of the course on which it embarked. For, responding to the ChiefJustice's conclusion that Illinois law was likely
to be indeterminate on the question of claim preclusion, the Court
relied on provisions of the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments stating or
contemplating an interjurisdictionalsolution that is not, and is not
based on, the law of any state. 4 37 The Court also stated that, having
discovered the most closely analogous state law rules, a federal
court should consider "whether application of the state rules would
bar the particular federal claim."' 438 The latter passage evokes
memories of federal common law and also, perhaps, of the Rules of
Decision Act. There are critical differences, however. Federal common law, even when incorporating state law rules, is avowedly federal law. 4 39 Further, not even a strict reading of the Rules of
Decision Act suggests that state laws "apply" in situations where it is
impossible for them to do so.4 40 In a case like Marrese, state law is
436
See id. at 1332-35. Kremer aside, the Court's only support for its conclusion that
§ 1738 applies in this context was Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388
(1929). Marrese, 105 S. Ct. at 1332. Becher provides no such support. As noted in Afarrese, "[w]ithout discussing § 1738, this Court. . . held [in Becher] that the issue preclusive effect of a state court judgment barred a subsequent patent suit that could not have
been brought in state court." Id. To be sure, Becher does "indicate that a state court
judgment may in some circumstances have preclusive effect in a subsequent action
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts," id., but it tells us nothing about
what law determines such preclusive effect, except as the failure to discuss § 1738 suggests a federal source. See supra note 428.
For problems with the Court's repeal analysis, see supra text accompanying notes
400-09.
437
See Marrese, 105 S. Ct. at 1333 n.3 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24 comment g, § 26 comment c(l), illustration 2 (1982)). The assumption of
an available court in the same system, made in the former, is a reflex of the interjurisdic-

tional rule stated in the latter. See also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS

§ 26 com-

ment c(l) reporter's note. The reporter states:
When the plaintiff, after having lost a state action, seeks relief with respect to the same transaction under a federal statute enforceable only in
federal court, it may be argued that he should be held barred especially if
he could have instituted his original suit in federal court. . . . It appears
sounder, however, not to preclude the federal action by the doctrine of
bar, but rather to allow a carry-over decided issue from the state to the
federal action by way of issue preclusion ....
438
Marrese, 105 S. Ct. at 1333 (footnote omitted).
439
See supra text accompanying notes 105-08 & 151.
440
But see, e.g., Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895) (state statute of limitations applied under Rules of Decision Act in federal patent action). The Court's decision in Campbell was driven by its concern that, if a state statute did not "apply," there
would be no limitations period. See id. at 613-14. Moreover, the Court suggested that
the language in question might confer "a certain discretion with respect to the enforcement of state statutes." Id. at 615. See further Merrill, supra note 92, at 34 n.149.
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always indeterminate.
The basic problem with Marrese, however, is the Court's adherence to its erroneous interpretation of the full faith and credit statute. One might have hoped that the influences prompting the Court
to insinuate federal law into its discussion of "state law" would lead
it to reconsider. 44 ' Moreover, Judge Posner's opinion, even though
accepting the Court's basic premise about the statute, offered food
for thought. In any event, under the reinterpreted full faith and
credit statute, his conclusion was correct: the statute "cannot be
used to decide" a case like Marrese.44 2 The reason, however, is not
that there can be no state law on the question. It is, rather, that as a
result of the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, the same
problem of preclusion cannot arise "in the courts" of the state
whose courts rendered the judgment, with the result that there can
be no "law or usage," whether state or federal. Some may reject
this interpretation of section 1738 in cases of exclusive jurisdiction
as too literal. 44 3 Accepting my basic interpretive position, however,
they must admit that if the reinterpreted full faith and credit statute
imports a principle of functional equivalence, the mediation of state
law through that principle must include consideration of federal
policies and interests. In other words, whether or not the full faith
and credit statute plays a role, there is a role for federal common
law.
Under traditional federal common law analysis, the argument
for uniform federal preclusion rules, rather than state law borrowed
as federal law except where it is hostile to or inconsistent with federal interests, is likely to be strongest in exclusive jurisdiction cases.
Although a regime of borrowed "state law" would not present the
federal courts with problems of administrability as serious as those
attending preclusion of federal claims in cases within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the state courts, 4 44 finding state "law" would impose
See supra text accompanying notes 437-38.
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1154
(7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985).
Taking this view, I need not reach the question of repeal, although the analysis of
§ 1983 suggests that a finding of an implied repeal is likely, at least if the full faith and
credit statute is otherwise interpreted correctly. See supra text accompanying notes 40009.
443
For the importance of a principle of functional equivalence to the role of full
faith and credit as a nationally unifying force, see A. VON MEHREN &D. TRAUTMAN, THE
LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 1460-63 (1965). See also Harper, The Supreme Court and the
Conflict of Laws, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 884-90 (1947); Summers, Full Faith and Creditfor
Judicial Proceedings, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 441, 446-51 (1955).
444
In a case like Marrese, the preclusion question will arise only in a federal proceeding. Compare supra text accompanying notes 157-58 (federal question judgment of federal court), 371-72 (federal question judgment of state court).
441

442
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its own costs. Moreover, the administrability problems for litigants
would be extreme. At least in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is
possible that, assuming the choice of law problems can be resolved
with confidence, 44 5 courts of the relevant state will have selected or
fashioned the rule of preclusion applicable to the federal claim.
Where the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, however, there
is no possibility of finding a solution in state jurisprudence. Speculation about "state law" mediated through a principle of functional
equivalence may be great mental exercise for the Supreme Court. It
is not, however, a task to impose on litigants, for whom the stakes
include the loss of federal substantive rights.
More fundamentally, a congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction typically bespeaks concern for the elaboration of a scheme of
substantive rights by federal judges. 44 6 Even if the administrability
of a system of borrowed state law were the only relevant consideration, one might well conclude that federal judges should not be distracted by the judicial equivalent of a wild goose chase. Just as
Congress usually has better things to worry about than the arcana of
preclusion law, federal judges have better things to worry about
than what a state court would think about a problem it has never
considered and never will. In both cases, one of those better things
44 7
is paying attention to federal substantive rights.
If one believes, as I do, that the Rules of Decision Act speaks
directly to the creation or application of federal common law, the
result is no different. Indeed, in exclusive jurisdiction cases one can
say, without linguistic strain or academic sleight of hand,4 48 that
state laws do not "apply" within the meaning of the Act. 44 9 It matters not, however, because, for the reasons given above, uniform
federal preclusion law is likely to be deemed "required" by the statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts.
To say that uniform federal preclusion law governs in exclusive
jurisdiction cases is not to say that trans-substantive federal preclusion law governs in such cases or that federal law should not preclude. In connection with cases of concurrent jurisdiction under the
445
Comparesupra text accompanying notes 159-62 (federal question judgment of federal court) with supra text accompanying note 374 (federal question judgment of state
court).
446
See, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 134 (1979); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 5, § 4470; Atwood, supra note 331, at 10 1-08.
447
Cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1947 (1985) ("Moreover, the legislative
purpose to create an effective remedy for the enforcement of federal civil rights is obstructed by uncertainty in the applicable statute of limitations, for scarce resources must
be dissipated by useless litigation on collateral matters.") (footnote omitted).
448 See supra note 121; see also text accompanying note 265 (manipulation of language
"in the cases where they apply" to avoid requirement to apply state laws).
449 But see supra note 440.
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reinterpreted full faith and credit statute, I have noted the paradox
that a regime of borrowed state preclusion law may prove more protective of federal substantive policies than federal preclusion law if
4 50
state and federal judges take their policing function seriously.
The paradox results from a tendency among federal judges, freed to
apply federal preclusion law, to turn, without thought, to preclusion
rules announced in a different substantive context or those fashioned in no substantive context. The Supreme Court has encouraged this phenomenon in its cases on mutuality4 5' and, more
generally, in its wholesale borrowings from the Restatement (Second) of
45 2
Judgments.
Apart from the problem of unthinking application of preclusion
law that is disembodied because it is trans-substantive, we have recently seen evidence of preclusion law that is just plain disembodied. 4 53 The paradox under the Court's interpretation of the full
faith and credit statute is that state law may protect both federal
substantive policies and federal substantive rights more effectively
than the rules that at least some Justices would apply if they were
free to apply "federal law."'4 54 A court's power to fashion or apply

uniform federal common law imports power to consider policies in
addition to those animating federal substantive law. This power is
not, however, a license to proceed in disregard of those policies or
of the effect of putative federal common law rules on substantive
rights.
Finally, the discussion of the exclusive jurisdiction cases has, to
this point, focused on cases like Marrese, involving the problem of
claim preclusion. When the problem is issue preclusion, a somewhat different analysis may be appropriate.
First, in some cases the question is whether an issue under state
law litigated and decided in state court should be given preclusive
effect so as to foreclose litigation of a federal claim within exclusive
federaljurisdiction. Here too, I believe, the full faith and credit statute plays no role, because the same problem of preclusion cannot
45 5
arise in subsequent proceedings in the courts of the state.
See supra text accompanying note 377.
See supra text accompanying notes 205-14.
See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154, 162, 164 n.I 1 (1979). See
also supra text accompanying note 358; note 420.
453 See supra text accompanying note 357.
454 See Burbank, supra note 92, at 664-65.
455 On this view, the Kremer Court should have decided whether title VII vests exclu450
451
452

sive jurisdiction in the federal courts before addressing the preclusion problem. See
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 479 n.20; see also supra text accompanying note 429.

There are distinctions among cases involving the general problem treated in the
text that may bear on the preclusion question. See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra
note 5, § 4470, at 681-85. They do not, however, affect the analysis concerning the
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Whether or not that is the case, in the choice, under traditional federal common law analysis, between uniform federal preclusion rules
and federal law-in-reserve, I believe that the balance lies again with
the former. Thus, for example, there not only is, but there can be,
no state law on the question whether the issue is the same, and the
answer to that question will inevitably involve interpretation of federal law. 45 6 The game is not worth the candle, particularly for litigants. Those prematurely mourning the death of federalism may
45 7
find consolation in the homogeneity of modem preclusion law.

And, again, uniform federal preclusion law should not be equated
with trans-substantive federal preclusion law or with a rule of no
preclusion.
Second, as we have seen, in some cases an issue under federal
law integral to a claim within exclusive federal jurisdiction, is incidentally and permissibly adjudicated in state court. 458 In this context, the full faith and credit statute may apply.4 5 9 But under the
reinterpreted full faith and credit statute, one must still consider
whether state law is displaced, in whole or part, by federal law.
Here, it is more difficult to predict problems as a result of a regime
of borrowed state law than it is when state courts cannot speak to
the question. It is also more difficult to suggest in advance what the
congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction implies for the source
of preclusion law. 4 60 Decision should thus await a particularistic
source of preclusion law under the reinterpreted full faith and credit statute. The same is
true with respect to issues of historical fact as opposed to findings applying law to fact.
See id. at 680-81.
456 Cf supra text accompanying notes 434-40 (claim preclusion). I am, of course,
assuming-I hope not unreasonably-that this would be a requirement of any jurisdiction's law of issue preclusion.
As Professor Cooper has pointed out, in an analysis directed to the content rather
than the source of preclusion rules in this context: "Independent redetermination of
issues of law application . . . may be the only sure guarantee that the standards of federal and state law are in fact identical." 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5,
§ 4470, at 683.
457
More to the point, they should heed Justice Blackmun's caution: "We must
avoid the temptation to let 'federalism' become the Natural Law of the 1980's, a brooding omnipresence to which duly enacted statutes are made to pay homage." Blackmun,
Section 1983 and FederalProtection of Individuals Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade
Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23 (1985).
458
See supra text accompanying notes 378-80.
,459 The statute would apply where the preclusion problem is presented in a case
filed in federal court that could have been filed in state court. It would not apply in an
action that could be filed only in federal court.
There remains the possibility that the statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction on
the federal courts may be found expressly or impliedly to repeal the full faith and credit
statute. See supra text accompanying notes 400-09; note 442.
460
"The basic inconsistency is between the statute makingjurisdiction over antitrust
claims exclusively federal and the decision that state courts may decide antitrust defenses." Currie, supra note 331, at 347. Professor Currie was, however, concerned with
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analysis of the federal statute. The inquiry, however, should not be
confined to evidence of Congress's specific intention with respect to
preclusion. One should also ask whether the statute implicitly and
plausibly calls for uniform federal preclusion rules. If not, state preclusion law applies except when it is hostile to or inconsistent with
particular federal substantive policies or where state law would have
46
the effect of nullifying federal substantive rights. '
CONCLUSION

This is a long article about an exquisitely difficult subject. In
part, its length has been determined by a felt need, in suggesting a
general approach to problems of interjurisdictional preclusion, to
confront the analysis of component parts by courts and commentators who have not seen the problems whole. I also thought it important to support my interpretation of the full faith and credit statute
rather fully as a prelude to the application of federal common law
analysis in the state-federal configuration.
I expect that every reader of this Article will find something,
perhaps many things, with which to disagree. I hope, however, that
most readers will agree with the following propositions about federal judgments: (1) The full faith and credit statute does not apply
to federal judgments, and even if it did, that statute would not direct
the application of the law of the rendering system, i.e., federal law.
(2) Whatever the federal source of the obligation to respect a federaljudgment, it neither inexorably nor obviously requires that federal preclusion law govern all questions concerning the scope and
effects of that judgment. (3) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
cannot validly provide preclusion rules for federal judgments. (4)
Absent federal preclusion law provided by the Constitution, federal
statutes, or Federal Rules, the only putative federal rules are rules of
federal common law. (5) A substantial body of Supreme Court precedent addresses the circumstances in which federal common law
can be validly created or applied, and there is no obvious reason
why the mode of analysis emerging from that body of precedent is
results rather than the law that should determine them. See supra note 428; see also 18
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4470, at 678 & n. 11.

461

This is another situation in which the preclusion rules applied in state and fed-

eral court may differ. In that event, the result would be attributable to an anomaly simi-

lar to that presented by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See supra text accompanying notes 398-99;
notes 409 & 460. Thus, in a subsequent contract action brought in state court, policies
animating the patent laws might require a rule of nonmutuality. See supra text accompanying notes 378-80. In such an action brought in federal court, those policies might

have to yield to policies informing the grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction. See 18
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4470, at 684-85. In both cases, however, the

preclusion law applied would have a federal source.
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unsuited to the preclusion context where federal judgments are involved, whether the judgments concern federal or state law questions. (6) When a federal court sitting in diversity adjudicates rights
under state law, there is another body of Supreme Court precedent
that cannot fairly be ignored in the preclusion context. (7) Unless
one explicitly repudiates either or both of the bodies of precedent
referred to in (5) and (6) above, it is worth the effort to try to integrate them.
I also hope that most readers will agree with the following propositions about statejudgments: (8) The full faith and credit statute
does not choose the domestic preclusion law of the rendering state;
rather, it requires the application in interjurisdictional cases of the
law that the courts of the rendering state would apply. (9) The law
thus applied may be domestic state law, the law of another state, or
federal law. (10) Unless provided directly by the Constitution or a
federal statute, the federal law displacing state law in state courts is
federal common law. (11) State court judgments in cases of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction are, according to federal common
law analysis, usually governed by (borrowed) state preclusion law.
(12) In such cases, however, state preclusion law must yield to federal preclusion law domestically when its application would be hostile to or inconsistent with particular federal policies, and the full
faith and credit statute makes the domestic solution the national solution. (13) State preclusion law must also yield to federal preclusion law when the application of state law, viewed as a whole, would
be hostile to or inconsistent with a scheme of federal substantive
rights. (14) The full faith and credit statute usually plays no role in
determining the preclusive effects of state court judgments on
claims within exclusive federal jurisdiction. (15) In most cases
within exclusive federal jurisdiction, the preclusion law applied will
be uniform federal law. (16) "Uniform federal law" does not necessarily mean trans-substantive federal law, and a court must test
trans-substantive federal preclusion rules for consistency with federal statutory policies and with the scheme of rights provided by
federal substantive law.
In stating these propositions, I have omitted some others for
which I have argued but which are probably more controversial.
Thus, I believe that the Rules of Decision Act speaks directly to the
circumstances in which federal courts can fashion or apply federal
common law. I also believe that consideration of the role of federal
law in state court cases both helps to explain why that phenomenon
has been treated as discrete and suggests problems with traditional
federal common law analysis even in its conventional applications,
problems that a Rules of Decision Act approach obviates. But this is

1986]

INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRECLUSION

not primarily an article about the Rules of Decision Act, and I am
concerned lest readers who disagree with me on that proposition
fail to address my basic propositions concerning federal preclusion
law.
I also believe that, in section 1983 actions brought in federal
court, there should be no need to resort to state preclusion law. In
my view, the strong preference for a federal forum evinced by the
Congress that passed the predecessor of section 1983 is irreconcilably in conflict with the reinterpreted full faith and credit statute,
which assumes and uses as a referent subsequent litigation in state
court. In such cases the federal courts should look directly to federal preclusion law, shaped in response to the requirements of the
substantive scheme. I recognize, however, that the legislative history of section 1983 is variously interpreted. In any event, correct
interpretation of the full faith and credit statute suggests other
means to achieve more effective protection of substantive rights
under section 1983 than that provided by the Court's essentially incoherent decisions treating the issues.
Apart from propositions that I do not regard as basic to this
Article, I acknowledge that I have been relatively and uncharacteristically agnostic on a subject that has sharply divided scholars, to wit,
the dilemma that should properly be thought to confront federal
courts adjudicating questions of state law in diversity actions. Given
my readiness to criticize the Court on other matters, my failure to
criticize its post-Erie cases and insistence that lower federal courts
and commentators take those cases seriously in the preclusion context, may be thought to signal agreement with them. In my defense,
I can only reiterate that, from the perspective of federal common
law, the Court's post-Erie cases are not the only barrier to the
across-the-board application of uniform federal preclusion rules to
federal diversity judgments adjudicating state law questions.
Finally, I hope that my analysis of problems created by the application of trans-substantive preclusion rules will contribute to the
reconsideration of some of the basic assumptions of modern procedural systems. Elsewhere, for instance, I have suggested "that Congress too rarely adverts to the possible need for specialized
procedure-as opposed to the trans-substantive procedure of Federal Rules-when it enacts legislation. ' 4 6 2 I have also suggested
that "in considering proposed legislation, Congress should require
a Procedural Impact Statement, the purpose of which would be to
ensure that existing federal procedure adequately will serve a bill's
462
Rules EnablingAct of 1985: Hearingon H.R. 2633 and H.R. 3550 Before the Subcomnm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (footnote omitted).
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substantive policies. ' 463 Those responsible for federal procedure
now recognize a problem in the use of trans-substantive rules of
procedure, 4 64 although their perspective on that problem differs
from that of a legislator. Moreover, they have yet to do more than
tinker with the existing system in this aspect. One need not believe
that the label "procedure" is usefully applied to preclusion law to
believe that it is time to stop tinkering with federal procedure and to
rethink it.465

Id. at 21 n.12.
See, e.g., Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A.J. 1468 (1981).
I have no thought of discussing with you this morning any particular
rules, practices, procedures or rules of evidence. On the contrary, what I
submit to you is whether it is enough to confine our studies and inquiries
into refinement of our processes, when perhaps what we really need to do
is take a fresh look at the entire structure we have created to resolve
disputes.
Warren E. Burger, ChiefJustice of the United States, remarks at the American Law Institute, Washington, D.C. 2 (May 14, 1985) (copy on file at the Cornell Law Review).
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